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Terms of Reference 
 
That you prepare a paper which provides background information and considers 
policy issues in regard to: 
 
1. The issues involved in: 
 
• the appointment of retired judicial officers, as either acting, temporary, part-
time or reserve judges 
• the renewal of such appointments 
• the allocation of these judges to cases. 
 
2. Whether there should be a maximum age at which a judicial officer could act as 
an acting, temporary, part-time or reserve judge. 
 
3. Whether the qualification for such an appointment should be restricted to former 
judicial officers and, if not, the qualification for such an appointment by a person 
who is not a retired judicial officer and the conditions upon which those 
appointments are made. 
 
4. A full consideration of the policy implications of having a common retirement age 
for judicial officers across jurisdictions and levels of courts, in particular how a 
common retirement age would impact upon the use and availability of acting 
judges. 
 
The project does not encompass the appointment of tenured judges who sit part-time, 
including job sharing by permanent judicial officers. 
 
 




The appointment of Temporary Judicial Officers can arouse strong opinions. In 2016, 
the appointment of such officers to the South Australian Supreme Court attracted 
negative commentary.1  In Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 
Kirby J, when considering whether New South Wales legislative provisions allowing 
the appointment of Temporary Judicial Officers were constitutional, asserted that the 
‘time has come … to draw a line and forbid the practice’.2 At the same time such 
appointments can assist the courts, and hence serve the public interest, in significant 
ways. They allow for the appropriate management of conflicts of interest, strengthen 
a bench that is depleted due to temporary illness or unavailability, and may provide 
a cost effective way to manage short-term workload pressures. This Report, 
commissioned by the Judicial Conference of Australia (‘JCA’) in May 2016, on the use 
of Temporary Judicial Officers in Australian courts examines the challenges and the 
advantages of the use of temporary judicial officers. The Terms of Reference 
accompanying the commission are stated on page iv. 
 
The Terms of Reference identify the subject of this Report as ‘either acting, temporary, 
part-time or reserve judges’. The extent to which part-time judges are to be discussed 
in the Report is, however, qualified by the exclusion stated at the end of the Terms of 
Reference. As we point out at the commencement of Part 2, the four alternative names 
used in the Terms of Reference are not exhaustive. After identifying all relevant 
descriptors across Australian court systems, we adopt the expression ‘Temporary 
Judicial Officers’ throughout this Report as a generic reference for these positions. 
As no such appointments are able to be made in respect of the federal judiciary due 
to the strict constitutional separation of judicial power that exists under the 
Commonwealth Constitution, this Report is almost exclusively concerned with the 
state and territory judicial systems. However, some discussion of the federal judiciary 
is relevant to the topic of a common retirement age in point 4 of the Terms of 
Reference. 
 
The request that we provide ‘background information’ on the use of Temporary 
Judicial Officers was one that we interpreted to require more than the comprehensive 
audit of existing statutory regulation, which is presented thematically in Part 2 (with 
an overview of that information provided in tabular form in Schedule 1). Accordingly, 
we initiated a data-driven study of the phenomenon of Temporary Judicial Officers 
as a matter of practice. We are grateful to the JCA for its support for this empirical 
aspect of the project and its assistance in seeking relevant information from state 
and territory courts. We also thank the Heads of Jurisdiction and the court staff 
involved in responding to the requests for information. The material gathered, 
supplemented from court Annual Reports as necessary, is presented in Part 4 of this 
Report, which commences with a full description of the methodology involved in data 
collection and analysis. The data on the utilisation of Temporary Judicial Officers is 
the first of its kind in Australia, and adds significantly to any assessment of this 
practice. 
 
Point 1 of the Terms of Reference required us to consider a range of issues arising 
from the appointment, renewal, case allocation and retirement of Temporary Judicial 
Officers. Point 3 drew attention to the potential (at least in some jurisdictions) for the 
appointment as Temporary Judicial Officers of persons who have not formerly held 
judicial office. In the interests of both clarity and comprehensiveness, we included 
such persons in our discussion of the issues highlighted at Point 1 of the Terms of 
                                           
1 Sean Fewster, ‘Judge Barry Beazley publicly named as new Acting Supreme Court 
Justice after having already refused the position’, The Advertiser, 1 April 2016. 
2 Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45, 94 [125]. 
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Reference, rather than limiting this to the ‘retired judicial officers’ expressly referred 
to there. In so doing, we were better able to respond to the question asked in Point 3.  
 
Points 2 and 4 concerned the use of age limits to judicial service. Point 2 focussed on 
a maximum age for service as a Temporary Judicial Officer. Point 4 required a much 
broader discussion about the policy implications of a common retirement age for 
judicial service generally, but noting the impact of such a development on the use 
and availability of Temporary Judicial Officers. Discussion of these issues was 
assisted by other recent empirical research that we have carried out independently 
of this commission. In the first half of 2016, we sent a survey to judicial officers in 
many Australian courts asking for their responses to a range of questions. Amongst 
these, respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed both that 
the ‘use of acting judicial officers’ was a ‘challenge confronting the judiciary’ and that 
‘post-retirement age limits on the use of acting judicial officers are appropriate’. 
Additionally, respondents’ views were also sought on the use of a mandatory 
retirement age for Permanent Judicial Officers and the appropriateness of requesting 
judicial officers to undergo capacity checks. The quantitative and qualitative data 
resulting from these survey questions is referred to in relevant parts of this Report 
and is also presented in summary form in Schedule 2. 
 
The Report’s response to the Terms of Reference draws not only on the statutory and 
empirical research already mentioned, but also incorporates a thorough literature 
review of primary and secondary sources. This was especially important in the 
identification of the various justifications and concerns around the use of Temporary 
Judicial Officers, which we set forth in Part 3. With the benefit of the data on use of 
Temporary Judicial Officers in practice that is presented in Part 4, those concerns 
are organised in three broad areas over the course of Part 5: appointment and judicial 
independence; performance and remuneration; and termination and pension. The 
Report concludes with a discussion in Part 6 on the topic of a common retirement 
age for judicial officers across jurisdictions and levels of courts. 
 
Schedule 3 of the Report provides a succinct comparative perspective on the issue of 
Temporary Judicial Officers by short country reports on arrangements in New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. Although necessarily brief, the 
comparative material assists to put the inconsistencies and concerns arising from 
the Australian jurisdictions into perspective. 
 
What emerges very clearly from the Report is that the arrangements for the use of 
Temporary Judicial Officers across Australia are highly varied. While that may not be 
regarded as problematic in itself, the fact that there appears to be so little principled 
consideration underpinning the different arrangements relating to the appointment, 
conditions, remuneration and termination suggests at least a need for greater 
knowledge of cross-jurisdictional practices. This may lead to more principled, efficient 
and effective use of Temporary Judicial Officers across Australian Court systems. 
There is also an important benefit in greater transparency in court reporting about 
their reliance on Temporary Judicial Officers so that the significance of their 
contribution to the administration of justice may be properly assessed. In this regard, 
it is noteworthy that the data analysed in Part 4 goes a considerable way to allaying 
frequently expressed concerns about the contemporary practice of such 
appointments in Australia. 
 
We gratefully acknowledge the excellent research assistance of Mr Harry Hobbs in 
our preparation of this Report. We also thank Tanya Wade for her data analysis of 
the material found in Schedule 2. 
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Writing with the majority, Justice Heydon’s decision in Forge v Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission as to whether Chapter III of the Constitution 
contemplates acting judicial appointments in state courts was heavily informed by 
the extensive history of appointing acting judges in the Australian colonies since 
before federation.3 He explained that it was Edmund Barton who, as New South Wales 
Attorney-General, extended the use of acting judicial appointments under the Judicial 
Offices Act 1892; both Barton and Richard O’Connor served as acting judges of the 
New South Wales Supreme Court.4 All of the other colonies had similar, and often 
colourful, pre-federation experience with the appointment of acting judicial officers.5  
Today, the statutory regulation of Temporary Judicial Officers across Australia is 
diverse, with variances horizontally across the states and territories and vertically 
between courts within a jurisdiction. Victoria is the only jurisdiction with a consistent 
approach to regulation, applying the same clear legislative rules for all Temporary 
Judicial Officers across all court levels with respect to appointment; eligibility; terms 
of office; renewal; mandatory retirement age; salary and entitlements; outside work; 
and security of tenure. As the following thematic overview illustrates, no other 
jurisdiction has a similar comprehensive regime.  
 
Before exploring the statutory regime, however, it is necessary to define our 
terminology. In referring to Temporary Judicial Officers we mean judicial officers, 
whether judges or magistrates, appointed temporarily for a finite period (often not 
exceeding 12 months, but in some jurisdictions up to five years). This distinguishes 
them from Permanent Judicial Officers: judicial officers appointed for an unlimited 
term until the age of mandatory retirement. The terminology to describe Temporary 
Judicial Officers differs across Australia: a review of the statutes indicates that they 
may be called ‘acting’,6 ‘auxiliary’,7 ‘reserve’,8 ‘temporary’,9 or ‘special’10 judicial 
officers. Throughout this Report, all such positions are referred to as ‘Temporary 
Judicial Officers’, with the exception where a distinction is drawn between the 
conditions of appointment of different types of Temporary Judicial Officers. For 
                                           
3 Forge v ASIC (2006) 228 CLR 45, 149-150 [277]. 
4 Forge v ASIC (2006) 228 CLR 45, 141-143 [256]. 
5 Forge v ASIC (2006) 228 CLR 45, 141-143 [256]-[267]. See Supreme Court and Circuit 
Courts Act 1900 (NSW), s 13; Supreme Court Act 1890 (Vic), s 14; Acting Judges Act 1873 
(Q), s 1; Supreme Court Act 1855 -56 (SA), s 5; Supreme Court Act 1880 (WA), s 12; 
Australian Courts Act 1828 (Imp) (9 Geo IV c 83), s 1. See further Forge v ASIC (2006) 
228 CLR 45, 95 [127] (Kirby J). 
6 See: Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) ss 37(1); 111 (for acting Associate Judges); Local 
Court Act 2007 (NSW) s 16(1); District Court Act 1973 (NSW) s 18(1); Supreme Court of 
Queensland Act 1991 (Qld) s 16(1); Magistrates Act 1991 (Qld) ss 6(1) and (1A); District 
Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) s 17(1)(a)-(c); Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) s 11; 
District Court of Western Australia Act 1969 (WA) s 18; Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA) 
sch 1 cl 9; Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 11; Magistrates Court Act 1983 (SA) s 5(3); 
Supreme Court Act 1887 (Tas) s 3(1); Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 4B(1); Magistrates 
Court Act 1930 (ACT) s 7 and Legislation Act 2001 (ACT) Part 19.3, Division 19.3.2; 
Supreme Court Act (NT) s 32(2); Local Court Act (NT) s 60(1).  
7 See: Supreme Court Act 1970 (WA) s 11AA; District Court of Western Australia Act 1969 
(WA) s 18A; Judicial Administration (Auxiliary Appointments and Powers) Act 1988 (SA) 
s 3. 
8 See: Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) s 81; Magistrates Court Act 1989 (Vic) s 9A; County Court 
Act 1958 (Vic) ss 12. For reserve associate judges see Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 
105B(1) and County Court Act 1958 (Vic) 17KA. 
9 See: Magistrates Court Act 1987 (Tas) s 4(4). 
10 See: Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) s 8. 
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example, in the Western Australian Supreme and District Courts, a distinction is 
drawn between Acting and Auxiliary Judicial Officers. Similarly, South Australia 
permits the appointment of acting judges and magistrates as well as auxiliary judicial 





Appointing authority: As with Permanent Judicial Officers, in almost all 
jurisdictions, the appointment of Temporary Judicial Officers is by the executive: it 
is formally made by either the Governor, the Governor in Council or Administrator of 
the jurisdiction. In the ACT where no such position exists, appointment is simply 
made by the executive.12 In the ACT, where provision is made for temporary judicial 
appointments under judicial exchange arrangements, the appointment is made by 
the Head of Jurisdiction.13 The appointment of a Temporary Judicial Officer to the 
Northern Territory Local Court may be made by the Administrator or the Minister,14 
which is in contrast to the fact that appointment of a Permanent Judicial Officer to 
that Court may only be made by the Administrator.15 In Victoria the appointment of 
a Temporary Judicial Officer is a two-stage affair. First, he or she must be ‘appointed’ 
as a reserve judge or magistrate by the Governor in Council,16 and then he or she 
must be ‘engaged’ by the Head of Jurisdiction.17 
 
Consultation: By convention, state Governors and the Northern Territory 
Administrators act on the advice of the relevant Minister, who would act in 
accordance with the decision of Cabinet and may also have, in practice, consulted 
the Head of Jurisdiction of the relevant court, as well as other professional bodies, 
such as the relevant bar association and the law society. In Queensland the statute 
compels consultation. The appointment of Temporary Judicial Officers to the 
Magistrates Court is made by the Governor in Council after consultation between the 
relevant Minister and the Chief Magistrate;18 for temporary appointments to the 
District Court, the relevant Minister must consult with the Chief Judge only if the 
candidate is a retired District Court Judge and in other cases the Governor in Council 
may appoint a Temporary Judicial Officer to the District Court without 
consultation;19 finally, in the Supreme Court, the Minister must consult the Chief 
Justice before making a temporary appointment, or such appointment must be made 
at the Chief Justice’s request,20 except where the appointment is of a person who is 
or has been a judge of another state or territory or the Federal Court.21 In South 
Australia the appointment of auxiliary judicial officers to all courts requires a more 
decisive involvement of the Chief Justice, whose concurrence in the appointment is 
                                           
11  Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 11; Magistrates Court Act 1983 (SA) s 5; District Court Act 
1991 (SA) s 12; Judicial Administration (Auxiliary Appointments and Powers) Act 1988 
(SA) s 3. 
12 Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 4B(1); Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) ss 7 and 8. 
13  Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) s 9E(2); Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 69C(2). 
14 Local Court Act (NT) s 60(1). 
15 Local Court Act (NT) s 53(1). 
16  Magistrates’ Court 1989 (Vic) s 9A; County Court Act 1958 (Vic) 12(1); Constitution Act 
1975 (Vic) s 81(1). For reserve associate judges see County Court Act 1958 (Vic) s 17KA 
and Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 105B. 
17  Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (Vic) s 9C; County Court Act 1958 (Vic) 12B; Constitution Act 
1975 (Vic) s 81B. For Reserve Associate Judges see County Court Act 1958 (Vic) s 17KC 
and Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 105D. 
18 Magistrates Act 1991 (Qld), s 6(1A). 
19 District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) s 17(1)-(4). 
20  Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 (Qld) s 6(1), (2) and (5). 
21  Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 (Qld) s 6(3). 
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necessary.22 However for acting judicial officers there is no requirement of 
concurrence, or even consultation with the Chief Justice or any other head of 
jurisdiction.23 There is an explicit statutory requirement for the Attorney-General’s 
recommendation for appointment of an acting magistrate,24 but not for appointment 
to the Supreme or District Courts.25 In the ACT, for temporary judicial appointments 
under judicial exchange arrangements, the Head of Jurisdiction must act with the 
agreement of the exchanging Head of Jurisdiction.26 
 
Justification: The statutory provisions permitting the appointment of Temporary 
Judicial Officers do not always explicitly refer to the justification for doing so. In 
Victoria, the Governor may appoint as many Temporary Judicial Officers ‘as 
necessary’ ‘for transacting the business of the Court’.27 In Queensland, Western 
Australia, South Australia and Tasmania, various formulations for justifications of 
appointment are found in the statute. These include references to situations of ‘a 
temporary nature’ ‘in which it is necessary or desirable, in the public interest’,28 or 
‘as the Governor thinks necessary for the proper administration of justice’,29 where a 
Judicial Officer is or is expected to be absent30 or is otherwise unable to perform their 
role,31 and also when the proper conduct of the business of the Court,32 or the 
interests of the administration of justice,33 requires an additional appointment. In 
Queensland, different justifications give rise to different eligibility criteria and term 




Across the jurisdictions, eligibility for appointment as a Temporary Judicial Officer 
generally follows similar criteria as appointment for a Permanent Judicial Officer. 
Section 37 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) serves as an appropriate example:  
 
37(2) In subsection (1) qualified person means any of the following persons: 
(a) a person qualified for appointment as a Judge of the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales, 
(b) a person who is or has been a judge of the Federal Court of Australia, 
(c) a person who is or has been a judge of the Supreme Court of another State or 
Territory.34 
                                           
22 Judicial Administration (Auxiliary Appointments and Powers) Act 1988 (SA) s 3(1). 
23  Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 11; Magistrates Court Act 1983 (SA) s 5; District Court Act 
1991 (SA) s 12. 
24 Magistrates Act 1983 (SA) s 5(1)-(3). 
25  Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 11(1); District Court Act 1991 (SA) s 12(1). 
26  Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) s 9E(2); Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 69C(2). 
27 Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) s 81(1); County Court Act 1958 (Vic) s 12(1); Magistrates Court 
Act 1989 (Vic) s 9A(1). For Reserve Associate Judges see County Court Act 1958 (Vic) 
17KA(1) and Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 105B(1). 
28 Supreme Court Act 1887 (Tas) s 3(1). 
29  Magistrates Court Act 1983 (SA) s 5(1). 
30 Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) s 11(1). 
31 Supreme Court Act 1991 (Qld) s 6(1). 
32 District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) s 17(1); District Court of Western Australia 
Act 1969 (WA) s 18A(1). 
33 Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 11(1). 
34 Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 37(2). See further Local Court Act 2007 (NSW) s 16(1); 
District Court Act 1973 (NSW) s 18(1)-(2); Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 105B(2)(b)(i)-
(iii); County Court Act 1958 (Vic) s 12(b)(i)-(ii); Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (Vic) s 
9A(2)(b)(i)-(ii); Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 (Qld) s 6(3); Magistrates Act 1991 
(Qld) s 6(1); District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) s 17(1)-(3); Supreme Court Act 
1935 (WA) s 11AA(1)(a)-(b), see also s 11(1)-(2); Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA) 
Schedule 1, cl 9(2); District Court of Western Australia Act 1969 (WA) s 18A(1); Supreme 
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In this subsection, paragraphs (b) and (c) echo the requirement in s 26 of the Act that 
a person is qualified for appointment as a Permanent Judicial Officer of the Supreme 
Court if the person ‘holds or has held a judicial office of this State or of the 
Commonwealth, another State or a Territory’. However, s 37(2)(a) also contemplates 
the appointment of Temporary Judicial Officers who are not current or former judicial 
officers, namely, a person who ‘is an Australian lawyer of at least 7 years’ standing’, 
since such persons are also qualified for permanent appointment under s 26. 
 
Most jurisdictions include a mandatory retirement age for temporary appointments 
(see full discussion in Part 2.6). This should be read as part of the eligibility 
requirements and in some jurisdictions, this connection is explicit. For instance, in 
the Northern Territory Local Court Act, s 60(3)(a) states ‘A person is eligible to be 
appointed if the person is under 75 years of age.’35 Another example comes from New 
South Wales, where s 37(4) and (4A) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 provide that a 
retired judge may be appointed, even though the judge has reached the age of 72 
years (for former NSW judges) or 70 (for former judges of other courts), but that the 
Temporary Judicial Officer ‘may not be so appointed for any period that extends 
beyond the day on which he or she reaches the age of 77 years’.36 
 
Some jurisdictions expressly state that persons who are ineligible for permanent 
appointment on the basis of attaining the compulsory retirement age are nonetheless 
eligible for appointment as Temporary Judicial Officers. Section 37(4) and (4A) of the 
Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) provide an example of this. Another instance is found 
in s 11AA of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), which provides: 
 
11AA Auxiliary judges 
(1) When for any reason the conduct of the business of the Court requires, in the 
opinion of the Governor, the appointment of an auxiliary judge, the Governor 
may by commission under the Public Seal of the State appoint a person — 
(a) who would, but for the fact that he or she has attained the age referred to 
in section 3 of the Judges’ Retirement Act 1937 [70 years], be qualified to 
be appointed a judge or an acting judge; or 
(b) who is a retired judge or a retired District Court judge but has not yet 
attained that age, 
to be an auxiliary judge for such period not exceeding 12 months as is specified 
in that commission.37 
 
                                           
Court Act 1935 (SA) s 11(1)-(1a); District Court Act 1991 (SA) s 12(3); Judicial 
Administration (Auxiliary Appointments and Powers) Act 1988 (SA) s 3(2)(a); Supreme 
Court Act 1887 (Tas) s 3(1)-(1A); Magistrates Court Act 1987 (Tas) s 4(4)-(4A); Supreme 
Court Act (NT) s 32(2); Local Court Act (NT) s 60(3). 
35  No such eligibility criterion applies to the Northern Territory Supreme Court. 
36 Similar provisions exist in: Local Court Act 2007 (NSW) s 16(2); District Court Act 1973 
(NSW) s 18(4)-(4B); Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 111(6) for Acting Associate Judges; 
Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) s 81(2)(a); County Court Act 1958 (Vic) s 12(2)(a); Magistrates’ 
Court Act 1989 (Vic) s 9A(2)(a); Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 105B(2)(a) and County 
Court Act 1958 (Vic) 17KA(2)(a) for Reserve Associate Judges; Supreme Court of 
Queensland Act 1991 (Qld) s 6(6); District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) s 17(5); 
Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA) s 9(3)(a); Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) s 8A(2) (for 
Special Magistrates) and for acting appointments under a judicial exchange, see 
Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) s 9E(5); Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 69C(5) 
37 See also District Court of Western Australia Act 1969 (WA) s 18A(1); Judicial 
Administration (Auxiliary Appointments and Powers) Act 1988 (SA) s 3(2); Supreme Court 
Act 1935 (SA) s 11(1a); Magistrates Court Act 1983 (SA) s 5(3a); District Court Act 1991 
(SA) s 12(3). 
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Victoria is the only jurisdiction that restricts eligibility of Temporary Judicial Officers 
to former Judicial Officers. For each level of court in the Victorian hierarchy, a person 
is only eligible to serve as a Temporary Judicial Officer if he or she is or has been a 
judicial officer of that court either in Victoria or its equivalent elsewhere in 
Australia.38 In South Australia, s 5(3a) of the Magistrates Act 1983 (SA) provides that 
a former magistrate who has retired from office is eligible for appointment as an acting 
magistrate. This is a similar eligibility standard for acting appointments to the South 
Australian Supreme and District Courts.39 The Judicial Administration (Auxiliary 
Appointments and Powers) Act 1988 (SA) also indicates persons are eligible for 
appointment as an auxiliary judicial officer if they are eligible for appointment as a 
Permanent Judicial Officer, or ineligible for the latter only on the basis of having 
attained compulsory retirement age.40  
 
Some jurisdictions establish more generous eligibility requirements for Temporary 
Judicial Officers than permanent appointments. In Queensland, a clerk of the 
Magistrates Court may be appointed a Temporary Judicial Officer for that Court.41 In 
the ACT, an admitted lawyer of 5 years standing is eligible for temporary appointment 
to the Supreme Court;42 and acting appointments under a judicial exchange must 
meet no further eligibility criteria, but such an appointment cannot extend beyond 
the retirement age for that court.43 In the ACT Magistrates Court there appear to be 
two types of Temporary Judicial Officers. Magistrates may be appointed in an acting 
capacity,44 in which case the eligibility criteria are the same as for Magistrates.45 No 
eligibility requirements are set out in statute for temporary appointment as a Special 
Magistrate beyond the requirement that appointees must be younger than 70 years 
of age.46 Rather, s 8AA of the Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) provides: 
 
8AA Requirements of appointment—special magistrates 
(1) The Executive must, in relation to the appointment of special magistrates, 
determine— 
(a) the criteria that apply to the selection of a person for appointment; and 
(b) the process for selecting the person. 
(2) A determination is a notifiable instrument. 
 
The Magistrates Court (Special Magistrates Appointment Requirements) 
Determination 2015 (No 1),47 does not require a candidate to have served as a judicial 
officer or even to be admitted as a lawyer. The selection criteria require that a 
successful candidate have, inter alia: appropriate knowledge of the relevant law and 
its underlying principles; integrity and independence of mind; sound judgment; an 
ability to understand and deal fairly with all persons whatever their background; the 
ability to inspire respect and confidence, and to explain procedures and decisions 
reached clearly and succinctly; and the ability to work at speed and under pressure.  
 
 
                                           
38 Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) s 81(2)(b); County Court Act 1958 (Vic) s 12(2)(b); Magistrates 
Court Act 1989 (Vic) s 9A(2)(b). See also Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 105B(2) and 
County Court Act 1958 (Vic) s 17KA(2) for Reserve Associate Judges. 
39 Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 11(1a); District Court Act 1991 (SA) s 12(3).  
40 Judicial Administration (Auxiliary Appointments and Powers) Act 1988 (SA) s 3(2). 
41 Magistrates Act 1991 (Qld) s 6(1)(a). 
42 Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 4B(3). 
43  Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 69C(3) and (5). 
44  Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) s 7(2); Legislation Act 2001 (ACT) Part 19.3; Div 19.3.2. 
45  Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) ss 7AA(1) and 7A. 
46 Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) s 8A(2). 
47 Notifiable Instrument NI2015-579 (7 October 2015). 
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2.4 Duration of term 
 
Temporary Judicial Officers are appointed to serve only for a limited term. 
Nevertheless, there is a wide diversity among states and territories concerning the 
upper limit of their term of office. In only two jurisdictions (Victoria and South 
Australia) is the upper limit consistent across all Courts within the hierarchy. In New 
South Wales, terms of temporary appointment to the Local Court, District Court and 
Supreme Court are consistent, but there is no upper limit set for Acting Associate 
Judges.48 In two jurisdictions the professional history of the appointee (Queensland) 
or the method of appointment (Northern Territory) is relevant to ascertaining the term 
of office.  
 
At the upper end of the spectrum, Temporary Judicial Officers in New South Wales 
across all courts may serve ‘for a time not exceeding 5 years’.49. This textual 
formulation provides explicit statutory authority for the appointment of a Temporary 
Judicial Officer in New South Wales for a period shorter than 5 years. Indeed, the 
New South Wales Attorney-General, Ms Gabrielle Upton, made this point when 
introducing the Courts and Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2015 (NSW), which 
increased the upper term limit from 12 months to 5 years, stating that ‘[t]he provision 
still allows acting judges to be given shorter terms than five years’.50 The appointment 
of a Temporary Judicial Officer in Victoria ceases at ‘the end of 5 years from the date 
of his or her appointment’51, but within that appointment period they may have a 
series of engagements, each no longer than six months.52 
 
Acting and auxiliary judicial officers appointed to the Supreme, District and 
Magistrates Courts of South Australia, and Temporary Judicial Officers in the 
Northern Territory Supreme Court may serve for a period not exceeding 12 months.53 
In the ACT Supreme Court, a Temporary Judicial Officer may serve for a period not 
exceeding 12 months,54 unless the appointment is made under a judicial exchange 
arrangement, in which case the period must not exceed 6 months.55 No time limit is 
specified for appointment to the Queensland, Western Australian or the ACT 
Magistrates Courts;56 unless in the ACT the temporary appointment is made under a 
judicial exchange arrangement, in which case the period must not exceed 6 months.57 
No time limit is specified for appointment to any Court in Tasmania, where the term 
of office is, under the statute entirely at the discretion of the Governor.58 In the 
Tasmanian Supreme Court, the appointment is expressed to be made ‘until the 
                                           
48  Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 115(3). 
49 Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 37(1); Local Court Act 2007 (NSW) s 16(1); District Court 
Act 1973 (NSW) s 18(1). 
50 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 6 May 2015, 185 
(Gabrielle Upton, Attorney-General).  
51 Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) s 81A(1); Magistrates Court Act 1989 (Vic) s 9B(1); County 
Court Act 1958 (Vic) ss 12A(1). For Reserve Associate Judges see Supreme Court Act 1986 
(Vic) s 105C(1); County Court Act 1958 (Vic) 17KB(1). 
52  Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) s 81B(4); County Court Act 1958 (Vic) s 12B; Magistrates 
Court Act 1989 (Vic) s 9C. For Reserve Associate Judges see Supreme Court Act 1986 
(Vic) s 105D; County Court Act 1958 (Vic) 17KC. 
53 Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 11(1b); District Court Act 1991 (SA) s 12(3); Magistrates 
Act 1983 (SA) s 5(3); Judicial Administration (Auxiliary Appointments and Powers) Act 
1988 (SA) s 3(4); Supreme Court Act (NT) s 32(2). 
54  Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 4B(2). 
55  Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 69C(4). 
56 Magistrates Act 1991 (Qld) s 6(2); Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA) Schedule 1, cl 9(3); 
Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) s 7 and Legislation Act 2001 (ACT) Part 19.3; Division 
19.3.2; s 8A(1). 
57  Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) s 9E(4). 
58 Supreme Court Act 1887 (Tas) s 3(1); Magistrates Court Act 1987 (Tas) s 4(4). 
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happening of such event, or for such period’ as is specified in the instrument of 
appointment. A distinction arises in Western Australia between ‘auxiliary’ and ‘acting’ 
judicial officers. A 12-month limit applies to auxiliary judges appointed to the 
Western Australian District and Supreme Courts.59 By contrast, acting judicial 
officers in the District and Supreme Courts are appointed until their period of 
appointment expires, ‘for the period during which [a permanent] judge is absent from 
duty’, or until the Permanent Judicial Officer vacancy upon which their appointment 
is predicated is filled.60 This latter type of appointment is not subject to the 12-month 
cap that applies to auxiliary judicial officers.  
 
For appointment as a Temporary Judicial Officer to the Queensland Supreme and 
District Courts, the term of office varies according to the professional history of the 
candidate. A person qualified to be a Judge of the Supreme Court may be appointed 
as a Temporary Judicial Officer of that Court for a period of no longer than 6 months, 
although the reasons for this appointment are restricted.61 However, if that person is 
or has been a Judge in any court of another state or the Federal Court of Australia, 
he or she may serve for up to 1 year,62 and if he or she is a retired Judge of the 
Queensland Supreme Court he or she may be appointed for a 2 year period.63 Similar 
arrangements exist for the appointment of former judges to serve as Temporary 
Judicial Officers in the Queensland District Court, but curiously no time limit is 
stipulated for the appointment of a person who is qualified to be a judicial officer of 
the court, although the reasons for this appointment are restricted.64 It may be that 
the specific justifications cited in respect of such an appointment are to be 
understood as short-term ones, pertaining for less than one year. Under section 6(2) 
of the Magistrates Act 1991 (Qld), appointments may be ‘for a specified period or for 
a specified matter.’ 
 
The term of office for appointment to the Northern Territory Local Court is dependent 
on the method of appointment. If the Administrator has made the appointment, the 
Temporary Judicial Officer may serve for 12 months, but if the Minister has made 




No states or territories expressly preclude reappointment of Temporary Judicial 
Officers, although only five (Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia 
and the Northern Territory) provide unambiguous statutory authority permitting 
reappointment. Within these five jurisdictions, a number of distinctions emerge. As 
Victoria does not distinguish among courts in its judicial hierarchy, all Temporary 
Judicial Officers are eligible for reappointment.66 Likewise, in Western Australia and 
South Australia auxiliary judicial officers are permitted multiple reappointments, but 
                                           
59 District Court of Western Australia Act 1969 (WA) s 18A(1); Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) 
s 11AA(3). 
60 Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) s 11(1) and (2); District Court of Western Australia Act 1969 
(WA) s18(3). 
61 Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 (Qld) s 6(1) and (2). 
62 Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 (Qld) s 6(3). 
63 Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 (Qld) s 6(4). 
64 See District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) s 17(1)-(3). 
65 Local Court Act (NT) s 60(4)(a)-(b). 
66 Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) s 81(4); County Court Act 1958 (Vic) s 12(4); Magistrates Court 
Act 1989 (Vic) s 9A(4). For Reserve Associate Judges see Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 
105B(4); County Court Act 1958 (Vic) 17KA(4). 
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only for 12 months at a time.67 In Queensland, only Temporary Judicial Officers 
appointed to the Supreme or District Court are explicitly eligible for reappointment;68 
there is nothing addressing renewal as a Temporary Judicial Officer to the 
Magistrates Court. A Temporary Judicial Officer appointed to the Northern Territory 
Local Court may be reappointed, regardless of whether he or she was appointed by 
the Administrator or the Minister;69 no explicit provision is made for the Supreme 
Court. In the ACT, there is an implied reference to the possibility of renewal for acting 
appointments made under an exchange arrangement (the provisions state ‘an 
appointment under this section may be made on any one occasion’ for 6 months),70 
but otherwise the legislation is silent. 
 
2.6 Mandatory retirement age 
 
All jurisdictions establish a mandatory statutory retirement age for Permanent 
Judicial Officers (see Part 6 of this Report). However, not all jurisdictions explicitly 
set out a mandatory statutory retirement age for Temporary Judicial Officers. Those 
that do set retirement at different ages. As noted above, the relevant cap should be 
read as part of the eligibility criteria. 
 
In Victoria, all Temporary Judicial Officers cease to hold office upon attaining 78 
years of age.71 In Queensland, Temporary Judicial Officers serving on the Supreme 
or District Court, who are retired Queensland judges, cease to hold office upon 
attaining 78 years of age;72 otherwise, Temporary Judicial Officers on these courts 
appear to fall within the general provisions that require retirement at 70.73 Those on 
the Queensland Magistrates Court cease to hold office at 70 years of age.74 Temporary 
Judicial Officers on the Western Australian Magistrates Courts also cease to hold 
office at 70 years of age.75 In the Northern Territory a person may not serve as a 
Temporary Judicial Officer on the Local Court if he or she has reached 75 years of 
age.76 In the Northern Territory, Temporary Judicial Officers of the Supreme Court 
are explicitly exempted from the mandatory retirement age provisions applicable to 
Permanent Judicial Officers.77 In the ACT Supreme Court, Temporary Judicial 
Officers are not included the mandatory statutory age limits for Permanent Judicial 
Officers (70 years),78 except when appointed under a judicial exchange, in which case 
the appointment cannot extend beyond the retirement age of the Court.79 On the ACT 
Magistrates Court, Special Magistrates cease to hold office at the end of their specified 
term, or, if no term is set, 70 years of age.80 Acting Magistrates in the ACT appear to 
be subject to the ordinary retirement age of 65 years,81 and acting magistrates 
                                           
67 Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) s 11AA(3); District Court of Western Australia Act 1969 
(WA) s 18A(3); Judicial Administration (Auxiliary Appointments and Powers) Act 1988 (SA) 
s 3(4). 
68 Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 (Qld) s 6(7); District Court of Queensland Act 
1967 (Qld) s 17(6). 
69 Local Court Act (NT) s 60(5). 
70  Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 69C(4); Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) s 9E(4). 
71 Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) s 81A(1)(b); County Court Act 1958 (Vic) s 12A(1)(b); 
Magistrates Court Act 1989 (Vic) s 9B(1)(b). For Reserve Associate Judges see Supreme 
Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 105C(1)(b); County Court Act 1958 (Vic) s 17KB(1)(b). 
72  Supreme Court Act 1991 (Qld) s 6(6); District Court Act 1967 (Qld) s 17(5). 
73  Supreme Court Act 1991 (Qld) s 21; District Court Act 1967 (Qld) s 14. 
74 Magistrates Act 1991 (Qld) ss 4(1), 6(1), (5), 42. 
75 Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA) Schedule 1, cl 9(3). 
76 Local Court Act (NT) s 63(b). 
77  Supreme Court Act (NT) s 38. 
78  Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 4(3). 
79  Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 69C(5). 
80  Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) s 8A(1)(b), (2). 
81  Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) s s 7D(1). 
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appointed under an exchange arrangement cannot extend beyond the retirement age 
of the court.82 In Tasmania, the mandatory retirement provisions do not apply to 
Temporary Judicial Officers in the Magistrates Court,83 but in the Supreme Court, 
Temporary Judicial Officers appear to be caught by the general requirement for 
retirement at 72 years of age.84 
 
For all courts in New South Wales, the mandatory retirement age for Temporary 
Judicial Officers who are not former Judicial Officers is 72 years of age.85 Former 
Judicial Officers serving in a temporary capacity cease to hold office at 77 years of 
age.86 
 
The situation in Western Australia as it pertains to the Supreme Court and District 
Court is complex and differs between Auxiliary and Acting Judicial Officers. Under s 
11AA(1)(b) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), a retired Judicial Officer is eligible for 
appointment as an Auxiliary Judge on the court if he or she has not attained the 
compulsory retirement age for Permanent Judicial Officers,87 but the provision does 
not address whether the appointment of such a person ceases upon him or her 
reaching that age. However, under s 11AA(1)(a), a person is eligible for appointment 
as an Auxiliary Judicial Officer if he or she is qualified to be appointed in a permanent 
capacity but for the fact that he or she has already attained the age of compulsory 
retirement. In contrast, Acting Judicial Officers are included in the ambit of s 3 
Judges’ Retirement Act 1937 (WA), which provides for mandatory retirement at age 
70. The same distinctions between Auxiliary and Acting Judicial Officers exist in the 
District Court.88 
 
In South Australia there is no explicit statutory retirement age for Temporary Judicial 
Officers in any court, but the Judicial Administration (Auxiliary Appointments and 
Powers) Act 1988 (SA) indicates persons are eligible for appointment as an auxiliary 
judicial officer if they have attained compulsory retirement age, implying that the 
general age limits do not apply.89 Similarly, there appears to be no explicit restriction 
for acting judges in the Supreme and District Courts.90 In the Magistrates Court it is 
possible to construe the interaction between ss 3, 5(3) and 9(1) of the Magistrates Act 
1983 (SA) as requiring retirement of Temporary Judicial Officers at 70 years of age.  
 
2.7 Outside work 
 
Most jurisdictions do not explicitly state whether Temporary Judicial Officers may 
engage in work outside of their judicial duties. It is likely that the same rules that 
apply for Permanent Judicial Officers (full-time and part-time) apply to Temporary 
Judicial Officers (that is, generally, no outside work without permission of the 
Attorney-General), unless the individual commission expressly includes an exception 
                                           
82  Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) s 9E(5). 
83  Magistrates Court Act 1987 (Tas) s 8(3). 
84  Supreme Court Act 1887 (Tas) s 6A; although note Supreme Court Act 1959 (Tas) s 5(2) 
contemplates the appointment of an acting Associate Judge (a very limited role in that 
jurisdiction) beyond the age of 72 years. 
85  Judicial Officers Act 1986 (NSW) s 44; which applies to Temporary Judicial Officers 
through s 3(3A). 
86 Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 37(4)-(4A) and 111(6) (for Acting Associate Judges); 
Local Court Act 2007 (NSW) s 16(2); District Court Act 1973 (NSW) s 18(4)-(4B). 
87 Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) s 11AA(1)(b). 
88 See District Court of Western Australia Act 1969 (WA) ss 18 (Acting Judges) and 18A 
(Auxiliary Judges), together with s 16 of that Act and s 3 of the Judges’ Retirement Act 
1937 (WA). 
89  Judicial Administration (Auxiliary Appointments and Powers) Act 1988 (SA) s 3(1)(b). 
90  Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 11(1a); District Court Act 1991 (SA) s 12(3). 
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to this rule.91 For example, Queensland does not set out specific rules relating to 
Temporary Judicial Officers performing outside work. However, s 22 of the Supreme 
Court of Queensland Act 1991 (Qld) provides clear rules that all judicial officers must 
abide by:  
 
22 Accepting and holding other public offices 
(1) Subject to this section, a judge may accept and hold another public office. 
(2) A judge who accepts another public office— 
(a) must immediately notify the Attorney-General in writing; and 
(b) must immediately resign the other public office if the Governor in Council 
decides, after consultation between the Attorney-General and the Chief 
Justice, that the holding of that office, or the conditions on which it is held, 
would be inconsistent with the proper discharge of the office of a judge. 
(3) A judge may receive remuneration in relation to the acceptance or holding of 
another public office only with the approval of the Governor in Council.92 
 
Victoria is the only jurisdiction that establishes a clear statutory rule for all 
Temporary Judicial Officers seeking to engage in outside work. Temporary Judicial 
Officers in Victoria must obtain the approval of the Head of Jurisdiction before 
engaging in legal practice, undertaking paid employment or conducting a business, 
trade or profession of any kind, or holding office in an entity for which he or she 
receives remuneration.93  
 
Western Australia, South Australia, Tasmania, the Northern Territory and the ACT 
also provide specific rules concerning Temporary Judicial Officers ability to perform 
outside work. These rules do not apply uniformly to courts within the state or 
territory. For example, although Temporary Judicial Officers appointed to the 
Western Australian Magistrates Court may not perform other work unless permitted 
to do so by the Governor,94 there are no explicit rules applicable to temporary 
appointments to the Supreme or District Courts. A similar position exists in the 
Northern Territory, with explicit restrictions on the Local Court95 but no explicit rules 
applying to the Supreme Court. In contrast, although Temporary Judicial Officers 
appointed to the ACT Supreme Court may not engage in remunerative employment 
or hold another judicial office without the written approval of the executive in 
consultation with the Chief Justice,96 no explicit rule exists for Special Magistrates 
in the Magistrates Court, but acting Magistrates would appear to fall within a 
prohibition against outside work without the consent of the Attorney-General.97 In 
South Australia, part-time magistrates are unable to practice in the legal profession 
and any other outside work may only be undertaken with the ‘written approval of the 
Chief Justice given with the concurrence of the Chief Magistrate’.98 This applies to 
acting magistrates unless their instrument of appointment says otherwise.99 There 
are no explicit rules for Temporary Judicial Officers in the other South Australian 
                                           
91 For example, s 18A of the Magistrates Act 1983 (SA) states that the prohibition on a 
part-time magistrate performing legal or other work ‘does not apply to an acting 
magistrate to the extent specified in the magistrate’s instrument of appointment’. 
92  See also Magistrates Act 1991 (Qld) s 41; District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) s 
13. 
93 Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) ss 81E and 84; County Court Act 1958 (Vic) ss 12E, 13; 
Magistrates Court Act 1989 (Vic) s 9F. For Reserve Associate Judges see Supreme Court 
Act 1986 (Vic) s 105G; County Court Act 1958 (Vic) s 17KF. 
94 Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA) Schedule 1, cl 9(5). 
95  Local Court Act (NT) s 66. 
96 Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 16(2). 
97 Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) s 7G. 
98  Magistrates Act 1983 (SA) s 18A(4). 
99  Magistrates Act 1983 (SA) s 18A(7). 
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courts. In Tasmania, the provisions restricting outside work for magistrates are 




The salary paid to Temporary Judicial Officers is generally set at the same pro rata 
rate as Permanent Judicial Officers. There are however, some distinctions across 
jurisdictions depending on the particular court as to whether entitlements such as 
leave are included, and, in Queensland, depending on whether the Temporary 
Judicial Officer is a former Judicial Officer. 
 
Only Victoria and New South Wales make no distinction between courts within their 
judicial hierarchy and establish a clear and consistent rule aligning the salary and 
allowances of Temporary Judicial Officers to those of Permanent Judicial Officers. 
Temporary Judicial Officers throughout Victoria are entitled to receive the same 
salary and allowances of a Permanent Judicial Officer appointed to the respective 
court set under the Judicial Entitlements Act 2015 (Vic).101 The same is true in New 
South Wales.102 
 
In distinction to the approach in Victoria and New South Wales, other jurisdictions 
adopt different rules depending on the particular court. Until late 2016, Temporary 
Judicial Officers appointed to the Tasmanian Supreme Court received the same 
salary as the equivalent full time position, but there is now capacity for the 
appointment of part-time Temporary Judicial Officers who are paid a daily rate or for 
part of a day.103 Individuals temporarily appointed to the ACT Supreme Court are 
granted the same entitlements as permanent judges, ‘other than in relation to leave 
or pension’.104 Acting appointments to either the ACT Supreme or Magistrates Courts 
made under a judicial exchange arrangement are not entitled to receive 
remuneration.105 Western Australian auxiliary judges are entitled to the same salary 
as the equivalent Permanent Judicial Officer, but if the auxiliary judge is receiving a 
pension they are only entitled to ‘the difference between the rate of that pension and 
the rate of the annual salary payable’ (see further discussion of similar arrangements 
in other jurisdictions in Part 2.9, below).106 The salary of Western Australian acting 
judicial officers in the Magistrates, District and Supreme Courts is pegged to that of 
the equivalent Permanent Judicial Officer.107  
 
In practice, Queensland adopts a similar approach to Victoria and South Wales. But 
in the case of the Supreme Court of Queensland, the remuneration of Temporary 
Judicial Officers is formally dependent on their professional history. A former 
Supreme Court Judge serving in a temporary capacity is entitled to be paid in 
accordance with the Judicial Remuneration Act 2007 (Qld),108 whereas a person, other 
than a former Supreme Court Judge, serving as a temporary Judicial Officer has their 
                                           
100  Magistrates Court Act 1987 (Tas) s 4(5); s 12. 
101 Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) s 81F; County Court Act 1958 (Vic) s 12F(1); Magistrates Court 
Act 1989 (Vic) s 10(2); Schedule 1, Part 2, s 11. For Reserve Associate Judges see. 
Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) s 83B; County Court Act 1958 (Vic) s 17KG. 
102 Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 37(5); District Court Act 1973 (NSW) s 18(3B); Local 
Court Act 2007 (NSW) Schedule 1, Part 4, s 12(4). 
103 Supreme Court Act 1887 (Tas) s 3(2) and (3); Supreme Court Act (NT) s 41. For new 
arrangements for part-time appointments, see Supreme Court Act 1887 (Tas) s 3(3A).   
104 Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 37V. 
105  Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) s 9F (3)(a); Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 69D(3)(a). 
106 Judges’ Salaries and Pensions Act 1950 (WA) s 5(1b). 
107  Judges’ Salaries and Pensions Act 1950 (WA) s 12A; Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA) 
Schedule 1, cl 3 and 9(4). 
108  Judicial Remuneration Act 2007 (Qld) s 5A. 
Temporary Judicial Officers in Australia 
14 
remuneration set by the Governor in Council.109 In a safeguard to judicial 
independence, however, such remuneration cannot be less than that ‘paid and 
provided to a [permanent] judge’.110 Temporary Judicial Officers appointed to the 
Queensland Magistrates and District Court are paid at the same level as Permanent 
Judicial Officers of the respective court.111  
 
Some jurisdictions do not set the remuneration of Temporary Judicial Officers in 
statute at all. In all South Australian courts, the remuneration of auxiliary judicial 
officers is ‘determined by the Governor with the concurrence of the Chief Justice’.112 
For South Australian acting judicial officer remuneration appears to be tied to that 
of the equivalent Permanent Judicial Officer and set by the Remuneration Tribunal.113  
In the Tasmanian and ACT Magistrates Courts, remuneration is specified in the 
person’s instrument of appointment;114 and in the Northern Territory Supreme Court 
the salary appears determined in the same way as for Permanent Judicial Officers, 
that is, by the Administrator;115 and in the Local Court, the salary, allowances and 
other benefits are determined by the person making the appointment, namely, the 
Administrator or Minister.116  
 
2.9 Pension arrangements 
 
A Temporary Judicial Officer is not entitled to accrue pension rights for the period of 
their commission in all jurisdictions except New South Wales, in some instances in 
Queensland, and in the Northern Territory. Many jurisdictions expressly preclude a 
Temporary Judicial Officer’s period of service as giving rise to pension rights.117 In 
Victoria, service as a Temporary Judicial Officer ‘does not count’ as service for the 
purposes of pension arrangements.118 In South Australia, a person ‘acquires no 
rights’ under the Judges’ Pensions Act 1971 (SA) in respect of service as a Temporary 
Judicial Officer.119 In Tasmania a temporary commission as a Supreme Court judge 
‘is not taken to be service’ for the purposes of the Judges’ Contributory Pensions Act 
1968 (Tas),120 but Temporary Judicial Officers in both the Supreme and Magistrates 
Courts appear to be eligible for contributory superannuation schemes.  
 
In contrast, in the Supreme and District Courts in New South Wales, service as a 
Temporary Judicial Officer is deemed to be ‘prior judicial service’ for the purpose of 
the Judges’ Pension Act 1953 (NSW).121 However, the conditions or limitations 
specified in a Temporary Judicial Officer’s commission ‘may’ exclude the whole or any 
                                           
109 Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 (Qld) s 6(9). 
110 Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 (Qld) s 6(9). 
111 Judicial Remuneration Act 2007 (Qld) ss 9A, 28; Magistrates Act 1991 (Qld) s 47A. 
112 Judicial Administration (Auxiliary Appointments and Powers) Act 1988 (SA) s 3(6). 
113  District Court Act 1991 (SA) s 13; Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 12; Magistrates Act 
1983 (SA) s 13; Remuneration Act 1990 (SA) s 13. 
114 Magistrates Court Act 1987 (Tas) s 4(4), note s 4(5) and 10; Magistrates Court Act 1930 
(ACT) s 8B (for Special Magistrates) and under s 7C for acting Magistrates. 
115  Supreme Court Act (NT) s 41. 
116 Local Court Act (NT) ss 60, 62. 
117 See Supreme Court 1933 (ACT) s 37V and s 69D (in relation to appointments pursuant 
to a judicial exchange); Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) s 9F (3)(b) (in relation to 
appointments pursuant to a judicial exchange); Judges’ Salaries and Pensions Act 1950 
(WA) s 5(1b). 
118 Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) s 83; County Court Act 1958 (Vic) s 12D; Magistrates Court 
Act 1989 (Vic) s 9D. For Reserve Associate Judges see Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 
105F(1); County Court Act 1958 (Vic) s 17KE. 
119 Judicial Administration (Auxiliary Appointments and Powers) Act 1988 (SA) s 3(7). 
120 Supreme Court Act 1887 (Tas) s 3(4). 
121 Judges’ Pension Act 1953 (NSW) s 8(3). 
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part of the period of appointment from being regarded as prior judicial service.122  In 
the Local Court, Temporary Judicial Officers are not explicitly entitled to enroll in the 
superannuation scheme.123 In Queensland, service as a Temporary Judicial Officer 
in the Supreme and District Courts counts as prior judicial service under the Judges 
(Pensions and Long Leave) Act 1957 (Qld), other than if the appointee is a retired 
District Court or Supreme Court judge.124 The minimum defined benefit does not 
apply to acting District Court and Supreme Court judges.125 
 
In the Northern Territory Supreme Court, a period of service of a Temporary Judicial 
Officers is explicitly added to and deemed part of the period of service as a judge, but 
otherwise acting judges are excluded from that Act.126 In the Supreme and Local 
Courts it appears that a Temporary Judicial Officer’s conditions are determined 
entirely by the person making the appointment, ie. the Administrator or the Minister; 
in the Supreme Court these conditions are not expanded upon;127 in the Local Court, 
they include ‘salary, allowances and other benefits’.128 
 
Beyond the question of accrual of pension rights, a further issue is the ability of a 
Temporary Judicial Officer to draw both a pension and a salary. As discussed above, 
in Western Australia, if an auxiliary judge is receiving a pension they are only entitled 
to ‘the difference between the rate of that pension and the rate of the annual salary 
payable’.129 In Queensland, a former Judicial Officer serving as a Temporary Judicial 
Officer in Queensland is to be paid the salary of a Permanent Judicial Officer less any 
amount the retired Judicial Officer receives as a pension.130 If a former Judicial 
Officer is serving as a Judicial Officer, including a Temporary Judicial Officer, in 
another jurisdiction, that individual’s pension entitlements are to be reduced for the 
period they receive a salary by the amount of the salary, with some exceptions where 
the judge is 65 years old or more, and if the service is of a limited nature (as 
defined).131 In Victoria, former Judicial Officers appear to lose their entitlement to a 
judicial pension if appointed as a Temporary Judicial Officer in any jurisdiction other 
than the same Victorian jurisdiction in which they were a Permanent Judicial 
Officer.132 No other statutory regime appears to deal with this issue. 
 
2.10 Security of tenure 
 
Security of tenure arrangements for Temporary Judicial Officers differ across 
jurisdictions and courts.  
 
In New South Wales, Victoria and Western Australia the tenure of Temporary Judicial 
Officers in all courts is expressly equated with that of Permanent Judicial Officers. In 
New South Wales, Temporary Judicial Officers are expressly protected by the general 
protections of tenure granted to all judicial officers under s 53 of the Constitution Act 
1902 (NSW), which provides: 
                                           
122 Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 37(5); District Court Act 1973 (NSW) s 18(5), 
123  Local Court Act 2007 (NSW) sch 1, Part 1 and contra sch 1, Part 4. 
124  Judges (Pensions and Long Leave) Act 1957 (Qld) s 2A. 
125  Judges (Pensions and Long Leave) Act 1957 (Qld) s 2C(3). 
126  Supreme Court (Judicial Pensions) Act (NT) s3(2). 
127  Supreme Court Act (NT) s 32(2). 
128 Local Court Act (NT) s 62. A similar approach is adopted in the ACT Magistrates Court: 
Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) s 8B. 
129 Judges’ Salaries and Pensions Act 1950 (WA) s 5(1b). 
130 Judicial Remuneration Act 2007 (Qld) s 5A(1). 
131  Judges (Pensions and Long Leave) Act 1957 (Qld) s 18. 
132 Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) ss 83(4); 81D(2); Supreme Court Act 1986 ss 104A(7); 105F(2); 
County Court Act 1958 (Vic) ss 14(3A); 12D; Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (Vic) ss 10A(2) 
and 9D. 
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53  Removal from judicial office 
(1) No holder of a judicial office can be removed from the office, except as provided 
by this Part. 
(2) The holder of a judicial office can be removed from the office by the Governor, on 
an address from both Houses of Parliament in the same session, seeking removal 
on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity. 
… 
(5) This section extends to acting appointments to a judicial office, whether made 
with or    without a specific term. 
 
In the Supreme, County and Magistrates Court in Victoria a Temporary Judicial 
Officer ‘may only be removed from office in the same way and on the same grounds 
as [a Permanent Judicial Officer] is liable to be removed from office’.133 Similar 
provisions exist for the Western Australian Supreme, District and Magistrates 
Courts.134  
 
In some jurisdictions, the tenure of Temporary Judicial Officers appears to be secured 
by the same general provisions that secure the tenure of Permanent Judicial Officers. 
In South Australia, acting judges on the Supreme Court would appear to be included 
in the tenure given generally to judges of that Court,135 as with the District Court.136 
In the South Australian Magistrates Court, acting Magistrates are more explicitly 
considered in the guarantees of tenure afforded to all Magistrates.137 The 
appointment of auxiliary judicial officers in South Australia cannot be revoked.138 In 
Queensland, Temporary Judicial Officers of the Supreme and District Courts appear 
to be given tenure by the broad terms protecting the tenure of all Judicial Officers of 
those Courts;139 and Acting Magistrates by the provisions protecting the tenure of 
Magistrates generally.140 In the ACT, the tenure of ‘judicial officers’ is guaranteed,141 
which appears to extend to Temporary Judicial Officers of the Supreme Court and 
Magistrates Court, with the exception of acting judges appointed under an exchange 
arrangement.142 Tasmanian Supreme Court Temporary Judicial Officers appear to 
enjoy the same statutory guarantee of tenure under the Supreme Court (Judges’ 
Independence) Act 1857 (Tas).143 However, Temporary Judicial Officers on the 
Tasmanian Magistrates Court are explicitly given less security of tenure than 
Permanent Judicial Officers. The provisions governing tenure do not apply to a person 
appointed as a Temporary Judicial Officer.144 It would appear that tenure for these 
officers is protected by the instrument of appointment only.145 
 
                                           
133  Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) s 81A(2); County Court Act 1958 (Vic) s 12A(2); Magistrates 
Court Act 1989 (Vic) s 9B(2). For Reserve Associate Judges see Supreme Court Act 1986 
(Vic) s 105C(3); County Court Act 1958 (Vic) s 17KB(3). 
134  Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) s 11(3) (Acting Judges), s 11AA(4)(c) (Auxiliary Judges); 
District Court of Western Australia Act 1969 (WA) s 18(4)(b) (Acting Judges), s 18A(4)(b) 
(Auxiliary Judges); Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA) Schedule 1 cl 9(9) and cl 15.  
135  Constitution Act 1934 (SA) s 74. 
136  District Court Act 1991 (SA) s 15. 
137  Magistrates Act 1983 (SA) s 9(1). 
138  Judicial Administration (Auxiliary Appointments and Powers) Act 1988 (SA) s 3(5). 
139  Constitution of Queensland 2001 (Qld) s 61; and see also Supreme Court of Queensland 
Act 1991 (Qld) s 23. 
140  Magistrates Act 1991 (Qld) ss 42 and 46. 
141  Judicial Commissions Act 1994 (ACT) s 5. 
142  Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 69D(3)(c); Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) s 9F(3)(c). 
143  An ‘Acting Associate Judge’, appointed under the Supreme Court Act 1959 (Tas) has the 
same guarantees of tenure as an Associate Judge: s 4A(3)(c).  
144  Magistrates Court Act 1987 (Tas) s 4(5). 
145  Magistrates Court Act 1987 (Tas) s 4(4). 
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The security of tenure for Temporary Judicial Officers in the Northern Territory Local 
Court is also expressly lower than that of equivalent Permanent Judicial Officers. A 
Permanent Judicial Officer in the Northern Territory Supreme Court may only be 
removed by the Administrator on the grounds of proved misbehaviour or incapacity 
after an address from the Legislative Assembly praying for the officer’s removal.146 In 
contrast, s 40(2) of the Northern Territory Supreme Court Act provides that:  
 
An acting Judge may be removed from office by the Administrator on the ground of 
proved misbehaviour or incapacity, but shall not otherwise be removed from office. 
 
Similarly, s 63(d) of the Northern Territory Local Court Act provides that a Temporary 
Judicial Officer’s appointment may be ‘terminated by the appointer’. It does not 
appear that any grounds for removal are statutorily required, but may be set by the 
appointer.147 
  
                                           
146  Supreme Court Act (NT) s 40(1). 
147  Local Court Act (NT) s 62.  
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Since the passage of the Act of Settlement 1701, security of judicial tenure has been 
revered in the common law as fundamental to the guarantee of judicial independence 
and through that, the rule of law and the restraint of arbitrary government. In 
Australia, judicial tenure until the age of 70 is constitutionally guaranteed for federal 
judicial officers under s 72 of the Commonwealth Constitution, excepting removal on 
an address of both houses of Parliament on the grounds of proved misbehaviour or 
incapacity. At the federal level in Australia the prospect of Temporary Judicial Officers 
is unavailable. 
 
But at the state and territory level, the constitutional position is different. In 
Australia, the case that has confirmed the fairly generous constitutional boundaries 
for the appointment of Temporary Judicial Officers in state and territory jurisdictions 
is Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission.148 That case concerned 
a constitutional challenge to s 37 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) based on the 
Kable principle.149 This principle protects the institutional integrity of state and 
territory courts as part of the integrated federal judicial system established by 
Chapter III of the Constitution, and extends to protections of their independence and 
impartiality. Section 37 empowered the Governor to appoint any ‘qualified person’ 
(which includes former judges) as a Judge of the Supreme Court for a period of not 
more than 12 months. A majority of judges (6:1, with Kirby J dissenting) held that 
the provision was not necessarily inconsistent with the guarantees in Chapter III of 
the Constitution, and that those guarantees had not been breached by the 
appointment of a retired judicial officer as an acting judge in the case. This was 
despite the guarantees of tenure provided in s 72 for federal court judges. Forge thus 
establishes the position that, constitutionally, state and territory judges might be 
appointed on a temporary basis provided this does not occur to such an extent that 
the requisite qualities of judicial independence and impartiality, and the appearance 
of the same, are compromised. At least two judges (Kirby J and Gleeson CJ) indicated 
that sophisticated, fine-grained empirical data that reveal the extent of reliance upon 
Temporary Judicial Officers may inform such an analysis. 
 
The Declaration of Principles on Judicial Independence issued by the Chief Justices of 
the Australian states and territories states that security of judicial tenure must be 
provided for Australian judicial officers, with two exceptions, one being the conferral 
of functions by the head of jurisdiction on former judges, and the other being the 
appointment of ‘an acting judge’, whether a former judge or not, subject to the 
appointment being made with the approval of the Head of Jurisdiction and ‘provided 
that the appointment is made only in special circumstances which render it 
necessary’.150 This raises – but does not answer – the question of what special 
circumstances might render a temporary judicial appointment necessary. 
 
A common justification for the appointment of Temporary Judicial Officers is to 
‘overcome a temporary difficulty’ in the administration of justice.151 As we have 
                                           
148 (2006) 228 CLR 45. 
149 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51. 
150 Declaration of Principles on Judicial Independence Issued by the Chief Justices of the 
Australian States and Territories, reproduced in ‘Independence of the Judiciary’ (1997) 
15 Australian Bar Review 177. 
151 Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The Appointment and Removal of Judges’ in Helen Cunningham 
(ed), Fragile Bastion: Judicial Independence in the Nineties and Beyond (Judicial 
Commission of New South Wales, 1997) 1, 9. 
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explained above at Part 2.2, the Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia and 
Tasmania legislative frameworks refer explicitly to this justification. Usually, the 
temporary appointment for the administration of justice has been justified by 
reference to workload issues: to reduce backlogs of cases, to deal with uneven 
workflow by providing a more cost effective arrangement than a permanent 
appointment, and to fill temporary absences caused by illness or long-service leave. 
However, a number of other reasons for the appointment of Temporary Judicial 
Officers can be identified, some of which are more easily justified than others, and 
some of which raise more acute concerns as to the effect upon judicial independence. 
These reasons include importing expertise for particular cases, avoiding conflicts of 
interest, retaining talented judicial officers who have reached the statutory retirement 
age for Permanent Judicial Officers, trying and testing the suitability of potential 
judicial appointees, and achieving benefits through judicial exchange between 
jurisdictions.  
 
In this part of the Report we explain each of these justifications before examining the 
different concerns raised by the appointment of Temporary Judicial Officers. Our 
discussion of the justifications and concerns are also informed by empirical data that 
we have gained from a survey of 142 judicial officers from across Australia regarding 
the most pressing challenges facing the various levels of the judiciary, as set out 
further in Schedule 2 in this Report. Further data on the numbers and extent of use 
of Temporary Judicial Officers is set out and explained in detail, including its impact 
on the justifications and concerns that we consider in this Part, in Part 4 of this 
Report. 
 
3.2 Justifications for appointment of Temporary Judicial Officers 
 
3.2.1 Workload and cost-saving 
 
Most commonly, the appointment of Temporary Judicial Officers has been justified 
on the basis that such appointments allow for fluctuations in workloads in particular 
courts. Temporary Judicial Officers might be brought in to address an unexpected 
influx of cases, a backlog of cases that might have accumulated in a court, or to fill 
sustained absences of Permanent Judicial Officers for reasons of illness or long-
leave.152 Our survey of judicial officers indicated that the predominant advantage of 
using Temporary Judicial Officers was that they provided assistance with the 
management of workload demands: 
 
… Without acting judicial officers, the efficient operation of the court during 
times of illness and the provision of out of hours services would be 
compromised.153 
 
They are a necessity given work-loads.154  
 
Appropriately qualified judicial officers, such as those recently retired allow 
Judicial administrators to more efficiently manage lists and circuits. 155 
 
Appointment of appropriate acting judicial officers may be an efficient way to 
deal with case backlogs. 156 
 
                                           
152 See for example, the New South Wales Guidelines for the Appointment of Acting Judicial 
Officers (2010). 
153 Magistrates/Local; 15-19 years.  
154 Magistrates/Local; 5-9 years.  
155 District/County/Federal Circuit; 25+ years.  
156 District/County/Federal Circuit; 10-14 years.  
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As these comments illustrate, the use of Temporary Judicial Officers to fill positions 
caused by an unusual influx of matters in a court (for example, a series of cases 
resulting from an unexpected event), or because of temporary, albeit sustained, 
absences on the Court is often presumed to be a cost-efficient way of dealing with a 
temporary problem that is not anticipated to be ongoing. Concerns arise, however, 
where appointment of Temporary Judicial Officers is not driven by temporary 
difficulties, but rather a sustained increase in workloads that is not being addressed 
by the appointment of Permanent Judicial Officers.157 These concerns will be 
addressed in Part 3.3, below. 
 
3.2.2  Avoidance of conflicts of interest 
 
Another important justification for the appointment of Temporary Judicial Officers is 
that they can facilitate the administration of impartial justice in circumstances where 
a conflict of interest has arisen for the Permanent Judicial Officers of the court. This 
problem arises most frequently in smaller jurisdictions where it may be difficult to 
constitute benches from a small pool of judicial officers, which are untainted by 
apprehended bias, or where the parties concerned are connected to the 
administration of justice. Two recent instances of such appointments demonstrate 
the usefulness of Temporary Judicial Officers in these circumstances; others are 
reported in Part 4.10.  
 
The first example comes from 2012, when the former Chief Justice of the Northern 
Territory, Brian Ross Martin, was appointed an Acting Justice of the Western 
Australian Supreme Court to preside over the trial of Lloyd Rayney. Mr Rayney was 
charged with killing his wife in 2007. Both Mr and Mrs Rayney were senior and well-
known members of the Western Australian legal profession. Mr Rayney was a former 
lawyer in the WA Department of Public Prosecutions, and working at the time for the 
Corruption and Crime Commission. Mrs Rayney was a registrar for the Western 
Australian Supreme Court. On the request of Mr Rayney, the trial was heard by judge 
alone. Martin was appointed as a temporary Supreme Court judge to preside over the 
trial due to concerns over the appearance of bias for all permanent Western 
Australian judicial officers, given the careers and positions of both the victim and the 
defendant. Martin was sworn in as an Acting Judge solely for the purpose of 
conducting this trial. 
 
A second instance arose in 2016 in Queensland and involved the appointment of 
Justice Cliff Hoeben of the New South Wales Supreme Court as a Temporary Justice 
of the Supreme Court of Queensland to act as a supplementary judicial member to 
the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT). The initial need for Justice 
Hoeben’s temporary appointment arose after the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, 
Catherine Holmes, filed a professional disciplinary complaint against lawyer Michael 
Bosscher. The complaint related to Bosscher’s tendering of evidence containing 
defamatory allegations that the Chief Justice had engaged in criminal activity while 
she was a practicing barrister. Acting on the complaint, the Legal Services 
Commission commenced disciplinary proceedings against Bosscher in QCAT. This 
raised questions as to the impartiality of existing members of QCAT to hear the 
matter. The President of QCAT must be a Supreme Court judge.158 The Deputy 
President must be a District Court judge.159 Senior and Ordinary Tribunal members 
must be either legal professionals or in possession of particular expertise or 
                                           
157 See for example, Mason, above n 151; Michael Kirby, ‘Acting Judges—A Non-theoretical 
Danger’ (1998) 8 Journal of Judicial Administration 69, 73. 
158 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) s 175(1). 
159 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) s 176(1). 
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experience.160 To resolve any potential perception of conflict of interest arising from 
the subject matter and circumstances of the initiation of the complaint against 
Bosscher, Justice Hoeben was appointed to preside over the matter. This was 
achieved through an acting appointment to the Supreme Court of Queensland and 
then an appointment as a supplementary member of QCAT. Supplementary members 
must be judicial officers of the Queensland Supreme Court, District Court or 
Magistrates Court.161 Although, problematically in terms of ensuring the complete 
appearance of impartiality from the Chief Justice, Supplementary QCAT Members 
can only be appointed after consultation with the relevant Head of Jurisdiction.162  
 
The temporary appointment of Justice Hoeben to avoid any perception of conflict of 
interest in the disciplinary hearing proved serendipitous, as he would later be 
required to preside over a second QCAT hearing involving the former Chief Justice of 
Queensland, Tim Carmody. In July 2015, after less than 12 months in the position, 
Carmody resigned as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Queensland. His tenure 
had been marked by controversy and a rather public deterioration in his relationship 
with other members of the bench. While resigning from the position of Chief Justice, 
Carmody retained his commission as a Justice of the Supreme Court and was 
appointed by the government as a supplementary judicial member of QCAT. During 
his tenure as Chief Justice, the Courier-Mail had lodged a right to information request 
to access a recording of a conversation between Carmody and two other Supreme 
Court judges. Justice Carmody and the Justice Department refused the request, 
claiming various exemptions, but lost their case before the Queensland Right to 
Information Commissioner. Justice Carmody then appealed the Commissioner’s 
decision to QCAT. 
 
When the matter came before the then President of QCAT, Justice David Thomas, he 
remarked, ‘It seems reasonably clear that no judge in Queensland should hear the 
matter’,163 referring to the fact that the case would raise issues pertaining to the 
Queensland judiciary. This issue was resolved by setting the case before 
supplementary member and Acting Queensland Supreme Court Justice, Cliff 
Hoeben. 
 
3.2.3  Importing expertise 
 
Temporary Judicial Officers might be appointed for specific matters, or even to 
oversee entire lists of matters, in areas where the permanent judiciary is perceived to 
lack expertise. Defending the appointment of temporary judges to the South 
Australian Supreme Court in 2016, the Attorney-General of South Australia asserted 
as one of the justifications that ‘[t]hey are necessary from time to time to hear cases 
that may require specific legal expertise’.164 This is unlikely to arise in areas of general 
jurisdiction – such as crime or civil matters – but rather in specialist areas, which 
might include large and complex commercial matters, or specialist jurisdictions 
where general practitioners and judges are unlikely to have had any experience, such 
                                           
160 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) s 183(4) and (5). 
161 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) s 192(2). 
162 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) s 192(3). 
163 Melanie Petrinec, ‘Justice Thomas: No Judge in Queensland should hear the matter’, 




164 The Hon John Rau MP quoted in Samantha Woodhill, ‘Judge turns down temporary 
Supreme Court appointment’ Australasian Lawyer, 4 April 2016, 
<http://www.australasianlawyer.com.au/news/judge-turns-down-temporary-
supreme-court-appointment-213999.aspx>. 
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as maritime or defamation law.165 Further, the importing of expertise through the 
appointment of Temporary Judicial Officers is likely to be necessary only in smaller 
jurisdictions where there is no Permanent Judicial Officer with the relevant expertise 
available to be assigned to the matter or to oversee the list.166  
 
3.2.4  Retention of talented retirees 
 
Two scholars have identified the advantages of appointing former judicial officers as 
Temporary Judicial Officers in order to retain talented individuals.167 Professor Brian 
Opeskin argues that appointing former judges as acting judges is a ‘flexible tool for 
returning mandatory retirees to the bench’,168 ameliorating ‘the consequences of 
forced departure’ which ‘deprive their courts of fine talent’.169 Dr Alysia Blackham 
notes that appointing recently retired judges as acting judges is a useful method of 
avoiding arbitrary compulsory retirement ages and enables a jurisdiction to continue 
to rely on the experience and expertise of valuable judges while choosing not to 
reappoint judges whose faculties may have declined.  
 
However, with this advantage, disadvantages are also identified. Blackham observes 
that ‘if the executive is choosing to reappoint certain judges (and not others), this 
may impair the appearance or reality of individual and institutional independence’.170 
This risk, and others, is explored in more depth in Part 3.3, below. 
 
  
                                           
165 The issue of judicial ‘expertise’ and the value of specialization is not without contention, 
see Chad M Oldfather, ‘Judging, Expertise, and the Rule of Law’ (2012) 89(4) Washington 
University Law Review 847. 
166 An example of this can be seen in the recent appointment of a London QC with expertise 
in LLPs, insolvency and financial services to the Commercial Court of the British Virgin 
Islands as a ‘visiting judge’ to clear a backlog of commercial cases. ‘Judge appointed to 
help clear cases’, BVI News Online, 20 October 2016, <http://bvinews.com/new/judge-
appointed-to-help-clear-cases/>. 
167 See for example, Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, 
Parliament of Australia, Australia’s Judicial System and the Role of Judges (2009) 42 
[4.46], quoting from Acting Chief Justice Murray of the Western Australia Supreme 
Court. 
168 Brian Opeskin, ‘Models of Judicial Tenure’ (2015) 35 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
627, 654. 
169 Ibid, 653. 
170 Alysia Blackham, ‘Judges and Retirement Ages’ (2016) 39 Melbourne University Law 
Review 738, 750. See also Michael Kirby, ‘Judicial Independence in Australia reaches a 
moment of truth’ (1990) 13 UNSW LJ 187, 209; Michael Kirby, ‘The Future of Courts – 
Do they have one? (1999) 8 Journal of Judicial Administration 185, 186. 
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3.2.5  Testing the suitability of potential appointees 
 
One of the most controversial justifications for the appointment of acting judges is, 
in Sir Anthony Mason’s words, that it can provide ‘judicial experience for those who 
are minded to become permanent judges and ascertaining their competence and 
suitability for such appointment’.171 The New Zealand Law Reform Commission 
referred to this as providing ‘a training ground to determine whether the judge is 
suitable for permanent appointment.’172 In this respect, Sir Anthony referred to the 
advantages in the UK Recorder system, in which barristers or solicitors are appointed 
as part-time judicial officers to give potential Permanent Judicial Officers experience, 
although he noted it was vulnerable to ‘criticism on the score of judicial 
independence.’173 Looking at this issue from the perspective of the individuals 
concerned, a temporary appointment could provide a valuable opportunity to see 
whether the judicial role is one that they would like to take on in a permanent form. 
Such an opportunity could filter out candidates who find they are not 
temperamentally suited to, or likely to be suitably engaged with, a permanent judicial 
role. As one respondent in our survey indicated: 
 
Trialing proposed new appointees for say 3 months is similarly not 
objectionable. Both the Court and appointees should have the opportunity for 
an obligation free fixed term trial.174 
 
The advantages of such appointments should be considered alongside the risks 
associated with ‘trying out’ a judicial role. These risks are considered below in Part 
3.3. 
 
3.2.6  Judicial exchange 
 
Writing extra-judicially before his appointment as Chief Justice of the High Court, 
Robert French argued that the appointment of Temporary Judicial Officers could 
facilitate a program of judicial exchange.175 Such a program could allow the sharing 
of knowledge and experience between judges, as well as developing a mutual 
awareness and respect between the Australian judiciary.176 It could advance 
individual judicial performance; the performance of courts as institutions; the 
allocation of judicial resources to areas of local need, including the need for specific 
expertise; the attractiveness of judicial appointment in all jurisdictions; consistent 
Australia-wide approaches to administration of justice while maintaining 
institutional pluralism; and national collegiality.177 French explained, ‘a judge from 
one court visits another for a period and is appointed as an acting judge of the host 
court where he or she hears trials or participates in appellate work. Such a visitation 
could also involve the kind of observation, dialogue, discussion and report suggested 
for short-term non-participating visiting judges’.178 French proposed exchanges to 
                                           
171 Mason, above n 151. 
172 NZ Law Reform Commission, Review of the Judicature Act 1908: Towards a Consolidated 
Courts Act (Issues Paper 29, February 2012) 31 [3.60]. 
173 Mason, above n 151, 6; 
174  District/County/Federal Circuit; 25+ years. 
175 Robert French, ‘Judicial exchange: Debalkanising the courts’ (2006) 15 Journal of 
Judicial Administration 142. See also Robert French, ‘Seeing visions and dreaming 
dreams’ (Speech delivered at Judicial Conference of Australia Colloquium, 7 October 
2016) 12-14. 
176 French, ‘Judicial exchange’, above n 175. 
177 French, ‘Seeing visions and dreaming dreams’, above n 175, 13. 
178 French, ‘Judicial exchange’, above n 175, 153. On the value of judicial exchange see 
also Jim Spigelman, ‘Consistency and sentencing’ (2008) 82 Australian Law Journal 
450, 458, 459; Murray Gleeson ‘The State of the Judicature’ (2007) 14 Australian 
Journal of Administrative Law 118, 120: ‘properly done, it could become a routine 
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occur both horizontally across jurisdictions, as well as vertically, between levels of 
the court hierarchy, whereby judges on inferior courts are appointed for a short time 
as an acting judge on a superior court. 
 
  
                                           
method of creating more interaction between different judiciaries, to the benefit of the 
court system generally’.  
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3.3 Concerns raised by appointment of Temporary Judicial Officers 
 
3.3.1 Separation of powers and judicial independence 
 
The most frequently cited concern raised by the appointment of Temporary Judicial 
Officers is that such appointments have the potential to undermine the separation of 
powers, and particularly the independence of the judicial branch from the political 
branches. One participant in our survey articulated this view by saying simply that 
the appointment of Temporary Judicial Officers is ‘an anathema to the independence 
of the judiciary’.179 
 
The prospect of re-appointment of Temporary Judicial Officers raises concerns about 
executive preferment. Another respondent in our survey stated: ‘I am also concerned 
that acting appointments are subject to renewal at the instance of the AG and also 
the head of the court and this is a problem in terms of any potential impact upon 
independence of decision making.’ Another commented that Temporary Judicial 
Officers ‘may feel constrained, because of lack of tenure, in acting entirely 
independently’. One was more explicit regarding the nature of those reservations: 
 
The State Government has been making use of Acting Magistrates over the past 
5 years, instead of appointing additional magistrates. That has enabled the AG 
to select retiring magistrates whose approach, particularly to sentencing is 
consistent with the Government's law and order agenda. At a time when 
magistrates have been forced to retire on their 65th birthday certain favoured 
retiring magistrates have been appointed as Acting magistrates up to their 70th 
birthday, whilst others who would like to continue working have not received 
such a commission.180 
 
The New Zealand Law Reform Commission explains that, at least in that jurisdiction, 
‘Given that the renewable tenure is normally one or two years, it can be said that it 
is only marginally removed from tenure at pleasure’.181 Clause 16 of the Australian 
Bar Association’s Charter of Judicial Independence explains:  
 
Security of tenure until a fixed retirement age is not primarily for the benefit of 
judges but is to enable litigants and society at large to have confidence in the 
impartiality of judges and the courts. It is designed to prevent judges’ 
dependence upon Executive Governments for renewals of their commission, 
and any public perception of such dependence.182  
 
This is reflected in the strict separation of judicial power that pertains to the federal 
judiciary under the Commonwealth Constitution, and also the predominance of 
international instruments that emphasise judicial tenure as an unequivocal facet of 
judicial independence.183 Foreign judgments have also emphasised judicial tenure as 
an essential component of judicial independence.184 
 
Professor Michael Taggart, writing in the New Zealand context, observed that one of 
the most problematic aspects of the appointment of acting judges in that jurisdiction 
– which applies equally to Australia – is the opacity surrounding the appointment 
                                           
179 Magistrates/Local; 15-19 years. 
180  Magistrates/Local; 5-9 years. 
181 NZ Law Reform Commission, above n 172, 32 [3.65]. 
182 Australian Bar Association, Charter of Judicial Independence 2004 (August 2004). 
183 See for example, UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32 (2007) [19]-
[20]; Beijing Statement of Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary in the Lawasia 
Region (1997) [18]; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and 
Lawyers, 2009: [53]-[64]. 
184 Valente v R [1985] 2 SCR 673. 
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and re-appointment process.185 The lack of transparent criteria and processes 
governing temporary judicial appointment only adds to concerns that re-appointment 
may be based on executive favour. 
 
The prospect of re-appointment and thus executive preferment arises in different 
guises for Temporary Judicial Officers. In Forge, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ 
were concerned by the possibility of reappointment.186 They noted, however, that this 
would bear differently on different appointees.187 They identified three cases, with the 
first presenting the ‘more substantial issues’.188 The first was ‘the person in active 
practice [who] may be thought by some to be concerned about prospects of future 
permanent appointment, or about the effect of what is done while an acting judge 
upon resumption of practice at the end of the period of appointment’.189 This scenario 
raises worrying prospects that the individual may act in the temporary appointment 
in a manner that would be perceived favourably in the hope of obtaining a permanent 
appointment. Such prospects might be exacerbated where the statutory regime 
incentivises a transition from temporary to permanent appointment. For instance, in 
2005 Justice Ronald Sackville expressed reservations about the Victorian regime, 
where an acting judge is not entitled to a pension, but, if appointed as a permanent 
judge, time as an acting judge will be counted in determining their pension 
entitlement.190  
 
In parliamentary debates around the introduction of the New South Wales Courts and 
Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2015, which increased the period of appointment 
of Temporary Judicial Officers from ‘not exceeding 12 months’ to ‘not exceeding 5 
years’, there was some consternation expressed over governments ‘trying out’ judges. 
The Greens argued that the change could herald the use of longer appointments by 
the government to ‘try out’ judges. It was also argued that five-year appointments 
may lead a government to choose younger acting judges from practitioners who are 
in the middle of their careers’, giving rise to ‘apprehension that their decisions on the 
bench could be coloured by the need to return to the profession as practitioners once 
their acting appointment concludes’.191 
 
These reservations have been demonstrated to be more than simply theoretical. One 
of Britain’s most controversial judges, Peter Smith of the United Kingdom High Court 
of Justice, was approached by a law firm, Addleshaw Goddard, to take up 
employment with the firm should he take early retirement.192 The negotiations 
soured, terse words were exchanged between the judge and partners, and the judge 
retained his judicial appointment rather than joining the firm.193 The failed 
negotiations however, led to a controversial bias application being made against the 
judge when a party appeared before him represented by Addleshaw Goddard. Smith 
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refused to recuse himself, but this was later overturned on appeal.194 The case 
attracted publicity and there were calls for Smith to resign over his handling of the 
matter. While Smith’s case represents an extreme example, it demonstrates the 
controversies that may attend judicial return to the legal profession. With the 
appointment of Temporary Judicial Officers from the ranks of legal professionals, 
rather than retired judicial officers, such controversies might be anticipated to arise 
with greater frequency. 
 
The second category identified by Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ in Forge was ‘the 
person who holds some other judicial office [who] may be thought to be concerned 
about prospects of promotion to the Supreme Court’.195 In many respects this raises 
the same issues as any prospect of judicial promotion, which is considered below. 
 
The third was ‘the retired judge [who] may be thought to be concerned about the 
prospect of being able to continue to act as a judge beyond retirement and beyond 
the statutory retiring age with its consequences for continued professional 
engagement and enjoyment of a larger income’.196 While not entirely clear, as it refers 
to an already ‘retired’ judge, it appears this third category is referring to the individual 
who may act towards the end of his or her permanent judicial career in a manner 
that would be perceived favourably for temporary appointment following retirement. 
The prospect that judicial officers nearing the end of their permanent judicial tenure 
are likely to be considering such matters is explicitly referenced in the New South 
Wales Guidelines for the Appointment of Acting Judicial Officers (2010), which state: 
‘Retired judicial officers or judicial officers approaching retirement, who are interested 
in being appointed as acting judicial officers, should advise the relevant head of 
jurisdiction.’197 But, as Blackham argues, ‘if the executive is choosing to reappoint 
certain judges (and not others), this may impair the appearance or reality of 
individual and institutional independence’.198  
 
To the three categories identified by Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ can be added 
a fourth: where an individual (whether a former judicial officer or not) has been 
appointed for a short-term temporary judicial appointment and wishes to seek 
reappointment in that role, the individual may act in that temporary appointment in 
a manner that would be perceived favourably for a further temporary term. The New 
South Wales Guidelines provide, for example, that ‘a previous appointment as an 
acting judicial officer does not give a person an entitlement to reappointment as an 
acting judicial officer.’199 In this respect, the recent move in New South Wales to 
extend the term of temporary appointments was supported, with some caveats, by 
the Labor Opposition. They noted explicitly the benefit of an extended term on 
questions of judicial independence 
 
The major criticism of the concept of acting judges and magistrates is that it 
strikes at the principle of independence of the judiciary. With judicial officers’ 
positions effectively coming up for renewal every 12 months, a government that 
is unhappy with decisions of some judicial officers may not renew their 
appointment. Therefore, there is the danger of the perception of government 
acquiring decisions preferable to it rather than judicial officers being fiercely 
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independent. While the extension from 12 months to five years does not 
altogether eliminate that criticism, it does mitigate it to a significant degree.200 
 
The amelioration of concerns over temporary judicial appointments by the extension 
of temporary terms is also found in the Declaration of Principles on Judicial 
Independence issued by the Chief Justices of the Australian states and territories, 
which stipulates in relation to limited term appointments, they must be ‘for a 
substantial term’, and ‘not renewable’.201 
 
While the danger of executive preferment is real, it should be considered in context. 
In Forge, Gleeson CJ emphasised that judicial independence is secured by a 
combination of institutional arrangements, of which tenure is ‘important’ but ‘only 
one of a number of’ aspects.202 He went on to list some additional aspects, including 
their appointment by the same authority as Permanent Judicial Officers, the judicial 
oath, security of tenure during appointment, remuneration and accountability to the 
Judicial Commission of New South Wales and that state’s Independent Commission 
Against Corruption.203 Similar factors have also been referred to in the UK and in the 
European Court of Human Rights.204 In Forge, Gleeson CJ also pointed to the 
particular characteristics that might be attributed to an acting judge who was 
formerly a permanent judge, pointing out that professional standards and personal 
character are important constraints on self-interested behaviour.205 This raised the 
possibility that the appointment of a barrister as an acting judge might result in a 
different outcome.206 
 
Gleeson CJ dismissed the concerns raised regarding executive preferment because of 
their similarity to those that arise in respect of any prospect of judicial promotion.207 
In New Zealand, the Courts have also dismissed claims that the possibility of 
reappointment undermines judicial independence by reference to similar concerns 
over judicial promotion.208  
 
Separate to the threat to independence posed by executive preferment, Professor 
Taggart also identified a threat posed by intra-judicial preferment. This arises in the 
New Zealand context because it is the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court who selects 
an acting judge to sit in a case where a permanent member is disqualified or 
otherwise unavailable. This, Professor Taggart argued, gives rise to perceptions of 
intra-court ‘stacking’. He cited empirical research from the California Supreme Court 
which demonstrated that the use of the power to appoint temporary judges to the 
Court by successive Chief Justices over a 25-year period showed that the temporary 
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judges disproportionately voted the same way as three out of the four appointing 
Chief Justices.209 
 
In addition to the dangers of executive and perhaps even intra-judicial preferment, 
judicial independence might be undermined by Temporary Judicial Officers because, 
as noted in Part 2.7 above, there are fewer restrictions on acting judges holding other 
offices or employment. Similarly, Kirby J in Forge noted that Temporary Judicial 
Officers might mix intervals of judicial services with other employment or activities 
that break down judicial culture as an exclusive, dedicated, tenured service. This 
prospect raises potential ethical concerns, for example, around conflict or perceived 
conflict of interest. This is addressed separately in Part 3.3.3 below. 
 
In Forge, Kirby J also noted that Temporary Judicial Officers often did not enjoy the 
full privileges of judicial office, often lacking the staff, personal benefits and 
institutional resources of permanent judges, and playing a more limited role within 
the court more generally. This raises at least the perception that there are two 
‘classes’ of judicial officers within the court, something that might cause concern to 
parties appearing before a Temporary rather than Permanent Judicial Officer. 
 
While Gleeson CJ in Forge accepted that a regime of temporary judicial appointments 
did not ‘on that account alone’ deprive a body of the character of a Court,210 he did 
warn against ‘extreme cases’, where an acting regime ‘could so affect the character of 
the Supreme Court that it no longer answered the description of a Court or satisfied 
minimum requirements of independence and impartiality’.211 He also cautioned that 
a ‘quantitative analysis may be misleading’212 in determining whether such a 
situation had been reached. Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ expressed a similar 
view, noting that one reason s 37 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) did not go so 
far as to undermine the institutional integrity of the Supreme Court was that it did 
not give the executive an unlimited power to make acting appointments.213 Rather, 
the power was qualified by the requirement that the Court ‘must principally be 
constituted by permanent judges’ who have secure tenure.214 However, they also 
warned against a quantitative criterion for assessing whether this line had been 
crossed, commenting, it ‘would inevitably be arbitrary in its content and 
application’.215 Nevertheless, the institutional integrity of a Court would be ‘distorted’ 
by appointment of acting judges ‘if the informed observer may reasonably conclude 
that the institution no longer is, and no longer appears to be, independent and 
impartial’.216 
 
In this respect, concerns have been expressed in foreign jurisdictions when a court 
starts to rely too heavily on temporary judicial appointees. The Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights has noted that ‘having a high percentage of provisional 
judges [judges who do not enjoy security of tenure in their positions and can be freely 
removed or suspended] has a serious detrimental impact on citizens’ right to proper 
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justice and on the judges’ right to stability in their positions as a guarantee of judicial 
independence and autonomy’.217 
 
3.3.2  Funding and efficiency 
 
The appointment of Temporary Judicial Officers is often justified as being a cost-
efficient way of addressing backlogs and covering absences of Permanent Judicial 
Officers. However, on further examination, two potential concerns arise with this 
justification. The first is, as Opeskin contends, the appointment of Temporary 
Judicial Officers may in practice not be a cost-efficient solution. He explains that 
Temporary Judicial Officers, when appointed from the ranks of former judges, are 
generally ‘remunerated at a daily rate in addition to any pension they are entitled to 
receive as retired judges’.218 The only exception to this position is that which pertains 
in Victoria and Queensland, as explained in Part 2.9 above.  Thus, where a Temporary 
Judicial Officer is a former judge or magistrate from the same jurisdiction, the 
financial burden of meeting both the full pension and salary falls on the same state 
or territory. 
 
The second concern is that the appointment of Temporary Judicial Officers to fix 
‘backlogs’ often allows governments to avoid questions of how such a backlog might 
have arisen,219 including whether the judiciary is adequately funded and resourced 
to administer its ongoing case load. Failures to address ongoing funding shortages 
through additional budgetary allocation and the appointment of Permanent Judicial 
Officers can undermine the judiciary’s independence from the political branches. As 
the Declaration of Principles on Judicial Independence issued by the Chief Justices of 
the Australian states and territories says, ‘the appointment of an acting judge to avoid 
meeting a need for a permanent appointment is objectionable in principle.’220 In 
Forge, Gleeson CJ accepted that there might be ‘sound practical reasons’ behind 
temporary judicial appointments, however, he also warned that most people would 
consider that the executive should not ‘use the power of appointing acting judges to 
evade the responsibility of providing an adequately resourced court system’.221 
Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ adopted a similar position on this issue.222 This 
would suggest that temporary judicial positions that are regularly renewed, whether 
through the same or different appointees, are problematic. 
 
3.3.3  Ethical concerns 
 
The appointment of individuals as Temporary Judicial Officers raises particular 
ethical questions concomitant with, and occasionally additional to, those that arise 
for Permanent Judicial Officers. Faced with the prospect of only a short judicial 
commission, Temporary Judicial Officers might be more inclined to seek outside 
employment. The New South Wales Guidelines recognise this danger, requiring: 
‘During the term of any Commission, acting judicial appointees must be available to 
serve and must not be engaged in any activity or employment, which is incompatible 
with judicial office.’223 The Guide to Judicial Conduct of the Council of Chief Justices 
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of Australia states that where retired judges are appointed in acting judicial roles, 
they ‘should consider carefully the appropriateness of other activities that the retired 
judge might be undertaking’.224 It states that: 
 
The exercise of the judicial office on a part-time basis may require the 
observance of, or at least consideration of, some of the restrictions identified in 
this publication. Particular care should be exercised in relation to activities 
undertaken concurrently with part-time judicial work.225 
 
The prospect of former judges taking on temporary judicial appointments that cause 
a conflict with other activities is very real. It is demonstrated by the actions of Roger 
Gyles QC, who retired from the Federal Court of Australia in 2008. Following this, he 
was appointed by the University of Sydney to conduct an investigation into the future 
of the Sydney Conservatorium of Music following a particularly tumultuous period of 
management. At the same time, Gyles was appointed as an acting judge of the New 
South Wales Supreme Court (between 1 September and 31 December 2008, during 
which time he acted as a Justice and Justice of Appeal for 42 days).226 The matter 
concerning the Conservatorium proved highly controversial. It made its way to the 
New South Wales Ombudsman227 and the Independent Commission against 
Corruption.228 Gyles reported in November 2008,229 and this report became the 
subject matter and evidence in legal proceedings brought by the former Dean of the 
Conservatorium against the University of Sydney in the New South Wales Supreme 
Court.230 Gyles’ report, delivered at a time when he was an acting judge of that 
Supreme Court, was thus the evidence in a matter to be determined by that Court. 
 
3.3.4  Competency 
 
The appointment of practising legal professionals to temporary judicial positions 
might raise a question as to whether such individuals possess the same competency 
for the judicial role – in terms of relevant professional experience and skills – as those 
selected for permanent appointment. This might be a particular worry if a government 
is using temporary judicial appointments to ‘train’ or ‘test’ the competence and 
suitability of individuals for future permanent judicial appointment. As Ronald 
Sackville has suggested, before appointing a candidate as an acting judge their 
capacity and aptitude should be clear.231 Even if temporary appointees possess the 
necessary competence (and in most jurisdictions there are certainly legal 
practitioners who possess such competence), there is the danger of a perception 
amongst the public, and most troubling, the litigants who appear before such officers, 
that Temporary Judicial Officers are of a lesser quality. 
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The appointment of Temporary Judicial Officers from the ranks of former judges is a 
common practice. In some Australian jurisdictions, ostensibly to temper the concerns 
regarding infractions into judicial independence, Temporary Judicial Officers are only 
appointed from these ranks.  
 
The appointment, as temporary officers, of individuals who have passed the statutory 
age of compulsory judicial retirement raises questions as to whether they possess the 
necessary capacity in terms of being free of mental impairment, particularly age-
related illness such as dementia. The symptoms of mental impairment may not be 
easily identified by others, including diagnosis by medical practitioners, and may also 
go unnoticed by the individual themselves. Of course questions of age-related 
deterioration in mental health are not unique to the temporary appointment of retired 
judicial officers, and affect the permanent ranks of the judiciary as well, but are 
amplified in such a cohort by virtue of their age. 
 
Even where such reservations are unfounded in relation to individual former judges 
appointed as Temporary Judicial Officers, the fact that they are appointed after they 
have reached the mandatory statutory retirement age may give rise to a public 
perception that they are more likely to suffer age-related illnesses, or otherwise be 
beyond their peak. After all, this is at least part of the basis on which mandatory 
retirement ages were introduced (see Part 6 below). 
 
3.3.6  Impeding turnover 
 
While protecting judicial independence from the political branches of government, the 
system of judicial tenure operates as a tight restriction on turnover in this profession. 
The low rate of new appointees to the judicial role means that the reception by the 
courts of fresh ideas, both in terms of judicial craft but also on questions of 
administration and process, is postponed. This has the potential to enshrine a degree 
of conservatism within judicial ranks, which may inhibit the development of legal 
doctrine or efficient court practice. Mandatory retirement ages, to some degree, 
alleviate these potential disadvantages of judicial tenure.   
 
However, the practice of appointing former judges as Temporary Judicial Officers 
exacerbates the already low turnover and these potentially detrimental 
consequences. Judicial Officers are certainly alive to these concerns, as one 
respondent to our survey observed: 
 
There is some discussion, maybe even concern about the number of retired 
appeal judges returning to the Court of Appeal. Given the small number of 
appeal judges, and the capacity of a small number of them to exercise a 
disproportionate influence on appellate decisions, there is concern about the 
lack of renewal usually provided for by retirement. … 232 
 
And another said: 
 
I am not persuaded that circumventing the retirement age by having retired 
judges come back as acting judges is a good idea. It tends to perpetuate the 
lack of diversity and it does not encourage generational change in our courts.233 
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4. Empirical Analysis of Temporary Judicial Officers 
 
4.1 Desirability of data 
 
The Terms of Reference asked us to address the policy issues regarding the 
appointment, renewal, and case allocation of Temporary Judicial Officers. In Part 3 
of the Report, we explained that the use of Temporary Judicial Officers raises a 
number of theoretical concerns, but, to assess how significant these issues are in 
practice, it is necessary to determine the use made of Temporary Judicial Officers in 
Australian courts in empirical terms. (Please note that for ease in presenting and 
discussing the empirical data in this Part of the Report we adopt the acronym ‘TJO’ 
for Temporary Judicial Officers).234 
 
The relevance of empiricism was addressed in the 2006 case, Forge v Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission, where the High Court considered a 
constitutional challenge to the legislation authorising the appointment of acting 
judges to the Supreme Court of New South Wales.235 As noted in Part 3, it was claimed 
that s 37 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) compromised the independence and 
impartiality that the Supreme Court was required to possess in order for the Court 
to be a suitable recipient of federal jurisdiction. Kirby J (dissenting) held that 
statistics on acting appointments in New South Wales were relevant to this question 
because they demonstrated a clear change in the composition of the Supreme Court 
over time, and this trend should enliven the concern and response of the Court.236 
By contrast, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ held that no quantitative criterion 
should be adopted as limiting the state’s power to appoint acting judges, while 
Gleeson CJ cautioned that ‘quantitative analysis may be misleading’.237 However, it 
is important to note that Gleeson CJ did not reject the relevance of data in answering 
the question posed in that case. Rather, His Honour rejected the unsophisticated use 
of data on acting judges – such as data that failed to consider the number of acting 
appointments relative to the number of permanent judges, or data that failed to reflect 
the actual time for which acting judges sat. 
 
This study considers that proper attention to data can significantly inform our 
understanding and appreciation of the concerns around the practice of using TJOs. 
However, as Gleeson CJ indicated in Forge v ASIC, this understanding cannot flow 
from an artless use of statistics that fails to provide sufficiently fine-grained 
information about the patterns of use. 
 
4.2 Data collection and analysis 
 
Empirical data on the Australian judiciary is limited,238 and this is also true of data 
about TJOs. Official statistics are minimal, and publicly available data typically suffer 
from being too highly aggregated. For example, the Australian Productivity 
Commission produces an annual Report on Government Services, which gives data on 
the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) judicial officers in each state and territory 
court.239 However, the data do not distinguish between (a) the full-time service of 
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PJOs, (b) the fractional service of permanent part-time judicial officers, or (c) the 
additional service of TJOs. As a result, it is necessary to rely on two alternative 
sources of information on TJOs. 
 
One potential source of information about TJOs is the reports that most courts 
publish annually, outlining their work and performance over the previous financial 
or calendar year. Some courts provide a fair amount of information on TJOs in these 
publications. In other courts, reporting on TJOs is minimal or entirely absent, making 
it difficult to make comparisons between courts within or across jurisdictions. Annual 
reports have been utilised in this study only where it has been necessary to source 
information that could not be obtained elsewhere. 
 
To overcome this gap in knowledge, we requested that the Judicial Conference of 
Australia (JCA) seek information directly from state and territory courts. Information 
was requested from 21 courts, comprising all three levels of the court hierarchy 
(Supreme, District/County, and Magistrates/Local) in five jurisdictions (New South 
Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia), and two levels of 
the court hierarchy (Supreme, Magistrates/Local) in three jurisdictions (Tasmania, 
Northern Territory, ACT). The federal courts were not canvassed because, as noted in 
Part 3 above, there is a constitutional barrier to appointing federal judicial officers on 
a temporary basis. Moreover, the study did not include specialist courts, such as the 
New South Wales Land and Environment Court; but this is unlikely to have a 
significant bearing on the overall findings because specialist courts form a very small 
proportion of the entire Australian judiciary. 
 
The courts were asked to provide information for the past five annual reporting 
periods (2010/11 to 2014/15, or 2011–2015, depending on the reporting year 
adopted). Information was requested in response to nine questions that reflected 
issues identified as the principal concerns with respect to temporary judicial 
appointments. The topics of these questions were: 
 
 
1. the number of TJOs holding office in the reporting year; 
2. the number of PJOs holding office in the reporting year; 
3. the number of days of service by all TJOs during the reporting year; 
4. the number of days of service by all PJOs during the reporting year; 
5. the length of commission of each TJO holding office during the reporting 
year; 
6. the age of each TJO; 
7. the number of TJOs who previously held a commission as a PJO of that 
court or another court; 
8. the number of TJOs who previously held an appointment as a TJO of that 
court; and 




Of the 21 courts approached by the JCA, substantive responses were received from 
19 courts, comprising 7 Supreme Courts, 4 District/County Courts, and 8 
Magistrates/Local Courts. This provides a rich source of data about the practice of 
using TJOs in Australian courts. The notable omissions were the Supreme Court of 
New South Wales and the District Court of New South Wales. Together, these two 
courts accounted for 12.6% of the FTE judiciary in the states and territories in 
2015.240 Their omission is unfortunate because they are the largest Supreme Courts 
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and District Courts in Australia. To minimise the impact of this gap, as well as to 
supplement the responses made by courts where this proved to be incomplete or 
ambiguous, substantial efforts were taken to source relevant information from other 
published sources, including the courts’ annual reports. However, the data available 
from these publications are not as detailed as that available from the direct survey of 
other courts. Where relevant, any gaps in the data are noted in the notes to the 
Figures below. For example, at the time of collating the data, the annual review of the 
New South Wales Supreme Court for 2015, and the annual report of the Victorian 
Supreme Court for 2014/15 were not available, resulting in one year of missing data 
for some variables for those courts. 
 
Despite the breadth of the information obtained directly from the courts, there are 
inherent limitations in the data, which should be borne in mind when interpreting 
the results. The first limitation relates to temporal coverage. For reasons of 
practicality, the request made to the courts was limited to five years of data. It may 
be that significant trends in judicial practices are revealed only over longer time 
horizons, such as the 103 years of data presented by Kirby J in Forge v ASIC. 
Nevertheless, five years of data gives a useful contemporary snapshot, even if it is too 
short an interval from which to make confident predictions about long-term trends.  
 
In any attempt to compare the data, it must be remembered that some courts 
provided the data by financial year and others by calendar year, in accordance with 
their regular reporting practices. The data for courts reporting by calendar year were 
aggregated with the financial year data as follows: 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
FY2010-11 FY2011-12 FY2012-13 FY2013-14 FY2014-15 
 
A second limitation relates to consistency. The questions addressed to the courts were 
couched in simple language, without detailed exposition of the ‘counting rules’ that 
should be employed to facilitate uniform data collection and analysis. This approach 
was taken to accommodate the considerable variety of practices across the 21 courts, 
and to minimise the burden on the courts in compiling the data. Wherever possible, 
we have made appropriate adjustments to compensate for apparent differences in the 
way individual courts counted the data. Where data are not available for specific 
courts, this is noted, bearing in mind that the specific gaps vary from question to 
question. 
 
4.3 Number of Temporary Judicial Officers 
 
Each court was asked to report on the number of TJOs who held office during the 
reporting year. This is a count of the number of people who held such office, not the 
number of commissions held. This is an important distinction given that TJOs may 
hold more than one commission during a 12-month period, and in some courts often 
do so. Moreover, the count is based on the number of individuals who held office 
during the course of each year, which differs from the number who hold office on a 
particular census day, for example, at the end of the reporting year. The intention 
was to include TJOs with short commissions, who would otherwise be undercounted 
in a census taken at the end of the reporting period. 
 
The total number of persons who held office as TJOs across all states and territories 
was quite stable over the 5-year period 2010/11 to 2014/15. The overall number fell 
slightly from 147 officers in 2010/11 to 139 officers in 2014/15 (a fall of 5.4%), with 
a mean of 143.0 officers (Figure 4.3.1). 
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Figure 4.3.1: Number of TJOs, all jurisdictions, 2010/11 to 2014/15 
 
 
Despite the relative stability over time in the total number of TJOs across Australia, 
there was substantial variation in numbers across jurisdictions (Figure 4.3.2). New 
South Wales had by far the greatest number of TJOs, averaging 57.6 annually over 
the 5-year period, followed by Queensland (25.8 TJOs), Victoria (20.4 TJOs) and 
South Australia (15 TJOs), with Tasmania being the smallest user (2.2 TJOs). There 
were also temporal trends in the data in some states and territories. The use of TJOs 
appears to have been rising in Victoria, South Australia and the ACT, but falling in 
Queensland and Western Australia. 
 
Figure 4.3.2: Number of TJOs, by jurisdiction and year, 2010/11 to 2014/15 
 
 
When examined by level of the court hierarchy, there was also significant variation 
in the observed pattern of TJOs (Figure 4.3.3). Aggregating courts of equivalent 
hierarchy across Australia, the Supreme Courts and District/County Courts 
accounted for similar numbers of TJOs – respectively averaging 26.4 and 27.6 TJOs 
annually. These values were fairly stable over time. The Magistrates/Local Courts 
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4.4 Ratio of Temporary Judicial Officers to Permanent Judicial Officers 
 
The absolute number of TJOs provides only a rough guide to the importance of this 
type of commission to the judicial system as a whole because it gives no measure of 
relative scale. Other things being equal, one would expect larger courts to have more 
TJOs than smaller courts. A significant consideration in evaluating TJOs is thus the 
size of this cohort relative to the number of Permanent Judicial Officers (PJOs) – a 
point made by Gleeson CJ in Forge v ASIC. To assess this, the courts were also asked 
to report on the number of PJOs who held office during each reporting year. As with 
the calculation of TJOs, this was a count of persons rather than commissions. It 
included both full-time and part-time judicial officers, but it is known from other 
studies that the proportion of the permanent judiciary who work part-time is very 
small.241 
 
The statistics provided by the courts were used to compute the ratio of TJOs to PJOs 
for Australia as a whole and by other categories. For convenience, we have designated 
this ratio, based on the count of persons, as RPER. The interpretation of the ratio is 
straightforward. If court has, say, 10 TJOs and 40 PJOs, the value of RPER is 10/40, 
or 0.25. Alternatively stated, a ratio of 0.25 means that there are four times (=1/0.25) 
as many PJOs as TJOs. 
 
For Australia as a whole, RPER ranged between 0.159 and 0.172 over the five-year 
period in question, with an average value of 0.166 (Figure 4.4.1). In other words, there 
were approximately six times as many PJOs as TJOs in Australia in this period. This 
ratio was quite stable over the five-year interval, which is to be expected because the 
underlying number of TJOs and PJOs is itself quite stable over the period. This was 
true both for Australia as a whole and for most jurisdictions. In view of this, it is not 
necessary to examine further time trends, and reference will henceforth be made to 





                                           
241 Brian Opeskin, ‘The Supply of Judicial Labour: Optimising a Scarce Resource in 
Australia’ (2017) 7 Onati Socio-Legal Series (forthcoming). 
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Figure 4.4.1: Ratio of TJOs to PJOs (RPER), all jurisdictions, by year, 2010/11 
to 2014/15 
 
Notes: Data are unavailable for PJOs and TJOs in the NSW Supreme Court for 2015, 
and for TJOs in the Victorian Supreme Court in 2010/11 to 2012/13. 
 
Despite the relative stability in RPER across Australia over time, there is substantial 
variation by court hierarchy. The ratio is lowest in the District Courts (RPER=0.122) 
and highest in the Magistrates Courts (RPER=0.193), with the Supreme Courts 
occupying the middle of the field (RPER=0.152) (see Figure 4.5, col A, below). This 
suggests that, for Australia as a whole, the intermediate courts are the most stably 
staffed by permanent appointees, while the lower courts rely more heavily on 
temporary commissions. 
 
There are also significant differences from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Figure 4.4.2 
gives a disaggregated picture of the ratio of TJOs to PJOs by court level and 
jurisdiction. Thus, one can contrast a single court level across states (for example, 
all Supreme Courts use circle markers), or one can examine a jurisdiction across 
court levels (for example, by comparing the three different markers for New South 
Wales). The latter exercise demonstrates that, even within a single state or territory, 
substantially different practices arise from court to court. 
 
Specifically, Western Australia (RPER=0.09), Victoria (RPER=0.09) and Tasmania 
(RPER=0.10) make the least use of TJOs across their court systems (for simplicity, the 
figures quoted are aggregated data for all courts within each jurisdiction). For these 
jurisdictions, there are 10 or 11 times more PJOs than TJOs. These states may be 
contrasted with two small jurisdictions – Northern Territory (RPER=0.38) and the ACT 
(RPER=0.49) – where temporary commissions have a very high relative prominence. To 
a degree, these results can be explained by the size of the jurisdiction. In the ACT, 
for example, over the past five years there has been an annual average 6.2 TJOs 
against the 12.6 PJOs, and in that context a few temporary appointments can have 
a measurable bearing on the metrics. New South Wales, South Australia and 
Queensland are noteworthy because they are large jurisdictions, in terms of their 
judiciaries, and make quite high use of TJOs relative to PJOs, with ratios of 
RPER=0.23, RPER=0.19, and RPER=0.17, respectively. 
 
The ratio of TJOs to PJOs offers a valuable perspective on the use of TJOs in 
Australia. Consider, for example, the historical data presented by Kirby J in Forge v 
ASIC, referred to in Part 3 above. Justice Kirby discussed the large and growing 
number of TJOs in the New South Wales Supreme Court from 1989 to 2004, but 
Figure 4.4.2 shows that the number of TJOs relative to PJOs in that Court is not 
excessive relative to other Australian Courts. Over the period 2011-14 (which differs 
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from the period considered by Kirby J), there was an average of 9.8 TJOs to 54.8 
PJOs, leading to a ratio of 0.18—in other words there were 5.6 permanent judges on 
the New South Wales Supreme Court for every temporary appointee. This is a better 
ratio than 9 of the 21 courts evaluated in this study, including the New South Wales 
District Court and Local Court. 
 
Figure 4.4.2: Ratio of TJOs to PJOs (RPER) by jurisdiction and court level, 
2010/11 to 2014/15 
 
Notes: Data are unavailable for PJOs and TJOs in the NSW Supreme Court for 2015, 
and for TJOs in the Victorian Supreme Court in 2010/11 to 2012/13. 
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4.5 Days of service 
 
Some courts, although having the capacity to engage TJOs, do not use them to the 
full extent permitted by their commissions. For example, a TJO with a three-month 
commission might be asked to sit for only a few days during that period, depending 
on the needs of the court at the time. It is thus possible that the ratio of TJOs to PJOs 
considered in Part 4.4 still overstates the importance of TJOs in the staffing of the 
courts. This is because permanent officers, with regular court lists and 
institutionalised sitting arrangements, are likely to be more fully utilised than 
temporary officers in any sitting week. Courts were therefore asked to report on the 
number of days of service of TJOs during the reporting year, and to provide 
comparative data on the number of days of service of PJOs. From this it is possible 
to undertake a more detailed analysis based on the actual use of TJOs relative to 
PJOs, rather than relying solely on a count of heads. 
 
Considerable work was required to make these comparisons possible. Some courts 
advised that statistics on sitting days were not available for PJOs. In such cases we 
constructed data based on annual court reports showing the composition of the court 
at a specified date, and known dates of judicial appointment, retirement or death. 
Other courts did provide the requested data, but it became apparent that the basis 
of their calculations differed, and it was thus necessary to revise the data so that the 
same counting rules applied across all courts. For example, if a TJO with a three-
month commission was shown as sitting for 20 days, this was accepted at face value; 
but if a TJO with a three-month commission was shown as sitting for 90 days (which 
includes all weekends), an adjustment was necessary to reflect actual working days. 
This was done on the assumption that judicial officers work five out of seven days 
per week, so that 90 sitting days was scaled down to 64.3 sitting days (=90 x 5/7). 
Similar adjustments were made for PJOs. 
 
These adjustments do not take into account leave and court vacations, and 
consequently the calculated number of sitting days may be greater than the actual 
number. The same methodology was applied to the sitting days of TJOs (the 
numerator) and PJOs (the denominator), so the relativities would remain largely 
unaffected by the absence of an adjustment for leave and vacations, provided that 
TJOs and PJOs had equal access to these benefits. However, if PJOs are more likely 
than TJOs to have access to leave and court vacations (as discussed in Part 2), the 
results may be skewed. No information was available to us regarding the leave 
arrangements of TJOs, which may well depend on the length of their commissions. 
To the extent that PJOs are more likely than TJOs to have access to leave and 
holidays, the importance of TJOs relative to PJOs is likely to be understated by a 
small margin because the denominator (days of service of PJOs) will be overstated. 
 
On this basis, the average number of sitting days of TJOs across the 5-year period 
was compared to the average number of sitting days of PJOs for each court and 
jurisdiction. The resultant ratio, calculated on days of service, has been designated 
RDOS. Figure 4.5 shows the value of RDOS (Column B), and compares this to the 
analogous ratio calculated in Part 4.4 by reference to the number persons rather than 
the number of days (Column A). In calculating the totals by level of court hierarchy, 
Western Australia and Tasmania were excluded due to unavailability of data for TJOs, 
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Figure 4.5: Ratio of TJOs to PJOs, by court level and jurisdiction, 2010/11 to 
2014/15 
 
Notes: Western Australia and Tasmania are wholly excluded from the tally by court 
due to unavailability of data for TJOs, PJOs, or both. In addition, ratios for the listed 
courts do not include some years for which annual data are unavailable for TJOs, 
PJOs, or both. 
 
To better explain the significance of the table, consider the example of New South 
Wales. Over the 5-year period 2010/11 to 2014/15 and three court levels, on average 
TJOs in New South Wales contributed 874 sitting days per court per year, while PJOs 
contributed 22,870 sitting days per court per year. For New South Wales as a whole, 
this results in a ratio of 0.038 TJOs per PJO (Column B), based on sitting days 
(RDOS=874/22,870). However, when the same calculation is made on the basis of the 
number of persons, as it was in Part 4.4, TJOs appear to have greater significance. 
On average there were 20.6 TJOs per court per year compared to 91.3 PJOs. This 
yields a ratio of 0.225 (RPER=20.6/91.3) (Column A). Comparison of the two ratios 
allows us to construct a measure of the relative overstatement, which is shown in 
Column C and calculated as the ratio of the ratios (RPER/RDOS=0.225/0.038), which 
in this case equals 5.89. 
 
These data confirm the hypothesis that the ratio of TJOs to PJOs based on head 
count overstates the importance of TJOs in the staffing of the courts. When account 
is taken of the sitting days of TJOs, the use of TJOs in Australian courts is far more 
modest. Across all Australian courts (excluding Western Australia and Tasmania) the 
former measure overstates the use of TJOs relative to PJOs by a factor of 4.41 
(Figure 4.5). This overstatement is greatest for South Australia and least for 
Queensland. However, these calculations should only be taken as generally 
indicative, given the limitations of the data and the methodology that has been 
adopted to accommodate this. 
 
The survey of courts reveals only the raw statistics and the computed ratios. These 
do not in themselves answer the question of whether the use of TJOs has reached 
the levels at which there might be concern that they are affecting the character of the 
state courts, and undermining the requirement that these courts be principally 
constituted by permanent judges. When that line is crossed is not altogether clear. 
But we can say on the basis of the available data, that the ratios are relatively low 
when comparing the relative days of service between the temporary and permanent 
judicial workforce. 
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4.6 Duration of temporary commissions 
 
The courts were asked to provide data on the term of appointment (that is, the length 
of commission) of each TJO who held office during the reporting year. Where a TJO 
held more than one commission during the year, courts were asked to specify the 
length of each commission. The purpose of this inquiry was to ascertain whether 
temporary positions are being used to fill small gaps in the judicial labour force or 
longer term shortfalls. Of the 21 courts surveyed, 15 provided data of sufficient 
granularity to enable useful calculations to be made. The data for individual courts 
reflects both the statutory framework, which typically limits the maximum duration 
of temporary commissions (see Part 2.4), and the practice of the executive in making 
appointments within those limits. 
 
Summarising for Australia as a whole, the data set included 475 TJO commissions 
in the 5-year period under study. Of these, 15.2% (n=72) were in the Supreme Courts; 
5.3% (n=25) were in the District/County Courts; and 79.6% (n=378) were in the 
Magistrates Courts (Figure 4.6). It should be noted, however, that this distribution 
reflects the non-responses from several key superior and intermediate courts. A 
weighted average duration can be computed from the available data, using the ratio 
of the number of commissions in each court to the total number of commissions as 
weights. On this basis, the Australia-wide weighted average TJO commission was 
8.75 months in duration. This average is driven largely by the practice of two courts 
(New South Wales Magistrates and Victorian Magistrates), which together accounted 
for 56% of all TJO commissions over the 5-year period. 
 
The data once again reveal substantial variations by court level and by jurisdiction 
(Figure 4.6). Some courts offered commissions for substantial terms on a regular 
basis. For example, the ACT Magistrates Court had a total of 16 TJO commissions 
over the 5-year period, of which 12 commissions were for 36 months and four were 
for 12 months. This is reflected in the average term of 30 months in that Court, which 
is the highest average of all the surveyed courts. Similarly, the New South Wales Local 
Court had a total of 136 TJO commissions over the 5-year period, and all but seven 
of them were for 12-month periods. This is reflected in the average term of 11.57 
months in that Court. Nearly all the New South Wales data predates the statutory 
extension of the maximum term of acting judicial officers from 12 months to five 
years, which came into force on 15 May 2015.242 It is not known to what extent the 
new maximum has since been reflected in the appointment practice of the executive. 
 
By contrast, some courts engaged TJOs on quite short commissions, either on a one-
off basis or on a recurring basis. The shortest commission in the data set was just 3 
days (Victorian Magistrates Court), and other short commissions included one week 
(Western Australian Magistrates Court) and 23 days (Tasmanian Supreme Court). 
There were other courts in which the commissions of TJOs extended for a few months 
at a time, but several commissions were given to a single person in the course of a 
year. For example, in the Victorian Magistrates Court in 2014/15, 17 persons 
received 41 commissions as TJOs, and of these, four magistrates received one 
commission each, two magistrates received two commissions each, and 11 
magistrates received three commissions each. 
 
Gaps in the data make it difficult to discern clear trends across jurisdictions and 
court levels. Rounding out the picture provided by examining the relevant legislative 
provisions in Part 2, it appears that some jurisdictions generally appoint TJOs on 
longer-term commissions, and this practice is applied consistently across all court 
levels in that state or territory. An example is South Australia, where the average 
                                           
242 Courts and Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2015 (NSW) s 2 and sch 3. 
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length of commissions was 10.93 months in the Supreme Court, 12.0 months in the 
District Court, and 12.0 months in the Magistrates Court. In other courts the practice 
is consistently the other way, with shorter commissions being the norm. Thus, in 
Queensland, the average commission was 4.55 months in the Supreme Court and 
2.27 months in the District Court. 
 
Figure 4.6: Average duration of temporary commissions, by jurisdiction and court 
level, 2010/11 to 2014/15 
 
Notes: Data were unavailable for NSW (Supreme and District), Queensland (Magistrates), 
Tasmania (Magistrates), Northern Territory (Supreme) and ACT (Supreme). There is no 
District Court in Tasmania, Northern Territory or the ACT. 
 
4.7 Age of Temporary Judicial Officers 
 
The age of TJOs offers potentially useful information about the type of person who 
fills temporary judicial roles and the circumstances in which they do so. For example, 
age data might indicate whether TJOs are typically judicial retirees or individuals at 
various levels of seniority in their legal careers. The courts were thus asked to provide 
data on the age (in years and months), at the end of the reporting year, of each TJO 
who held office during that year. Age data was collected from 17 courts; the omissions 
being the New South Wales Supreme Court and District Court, and the ACT Supreme 
Court and Magistrates Court. The data for individual courts reflects both the 
statutory framework, which typically limits the maximum age of TJOs (see Part 2.6), 
and the practice of the executive in making appointments within those age limits. 
 
The data comprised annual statistics on the age of each TJO who held office during 
the reporting period. Viewed over the 5-year period, this is not a count of persons but 
rather ‘age observations’ based on an annual census at the end of the reporting 
period. For example, a magistrate who held office as a TJO for five successive years 
would yield five age observations—e.g., 65.5, 66.5, 67.5, 68.5 and 69.5 years. Across 
Australia, this counting method resulted in a total of 475 age observations. 
 
For Australia as a whole, the age distribution of TJOs is illustrated in Figure 4.7.1. 
The largest group comprised those aged 60–69 years, which accounted for 57.7% 
(n=274) of all age observations, followed by those aged 70–79 years, which accounted 
for 27.6% (n=131). The fact that more than one-quarter of the observations related to 
the 70–79 age group indicates that judicial retirees are an important source of the 
TJO labour force. This is so because the mandatory retirement age for judicial officers 
is 70 or 72 years in nearly all jurisdictions (the exceptions being magistrates in 
Western Australia and the ACT, who must retire at age 65). While there is often an 
assumption that TJOs are drawn almost exclusively from the ranks of former judges 
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and magistrates, there were quite a number of TJOs aged in their 40s (6.3%, n=30), 
and in their 50s (8.4%, n=40). 
 
Figure 4.7.1: Age distribution of TJOs, all jurisdictions, 2010/11 to 2014/15 
 
Notes: Age data were not available for NSW (Supreme Court and District Court) and 
the ACT (Supreme Court and Magistrates Court). 
 
It is also useful to consider the age data disaggregated by jurisdiction and court 
(Figure 4.7.2). For each court for which information was provided, the figure shows 
the average of all TJO age observations over the 5-year period 2011/11 to 2014/15. 
The Australia-wide average across all 475 observations is 65.4 years, but the averages 
for individual courts ranged from a high of 72 years (Tasmanian Supreme Court) to 
a low of 52.7 years (Queensland District Court). Consistently with the frequency 
distribution shown above, Figure 4.7.2 also shows that the large majority of court 
averages fall in the 60–70 year band. 
 
There are only a few discernible patterns of note. South Australia has relatively high 
average ages across all courts in its hierarchy, and Queensland conversely has 
relatively low average ages across all of its courts. The place of a court in the hierarchy 
generally seems to have no particular bearing on the average age of its TJOs. 
 
Figure 4.7.2: Average age of TJOs, by jurisdiction and court, 2010/11 to 
2014/15 
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Notes: Age data were not available for NSW (Supreme Court and District Court) and 
the ACT (Supreme Court and Magistrates Court). 
 
 
4.8 Prior permanent commissions 
 
The courts were asked to report on the number of TJOs who previously held a 
commission as a PJO of that court or another court. Alternatively expressed, this was 
the number of TJOs in each reporting period who had, at some time, retired or 
resigned from a permanent judicial position. The purpose of the question was to 
ascertain the extent to which the workforce of TJOs is drawn from the ranks of former 
judges and magistrates. This has implications for their level of expertise, and is 
presumably also correlated with the average age of TJOs. 
 
Of the courts surveyed, 16 provided answers to this question (the omitted courts are 
listed in the notes to Figure 4.8). The data comprised an annual tally of each TJO 
who held office on the court during the year who had also once been a PJO. The 
annual data were averaged to smooth out fluctuations, and thus provide a clearer 
picture of the courts’ practice over the whole period under study. These averages are 
illustrated in Figure 4.8 by the dark shaded column for each court (the 16 courts are 
shown across two graphs for visual ease, but it should be noted that the scale of the 
vertical axis differs in the bottom panel to accommodate the small numbers in some 
jurisdictions). 
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Figure 4.8: Number of TJOs who were previously PJOs, by jurisdiction and 
court, 5-year annual averages 2010/11 to 2014/15 
 
 
Notes: Data on the prior appointment history of TJOs were not available for NSW 
(Supreme Court and District Court), Victoria (Supreme Court), Queensland (Supreme 
Court) and Tasmania (Magistrates Court). 
 
These figures gain meaning when compared to the total number of TJOs in each court 
(also based on 5-year annual averages), as discussed in Part 4.3 above. The later data 
are illustrated in Figure 4.8 by the light shaded column for each court. When a 
comparison is made between the height of the dark and light columns for each court, 
it is easy to see the relative importance of former PJOs in the TJO labour force. For 
example, in the Victorian Magistrates Court (top panel), on average 13.2 of the 15.0 
TJOs held prior office as a PJO. 
 
In five courts for which data are available (New South Wales Local Court, South 
Australian District Court and Magistrates Court, Western Australian Magistrates 
Court, and Tasmanian Supreme Court), the average number of TJOs who were 
previously PJOs is identical to the average number of TJOs. The implication is that 
every TJO in those courts was once a PJO. Moreover, in four other courts (Victoria 
County Court and Magistrates Court, South Australian Supreme Court, and ACT 
Supreme Court), the number of TJOs who were previously PJOs differs by no more 
than 20% from the total number of TJOs, suggesting heavy reliance on former PJOs. 
The courts that stand out as making least reliance on former PJOs are the 
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Queensland Magistrates Court, the Northern Territory Supreme Court and Local 
Court, and the ACT Magistrates Court. 
 
4.9 Prior temporary commissions 
 
The courts were asked to report on the number of TJOs who previously held a 
temporary commission on that court. The purpose of this question was to ascertain 
the extent to which TJOs are drawn from a pool of ‘repeat players’. As noted in 
Part 3.3, one of the concerns identified in the literature is the threat to judicial 
independence from recurring reappointment, and the risk that the appointee might 
be, or appear to be, beholden to the executive for continuation of judicial office. 
 
Of the courts surveyed, only 11 provided answers to this question (the omitted courts 
are listed in the notes to Figure 4.9). This is just over half the total number of courts 
surveyed, representing about 66% of all persons appointed as TJOs in Australia over 
the period 2010/11 to 2014/15. The results should be interpreted with this sample 
limitation in mind. The data comprised an annual tally of each TJO who held office 
on the court during the year who had also once been a TJO of that court. As 
previously, the annual data were averaged to smooth out fluctuations. These averages 
are illustrated in Figure 4.9 by the dark shaded column for each court. 
 
Figure 4.9: Number of TJOs with prior temporary commissions, by jurisdiction 
and court, 5-year annual averages 2010/11 to 2014/15 
 
Notes: Data on the history of prior temporary appointments of TJOs were not 
available for NSW (Supreme, District), Victoria (Supreme, County), Queensland 
(Supreme), Tasmania (Magistrates), Northern Territory (Supreme), and ACT 
(Supreme, Magistrates). 
 
Once again, these figures gain meaning when compared to the total number of TJOs 
in each court (also based on 5-year annual averages). The later data are illustrated 
in Figure 4.9 by the light shaded columns. When a comparison is made between the 
height of the dark and light columns for each court, it is easy to see the relative 
importance of former TJOs in the TJO labour force. For example, in the Victorian 
Magistrates Court, on average 12.2 of the 15.0 TJOs held prior office as a TJO. 
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In five courts, the number of TJOs who held previous office as a TJO differs by no 
more than 20% from the total number of TJOs, suggesting heavy reliance on the 
reappointment of TJOs. Interestingly, these courts were all Magistrates/Local Courts, 
being those in New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia and the 
Northern Territory. There was a similar number of courts in which the ratio of TJOs 
with prior temporary commissions was low. These were Queensland (District), South 
Australia (District), all three courts in Western Australia, and Tasmania (Supreme). 
 
Theory suggests that it is the Magistrates Courts – with the highest proportion of 
recurring appointments – that suffer the greatest threat to judicial independence from 
temporary commissions.  At first this may appear surprising because the vast bulk 
of their work relates to less serious criminal offences, in which judicial 
accommodation of the views of the executive appears to be unlikely. However, it is 
consistent with the view expressed by one respondent to our survey of judicial officers 
(see Part 3.3.1 above), namely, that Attorneys-General have often selected as TJOs 
those retiring magistrates whose approach to sentencing is consistent with the 
government’s ‘law and order agenda’. 
 
4.10 Case allocation of Temporary Judicial Officers 
 
Finally, the courts were asked whether the temporary status of a TJO is relevant to 
case allocation in that court, and if so how. We were interested in examining whether 
the temporary nature of the judicial commission affected the type of cases determined 
by those officers, whether by reason of subject matter (for example, civil or criminal), 
expected length of hearing, or other circumstance. As discussed in Part 3, one 
circumstance identified in the literature is that TJOs—potentially beholden to the 
executive for renewal of their short commissions—might be allocated cases in which 
rights and liabilities could be adjudicated favourably to government. 
 
Of the 21 courts surveyed, 16 responded to this question; the non-responses being 
New South Wales (Supreme Court and District Court), Tasmania (Magistrates Court), 
Northern Territory (Supreme Court), and ACT (Magistrates Court). Of the 16 
responses, eight courts indicated unequivocally that the temporary status of a TJO 
was not relevant to case allocation. A representative response from this group was 
that of the Chief Magistrate of Victoria, Peter Lauritsen, who stated: 
 
Reserve Magistrates in Victoria are treated no differently to full time 
magistrates, in respect to either case allocations or work expectations. They 
simply undertake whatever work or list that is requested of them, at any venues 
around the State. 
 
Similarly, the Chief Magistrate of Queensland, Judge Orazio Rinaudo, stated: 
 
An Acting Judicial Officer’s acting status is not relevant to case allocation on 
court. Acting Magistrates are expected to take on any type of judicial function 
required of a permanent appointment. 
 
However, other heads of jurisdiction suggested that the temporary status of the TJO 
might be relevant to case allocation for a range of reasons. One reason related to 
subject matter. The Chief Judge of the Western Australian District Court, Kevin 
Sleight, indicated that the allocation of an acting judicial officer to civil or criminal 
cases was sometimes determined by the commission of appointment. The Chief 
Magistrate of the Northern Territory stated that, while there was no formal restriction 
on case allocation, ‘the majority of the time [an] acting Judicial Officer sits in the 
general bail and arrest court.’ 
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A second circumstance that affected the allocation of TJOs to cases in some courts 
was the short-term nature of their appointment. The Chief Justice of Victoria, Marilyn 
Warren, observed that: 
 
Status as a reserve judge is relevant to case allocation in as much as reserve 
judges are generally engaged for a certain period of time and therefore cases 
are allocated keeping in mind that the term of the engagement will cease at a 
certain date. 
 
Her Honour noted that most reserve judges in the Supreme Court sit in the Court of 
Appeal, whose work is more compatible with engagement for a defined period. In her 
Honour’s view ‘it is more difficult to allocate trial work where settlement and running 
over is more prevalent’. 
 
The Chief Justice of South Australia, Chris Kourakis, also identified length of trial as 
a relevant consideration in the allocation of civil cases to acting judicial officers in the 
District Court, but this factor pointed in the opposite direction. The implication 
seemed to be that long or complex civil trials can disrupt the roster of permanent 
judges and create an impediment to prompt judgment. In such circumstances, it 
might be appropriate to allocate such cases to a TJO, if one were available. 
 
A third circumstance identified as affecting case allocation relates to the unusual 
circumstances that can prompt the appointment of TJOs in the first place (see 
Part 3.2). The Chief Justice of Western Australia, Wayne Martin, stated that all the 
circumstances in which an acting judicial officer had been appointed to his Court in 
the 5-year period were ‘quite unusual’.243 Three of the four cases arose from conflicts 
of interest, which made it inappropriate for a permanent judge of the Court to hear 
the cases in question. These included a murder trial in which the victim had been a 
Registrar of the court (discussed in detail in Part 3.2.2); an appeal in the lengthy and 
complex Bell litigation; and a professional negligence claim in which a member of the 
Court had been briefed while at the Bar. Although not expressed in these terms, the 
implication from His Honour’s comment was that the temporary status of the acting 
judge was critical to case allocation in each case because their status as an ‘outsider’ 
was the very reason for their appointment in an acting capacity.  
 
The Chief Justice of Tasmania, Alan Blow, made a similar point in respect of the sole 
appointment of an acting judge to that Supreme Court in the period 2010/11 to 
2014/15. That person ‘was appointed to hear and determine a single case’. This was 
a case in which the Supreme Court was asked to review a decision of a magistrate in 
which the Tasmanian Director of Public Prosecutions had been found guilty of 
causing death by negligent driving. Presumably, that case too presented a conflict of 
interest issue. 
 
In summary, the responses of heads of jurisdiction to this question made it clear that 
the temporary status of a TJO may affect the civil/criminal subject matter of 
proceedings allocated to them; their availability for long or complex cases; and the 
allocation of cases that cannot be heard by permanent members of a court because 
of conflicts of interest. However, beyond these considerations, there is no evidence 
that temporary status is relevant to case allocation. 
 
  
                                           
243 This might be explained by the circumstance that, in Western Australia, the role 
typically attributed to ‘acting judges’ in other jurisdictions is there performed by 
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5.  Evaluating Temporary Judicial Officers 
 
The use of Temporary Judicial Officers, when appointed for legitimate temporary 
reasons and under appropriate conditions, contributes to the effective functioning of 
the court system. However, to ensure the use of Temporary Judicial Officers is not 
abused for improper reasons, it must be subject to limits. 
 
Part 2 identified the complex and varied regimes for the appointment and tenure of 
Temporary Judicial Officers across the Australian states and territories. It 
demonstrated the existence of substantial variation between jurisdictions and even 
levels of court within the one jurisdiction. Such variation can be positive, in that it 
facilitates the crafting of regimes that suit local conditions. However, our analysis 
reveals an unnecessary degree of statutory complexity and opacity. In Part 3, we 
explained the varied justifications and concerns about the use of and arrangements 
for Temporary Judicial Officers, including that they may undermine the proper 
functioning of, and public confidence in, the judiciary. Notably, the potential for 
Temporary Judicial Officers to be used as a temporary fix for a systemic workload 
problem or to undermine the independence of the judicial arm, were both raised as 
concerns by surveyed judicial officers. In Part 4, we analysed data provided by 19 
Australian courts to reveal the nature and extent of the use of Temporary Judicial 
Officers, and drew on this data to throw light on the justifications and concerns set 
out in Part 3. 
 
In this Part, we bring together the concerns regarding the lack of clarity and 
consistency in regimes with those more fundamental objections to the use of 
Temporary Judicial Officers. Recognising the ongoing benefits of local variation and 
adaptation, we evaluate the key risks associated with the use of Temporary Judicial 
Officers. 
 
5.1 Threshold Matters 
 
5.1.1 Quantitative restrictions  
 
A significant driver for the appointment and use of Temporary Judicial Officers 
appears to be the funding and efficiency gains thought to be attendant on the 
appointment of judicial officers to meet short term or particular needs. As noted in 
Part 3.2 above, as a workload management strategy, this use of Temporary Judicial 
Officers has support from surveyed judicial officers (see further Schedule 2(A)). 
 
In Forge v ASIC, Gleeson CJ issued a cautionary statement that the appointment of 
Temporary Judicial Officers could in ‘extreme cases’ affect the ‘character’ of the 
court,244 and put weight on the requirement in the legislation under consideration 
that the court be ‘principally’ staffed by Permanent Judicial Officers.245 This might 
suggest that some limit on the numbers and contribution of Temporary Judicial 
Officers should be stipulated.  
 
Three sets of data speak to this possible concern: the ratio of Temporary Judicial 
Officers to Permanent Judicial Officers, the duration of Temporary Judicial Officer 
commissions, and the frequency of repeated appointments of Temporary Judicial 
Officers. However, given the limited extent of the existing data (see further Parts 4.4, 
4.6 and 4.9)), it is difficult to make a general and conclusive assessment as to whether 
Temporary Judicial Officers are used to meet short-term needs or to address a long-
term disparity between workload and staffing.  
                                           
244 Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2006) 228 CLR 46, 69 [46]. 
245 Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2006) 228 CLR 46, 79 [73]. 
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The creation of quantitative limits on the use of Temporary Judicial Officers could be 
an appropriate regulatory step if there were evidence that this was excessive. 
However, given that there is no evidence at this point that this is occurring, it appears 
to be a solution in search of a problem. It is possible that over time more problematic 
ratios than those revealed by this Report may emerge. Alternatively, in some 
jurisdictions, reliance on Temporary Judicial Officers may be lessened in coming 
years. In such a potentially fluid environment, it would be precipitous to be 
prescriptive about the maximum permissible usage of Temporary Judicial Officers. 
We note also the potential for a quantitative limit to be arbitrary, as highlighted by 
Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ in Forge.246 Should the step be taken to identify a 
quantitative limit, it would need to be supported by appropriate evidence.  
 
 
5.1.2 Transparency through ongoing reporting 
 
What is clear from Parts 3 and 4 is that, presently, there is little transparency through 
the consistent provision of publicly available information about Temporary Judicial 
Officers, both in terms of their attributes (for example, the extent of appointment of 
former judicial officers, or the reappointment of Temporary Judicial Officers) and the 
extent of their use.  
 
This lack of data inhibits comparison and the ability to identify problems should they 
emerge. It constrains political accountability for the maintenance of courts systems 
and public debate about their operation at any given moment. One helpful step could 
be that all courts disclose, at the very least, the following data on their use of 
Temporary Judicial Officers in their annual reports:  
 
(a) the number and length of commissions of Temporary Judicial Officers; 
(b) the number of sitting days of Temporary Judicial Officers during the annual 
reporting period; 
(c) the ratio of Temporary Judicial Officers to Permanent Judicial Officers 
(calculated by reference to the sitting days for each);  
(d) whether Temporary Judicial Officers are former Permanent Judicial Officers; 
and,  
(e) whether Temporary Judicial Officers have previously held an appointment as 
a Temporary Judicial Officer. 
 
The disclosure of this information could provide assurance that Temporary Judicial 
Officers are being used appropriately and indicate whether any further intervention, 
such as the adoption of quantitative restrictions, is warranted. 
 
5.2 Appointment and judicial independence 
 
An oft-cited concern is that the appointment of Temporary Judicial Officers might 
undermine the separation of powers or judicial independence. In that context the 
opportunity for executive preferment or ‘tenure at pleasure’ is seen as particularly 
troubling. This Part considers whether aspects of the selection and appointment of 
Temporary Judicial Officers might be crafted in ways that support separation of 
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5.2.1 Restriction to former Permanent Judicial Officers 
 
One particular aspect of the current approach that has attracted adverse comment 
has been a reliance on the use of retired or former judicial officers and the lack of 
turnover this may promote on the bench. According to one judicial survey respondent 
this ‘tends to perpetuate the lack of diversity and it does not encourage generational 
change’.247 The evidence of repeated use of former judicial officers can also raise 
concerns about the separation of powers and judicial independence in that it carries 
the potential for executive preferment, so that a retiring judge or magistrate may seek 
further judicial appointment as a Temporary Judicial Officer.  
 
Against this must be weighed the alternative of appointing practitioners who have not 
previously held judicial office. The prospect of the government ‘trying out’ individuals 
for judicial office raises serious concerns about executive preferment and threats to 
judicial independence and impartiality. 
  
In practice, former judicial officers are a significant, and in some jurisdictions sole, 
source of Temporary Judicial Officers. The data reveals that most Temporary Judicial 
Officers have previously served as Permanent Judicial Officers (see Part 4.8), and 
many Temporary Judicial Officers have previously held commissions as Temporary 
Judicial Officers (see Part 4.9). An obvious benefit of appointing Temporary Judicial 
Officers is that it facilitates the retention of experienced judicial talent post-
retirement. Temporary Judicial Officers in this category can be particularly useful 
where a matter raises a conflict of interest with members of the existing bench, or 
where a matter requires specific expertise of a particular retired judge. Additionally, 
they are a vital resource if there is a need to fill an unexpected and temporary gap on 
an existing bench, perhaps due to illness or extended leave. This may well be the 
rationale behind the statutory restriction of Temporary Judicial Officer roles to former 
judicial officers in the Victorian Supreme, County and Magistrates Courts.248 
 
While acknowledging the complaint that prolonged judicial service through the 
appointment of Temporary Judicial Officers inhibits diversity, it is important to see 
the appointment of Temporary Judicial Officers in the context of the bench as a 
whole. The question of whether there is an appropriate mix of newer and experienced 
judicial officers on a particular court must be considered with reference to both the 
Temporary Judicial Officers and the Permanent Judicial Officers. A succession 
pattern may occur through which younger judicial candidates are brought in via 
permanent appointments, and given appropriate support and induction, rather than 
through the appointment of Temporary Judicial Officers, where experience and the 
ability to step rapidly into a gap are a priority. While there is a need for the courts to 
have renewal over time, there is little convincing evidence that this renewal should 
occur wholly or even predominantly through appointment of practitioners as 
Temporary Judicial Officers. At the same time, taken as but an element of the many 
factors affecting judicial diversity, extending the service of a small number of former 
judicial officers by their appointment as Temporary Judicial Officers should be 
understood as having only a modest impact on judicial renewal. 
 
One possible solution would be to draw all Temporary Judicial Officers exclusively 
from the ranks of former judicial officers, as is statutorily required in Victoria, and is 
the practice in some other jurisdictions. This would have the advantage of ensuring 
that highly experienced judicial officers are used to fill temporary vacancies. It would 
also avoid the risks to judicial independence and the conflicts of interest that could 
                                           
247  Supreme/Federal/Family; 0-4 years. 
248 Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 105B(2); Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) s 81(2); Magistrates 
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emerge with the appointment of senior practitioners. The concern that exclusive use 
of former Permanent Judicial Officers as Temporary Judicial Officers may have a 
conservative effect upon the institutional development of the courts and the 
emergence of fresh approaches both to the law and the administration of justice may 
be addressed by other strategies that are canvassed below, for instance, preventing 
the possibility of renewal or reappointment as a Temporary Judicial Officer; and 
ensuring the access of Temporary Judicial Officers to programs of judicial education 
and support. The potential for negative effects from the use of Temporary Judicial 
Officers in prolonging judicial careers and reducing generational change may be 
appropriately minimised (although not entirely removed) by each of these steps. 
 
5.2.2 Prohibition on reappointment of Temporary Judicial Officers 
 
There are two significant concerns that arise in relation to the reappointment of 
Temporary Judicial Officers. The first is the risk that the potential for executive 
preferment affects judicial independence and performance. The second is an 
increased danger that the executive may use repeated reappointments of Temporary 
Judicial Officers to address more systemic workload and funding issues within the 
court, thus avoiding the more appropriate appointment of Permanent Judicial 
Officers.  
 
Against these concerns weigh arguments that restricting reappointment of Temporary 
Judicial Officers may unnecessarily narrow the pool of interested candidates. 
However, taking into consideration the relatively low numbers of appointments of 
Temporary Judicial Officers relative to the total numbers of former judicial officers 
across Australia, we do not believe this argument is sufficiently supported by the data 
on existing usage of Temporary Judicial Officers. 
 
A restriction on the reappointment of Temporary Judicial Officers might possibly 
assist with managing the risk of the appearance and possibility of executive 
preferment. So, for example, Temporary Judicial Officers could be restricted to a 
single term, and not generally be eligible for reappointment. The appropriate length 
of such a term is discussed below (see Part 5.2.3). However, we also note that the risk 
to judicial independence is more acute when reappointment is made by the same 
state or territory. Accordingly, further appointment of a Temporary Judicial Officer to 
a court in another jurisdiction under the responsibility of a different executive is 
unlikely to cause concern.  
 
5.2.3  The justification for and term of Temporary Judicial Officers 
 
Concerns that the use of Temporary Judicial Officers is little more than a short-term 
solution to the problems faced by an insufficiently funded and overworked judicial 
system may also be addressed by greater clarity as to the justification for their 
appointment, and the tailoring of terms to these justifications. In Part 3.2, the use of 
Temporary Judicial Officers to manage temporary workload pressures due to ill 
health or the like, conflicts of interest, to gain or retain expertise and to try out new 
judicial officers were identified as common justifications, although the last is subject 
to robust disagreement. Conversely, the appointment of Temporary Judicial Officers 
to avoid a more permanent, but needed, appointment was seen as problematic.249  
 
Attempts to address this issue have already been made through the incorporation of 
a justification for appointment into the legislative frameworks in several jurisdictions. 
As described in Part 2, in Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia and 
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Tasmania, statutory formulations provide that the Temporary Judicial Officer 
appointment must be of ‘a temporary nature’ which ‘is necessary or desirable, in the 
public interest’,250 where a Permanent Judicial Officers is or is expected to be 
absent251 or is otherwise unable to perform their role,252 and also where the proper 
conduct of the business of the Court,253 or the interests of the administration of 
justice254 requires. The existing language means that there is considerable latitude 
for varied justifications, but this approach seems preferable to that of the remaining 
jurisdictions, which give an unfettered discretion to the executive through either 
extremely general language or silence as to justification 
 
It would be possible to tighten the existing legislative frameworks to require that 
Temporary Judicial Officers only be appointed where there is a temporary need. 
However, this course has some potential pitfalls. Care would need to be taken in 
drafting the relevant provisions to ensure that all legitimate justifications are 
captured. The prospect of an aggrieved litigant challenging the decision of a 
Temporary Judicial Officer on the basis that his or her appointment was made for a 
purpose not within those identified by the legislation is an unattractive one. As 
already noted, in Forge the High Court considered a challenge to the appointment of 
a former Federal Court judge as an acting judge of the Supreme Court of New South 
Wales under s 37 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW). This litigation turned on the 
constitutionality of the provision in question and the appointment of acting judges 
generally, but nevertheless underlines the potential for litigants to challenge judicial 
decisions on the basis of the temporary appointment of the decision-maker. This 
suggests that it is appropriate to proceed cautiously with prescriptive legislative 
frameworks.  
 
This matter could be addressed through the development of guidelines for the 
legitimate justification of commissioning Temporary Judicial Officers and a 
requirement of disclosure. The Council of Chief Justices of Australia and New Zealand 
appears to be an appropriate forum for developing such guidelines. The Council 
provides a forum to discuss matters of common concern, and to advance and 
maintain the independence of the judiciary. The individual members of this body also 
exercise considerable influence over the appointment of Temporary Judicial Officers 
through consultation by the executive. The guidelines could include an exhaustive 
list of legitimate justifications for appointing Temporary Judicial Officers. This would 
substantially develop the existing clause of the Chief Justices’ Declaration of 
Principles on Judicial Independence that provides that acting appointments should be 
made ‘only in special circumstances which render it necessary’.255 
 
Disclosure could make explicit the justification for the appointment, and be done 
both contemporaneously as part of each appointment process (e.g. by specifying the 
reason in the instrument of appointment) and subsequently in the annual report for 
each court. More explicit and specific justification accompanying the making of 
temporary judicial appointments, would reduce reliance on an upper limit on the 
duration of the term of a Temporary Judicial Officer (beyond that of age, addressed 
in Part 5.3, below). Rather, the term could be tailored to the justification for the 
appointment. For example, a Temporary Judicial Officer appointed to cover for a 
                                           
250 Supreme Court Act 1887 (Tas) s 3(1). 
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Permanent Judicial Officer who is unable to work due to illness, could be appointed 
for the period of the anticipated absence of the Permanent Judicial Officer, with some 
allowance for uncertainty. Similarly, a Temporary Judicial Officer appointed to hear 
and determine a specific matter because of a conflict of interest could be appointed 
until that matter is concluded by the delivery of final judgment.256 
 
5.2.4 Transparency of appointments 
 
The introduction of an open and transparent appointment process with publicly 
available criteria could alleviate, to some extent, concerns about executive 
preferment. Enhancing the transparency of the appointment process by 
incorporating a call for expressions of interest publicly with reference to stipulated 
criteria would support public confidence in the appointments process. In 
jurisdictions where this already occurs in the context of Permanent Judicial Officers 
this would better align the appointments process for Permanent Judicial Officers and 
Temporary Judicial Officers. 
 
It is possible that this could be done in advance of a specific appointment. The 
creation of a panel of appointable candidates who have expressed interest in 
Temporary Judicial Officer positions would ensure that appropriate persons could be 
accessed quickly should a temporary need arise.  
 
If the list of panel members were shared across jurisdictions, this could also ensure 
that all jurisdictions have access to interested candidates across Australia.  This 
would be particularly useful where the motivation for the appointment is the 
existence of a conflict of interest, as in the Rayney matter discussed above in 
Part 3.2.2, or where specific expertise not held within the jurisdiction is being sought. 
 
5.2.5 Role of Head of Jurisdiction in appointments 
 
As has been noted in Part 2, in two jurisdictions the appointment process for 
Temporary Judicial Officers incorporates a formal requirement for the involvement of 
the Head of Jurisdiction. In Queensland, the appointment of Temporary Judicial 
Officers to the Supreme Court and Magistrates Court requires consultation between 
the relevant Minister and, respectively, the Chief Justice or Chief Magistrate, except 
in the Supreme Court where the appointment is a person who is or has been a judge 
of another state or territory or the Federal Court.257 Also in Queensland, the relevant 
Minister must consult with the Chief Judge of the District Court when contemplating 
the appointment to that court of a Temporary Judicial Officer who is a retired District 
Court Judge.258 In South Australia, the appointment of Temporary Judicial Officers 
to all courts requires the concurrence of the Chief Justice.259 The remaining 
jurisdictions effectively provide that the appointment is the gift of the executive.260 
 
The involvement of the Head of Jurisdiction in the appointment process could militate 
against the idea that Temporary Judicial Officer appointments undermine the 
separation of powers and carry a danger of executive preferment. It also, however, 
potentially places the Head of Jurisdiction in an invidious position of accepting 
additional judicial resources albeit on a temporary basis, or going without in the hope 
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of a permanent judicial appointment.261 Nonetheless, the involvement of the Head of 
Jurisdiction could be seen as an advance on the position that the executive appoints 
Temporary Judicial Officers with no formal reference to the judiciary whatsoever, and 
in this respect we note that consultation with the Head of Jurisdiction is consistent 
with the practices of judicial appointment more generally.  
 
One logical approach would be for the distinctive circumstances surrounding the use 
of Temporary Judicial Officers to be reflected in the formal requirement for 
consultation with the Head of Jurisdiction. Relevantly, the central role of the Head of 
Jurisdiction in advising the executive as to the operational needs of the Court might 
be particularised so that the Head of Jurisdiction is in discussion with the executive 
about the need for each individual appointment of a Temporary Judicial Officer by 
reference to the legitimate justifications for and duration of the commission. In 
addition, the Head of Jurisdiction’s views on the suitability of former judicial officers 
of the court for an additional period of service as a Temporary Judicial Officer could 
also be provided to the executive.  
 
5.3 Performance and remuneration 
 
5.3.1 Outside employment and activities 
 
As explained in Part 3, the appointment of Temporary Judicial Officers raises distinct 
ethical concerns – most particularly, that they may hold other offices or employment 
either simultaneously with their temporary appointment, or between such 
appointments. This increases the prospect of an actual or perceived conflict of 
interest. These concerns are recognised, for example, in the New South Wales 
Guidelines for the Appointment of Acting Judicial Officers, which require that ‘acting 
judicial appointees must be available to serve and must not be engaged in any activity 
or employment, which is incompatible with judicial office.’262 
 
The Council of Chief Justices’ Guide to Judicial Conduct is alive to the possibility that 
Temporary Judicial Officers will take on employment or appointments that would be 
inappropriate for a Permanent Judicial Officer to undertake. The Guide states that 
Temporary Judicial Officers ‘should consider carefully the appropriateness of other 
activities that the retired judge might be undertaking’.263 But then it goes on to say 
in relation to acting appointments, which are often part-time: 
 
The exercise of the judicial office on a part-time basis may require the 
observance of, or at least consideration of, some of the restrictions identified in 
this publication. Particular care should be exercised in relation to activities 
undertaken concurrently with part-time judicial work.264 
 
As the Guide indicates, the question as to whether Temporary Judicial Officers should 
comply with the same ethical obligations as those that apply to Permanent Judicial 
Officers is one that is closely related to the position of part-time judicial officers, and 
what other employment or appointments such officers might be permitted to 
undertake. In R v Lippé,265 the Supreme Court of Canada considered the question of 
whether a part-time judge might engage in the practice of law without violating the 
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guarantee of a fair hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal.266 The 
Supreme Court found that certain activities or professions engaged in by part-time 
judges would be incompatible with their duties as judges, but the Court upheld the 
particular statutory regime under challenge. Members of the Court referred to the 
various safeguards that would maintain the perception of impartiality, including the 
legislative provision designed to minimise conflicts of interest, the judicial oath and 
the judicial code of ethics.  
 
In recognition that part-time judicial officers may have not only the time to engage in 
other employment or enterprise, but may need to do so because of financial 
pressures, jurisdictions across Australia allow, but regulate, the type of work they 
may undertake. In most jurisdictions a distinction is made between outside 
employment as a legal practitioner and outside employment or remuneration in 
another capacity. In Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia and 
the Northern Territory, employment as a legal practitioner is categorically prohibited, 
while employment in another capacity is permitted with the approval of the Chief 
Justice, Chief Magistrate, Governor in Council, Governor, or Minister.267 In Tasmania 
part-time judicial officers are prohibited from engaging in legal practice, and 
prohibited from undertaking other work where it ‘might reasonably be expected to 
interfere’ with their ability to perform the functions of the office of Magistrate.268 In 
the Federal Circuit Court, a part-time judicial officer ‘must not’ engage in work as a 
legal practitioner, and ‘must not’ engage in other paid work only ‘if that work is 
incompatible with the holding of a judicial office under Chapter III of the 
Constitution’.269 New South Wales does not distinguish between outside work as a 
legal practitioner or otherwise. Schedule 1, Part 1, cl 5(3) of the Local Court Act 2007 
(NSW) prohibits part-time Magistrates from engaging in remunerated and commercial 
work, including practising as a legal practitioner. 
 
While there is some jurisdictional variation in the existing regimes for the regulation 
of outside employment by part-time Permanent Judicial Officers, there is a general 
coherence in the principle of restricting outside employment that may be 
incompatible with the holding of judicial office. While it may be desirable for greater 
consistency to be achieved across jurisdictions, that is a matter that lies outside the 
scope of this Report. Given the current variations, it would appear beneficial for the 
restrictions on outside employment for Temporary Judicial Officers to reflect the 
corresponding jurisdictional regulation on outside employment for part-time 
Permanent Judicial Officers.  
 
5.3.2 Disciplinary processes 
 
There is a separate but related question as to whether Temporary Judicial Officers 
are, or ought to be, subject to the same disciplinary processes as Permanent Judicial 
Officers. Only New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia have established 
institutionalised disciplinary processes. In each of these states, the complaints-
related jurisdiction extends to judicial officers holding temporary appointments.270 
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However, a further examination of these jurisdictions reveals a weakness particularly 
as they apply to Temporary Judicial Officers. In each jurisdiction, the Commission or 
Commissioner must dismiss the complaint if the person complained about is no 
longer a serving judicial officer.271 The requirement to dismiss a complaint under 
these circumstances makes it more difficult for complaints to be made successfully 
against Temporary Judicial Officers. The data collected for this Report suggests that 
Temporary Judicial Officers are generally commissioned for a period of less than 12 
months; the Australia-wide weighted average was 8.75 months (although this does 
not take into account the possibility that they may be subsequently re-appointed (see 
Part 4.9)).  
 
In short, there is a much higher likelihood that a complaint made about the conduct 
of a Temporary Judicial Officer will be dismissed, not on substantive grounds, but on 
the ground that the person is no longer a judicial officer, either because they have 
completed their temporary term and have not been reappointed, or because they have 
resigned, an option that is easily available since it most likely carries a minimal loss 
of livelihood.  
 
It could be argued that this result – that the individual who has been the subject of 
the complaint no longer holds judicial office – is satisfactory. Alternatively, it may be 
seen as a significant weakness in the disciplinary system as it fails to provide any 
possibility of resolution of the complaint. While acknowledging that substantive 
complaints against judicial officers are rare, this possibility could undermine public 
confidence that the judiciary is subject to appropriate and robust accountability 
mechanisms. One way to address this would be to extend the jurisdiction of those 
bodies tasked with receiving and investigating complaints against judicial officers, 
including Temporary Judicial Officers, to include the conduct of former Temporary 
Judicial Officers, where that conduct was engaged in during the individual’s tenure 
as a judicial officer. This would mean that Temporary Judicial Officers could not avoid 
the consequences of a disciplinary investigation by resigning. If this change were 
made, there would have to be concomitant amendments to the powers of any 
investigating bodies so that they have the authority not only to make a finding of 
misconduct against a former Temporary Judicial Officer, but also to respond 
appropriately to that conduct.272  
 
In those jurisdictions where the question of judicial discipline remains an informal 
matter that is left to the Head of Jurisdiction, there would appear little basis for 
distinguishing the treatment of Permanent and Temporary Judicial Officers.  
 
5.3.3  Provision of education, training and support 
 
There is a danger, as Kirby J identified in Forge, that if Temporary Judicial Officers 
are not given the same levels of support, for example in relation to staffing and 
institutional resources, as permanent judges, there will be two ‘classes’ of judicial 
officers. This raises the possibility that the performance of Temporary Judicial 
Officers will be significantly undermined by a lack of institutional support and 
education. 
 
This outcome will be avoided if Temporary Judicial Officers are offered levels of 
support, commensurate with their workload. This might include staffing (including 
                                           
271 Judicial Officers Act 1986 (NSW) ss 20(1)(g) and 26(1)(a); Judicial Conduct Commissioner 
Act 2015 (SA) s 17(1)(f); Judicial Commission of Victoria Act 2016 (Vic) s 16(3)(e). 
272 See further Gabrielle Appleby and Suzanne Le Mire, ‘Judicial Conduct: Crafting a 
System that Enhances Institutional Integrity’ (2014) 38 Melbourne University Law 
Review 1, 54. 
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access to administrative assistants and associates as and when required); personal 
benefits, including travel and other allowances; and institutional resources, including 
access to chambers, library support and access to ongoing judicial education 




In Part 3.3 it was suggested that the appointment as Temporary Judicial Officers of 
practitioners with no previous judicial experience may raise concerns as to their 
competency in terms of their possession of the necessary skills and experience. Since 
there are certainly legal practitioners who have the required level of competency, the 
issue needs to be understood as one largely of public perception. Those who have 
previously served in the judiciary are assumed to be suitable for appointment as 
Temporary Judicial Officers; those with no judicial experience may not enjoy the same 
degree of public confidence. As we have discussed above in Part 5.2.1, this concern 
could be addressed if only persons who have held permanent judicial office are 
regarded as eligible for appointment as Temporary Judicial Officers. 
 
5.3.5 Age and capacity 
 
The question of how to address effectively and fairly concerns that exist in respect of 
individual judicial capacity is a complex one. Age limits on judicial service were 
introduced in many places, including all Australian jurisdictions, over the course of 
the 20th century in part to avoid the problems of declining capacity in judicial officers 
who held tenure for life. The bluntness of age limits as a solution to issues of 
incapacity, and also the costs and inadequacies of that strategy, are canvassed in 
Part 6 of this Report. The use of Temporary Judicial Officers in the states and 
territories may be understood today as an attempt to offset, or work around, the 
negative consequences of a statutorily prescribed mandatory judicial retirement age. 
 
However, as noted in Part 3, a tension exists in the appointment, as Temporary 
Judicial Officers, of individuals who have passed the mandatory judicial retirement 
age. If judicial careers are brought to an end through the use of age limits because of 
concerns about declining capacity as judges and magistrates age, then extending 
judicial service past that point (albeit on a selective basis) may be seen as logically 
inconsistent. On one level there is no reason why these concerns could not be 
addressed through the general arrangements in respect of judicial incapacity of 
Permanent Judicial Officers, such as they are. But it should be acknowledged that 
there is a higher probability of capacity issues arising in relation to Temporary 
Judicial Officers because of their age. Moreover, there may be ways to address this 
problem that are specific to the situation of Temporary Judicial Officers. 
 
There are two principal means to address concerns over the capacity of Temporary 
Judicial Officers: 
 
Age limits: As discussed in Part 6, the use of age limits to determine mandatory 
judicial retirement is not unproblematic. However, it is consistent with that practice 
that age is also used to determine the period in which individuals may be eligible to 
serve as Temporary Judicial Officers. Reflecting that fact, there are age limits on the 
holding of a commission as a Temporary Judicial Officer in most, but not all, 
jurisdictions. The age limits vary from 70 years, more usual in the case of lower 
courts, through to 78 years in Victoria and the intermediate and superior Queensland 
courts. An age limit for Temporary Judicial Officers that is proximate to the 
mandatory judicial retirement age for Permanent Judicial Officers could ameliorate 
concerns about the capacity of individuals to serve in the former role after their 
attainment of the latter. By ‘proximate’, we refer to an age limit on Temporary Judicial 
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Officers that does not exceed an additional five years beyond the current mandatory 
judicial retirement age for the relevant court.  
 
Capacity Testing: No Australian jurisdiction presently employs compulsory capacity 
testing for judicial officers. There is a facility in some jurisdictions for judicial officers 
to be requested to undergo a medical or psychological examination.273 Where the 
Head of Jurisdiction has such a power, it is used in response to specific complaints 
or concerns about an individual rather than being exercised systemically. Our recent 
survey of judicial attitudes revealed little disquiet about empowering Heads of 
Jurisdiction or a judicial commission to request judicial officers to undergo capacity 
testing, with 77% of respondents in agreement, of whom 21% agreed strongly (see 
Schedule 2B of this Report).  
 
Compulsory capacity testing for all judicial officers is a more complex proposition 
given legitimate concerns about protecting security of tenure. But a case may be 
made for treating Temporary Judicial Officers differently by virtue of the fact that 
their tenure is typically time-limited and that many are appointed after having passed 
the mandatory judicial retirement age. Imposing a requirement of compulsory 
capacity testing before individuals are commissioned as a Temporary Judicial Officer, 
or at some point during their term of appointment (e.g., where this is more than 12 
months), or prior to reappointment (should that option remain in place) would seem 
defensible and likely to allay concerns about their continued capacity to carry out 
judicial work. However, to retain parity with the treatment of Permanent Judicial 
Officers, who are free from mandatory testing, any regime of capacity testing for 
Temporary Judicial Officers could be confined to individuals who are above the 
mandatory retirement age for Permanent Judicial Officers at the time of their 
appointment or who will exceed that age during their term of office as a Temporary 
Judicial Officer. 
 
5.3.6 Transparent allocation of cases 
 
The risk that Temporary Judicial Officers may seek or receive executive preferment, 
either through subsequent renewal or, if applicable, appointment to a permanent 
position, can be mitigated, at least in part, by ensuring that there is a transparent 
and even-handed allocation of cases to Temporary Judicial Officers. 
  
The data discussed in Part 4 indicated that the allocation of cases to Temporary 
Judicial Officers is managed generally in the same way as the allocation of cases to 
Permanent Judicial Officers. Differences arise in three circumstances. First, the 
temporary nature of the Temporary Judicial Officer in question is considered when 
case allocation is being made for longer cases. Second, when the appointment is for 
the purpose of managing a conflict of interest scenario, this will naturally determine 
the allocation of the Temporary Judicial Officer to the relevant case. Finally, where 
the Temporary Judicial Officer is appointed to fill a gap in a particular legal field (e.g., 
a civil, criminal or commercial list) this will determine their sitting calendar. 
 
                                           
273 See Judicial Officers Act 1986 (NSW), s 39B(2), enabling the Head of Jurisdiction, at his 
or her own volition, to initiate such a request from the Judicial Commission of New 
South Wales. This is distinct from the power the Commission has under s 39D(1) to 
‘require’ the judicial officer to undergo such an examination in response to a formal 
complaint. Additionally, the ability of a Head of Jurisdiction in the federal court system 
to request a judicial officer undergo capacity testing would seem contained within the 
statutory recognition given to their power to ‘handle’ complaints: Federal Court of 
Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 4; Family Court of Australia Act 1975 (Cth), s 4(1); Federal 
Circuit Court 1999 (Cth), s 5.     
Temporary Judicial Officers in Australia 
61 
All of these are legitimate considerations when case allocation is made to Temporary 
Judicial Officers and could be used as the basis to guide Heads of Jurisdiction as 




Protection of the remuneration of judges has been an important facet of judicial 
independence ever since the Act of Settlement 1701 provided that a judge’s salary 
must be ‘ascertained and established’. In Australia, that protection was enshrined 
and enhanced in the Commonwealth Constitution for federal judicial officers, such 
that judicial remuneration must be fixed by the parliament (not the executive), and 
‘shall not be diminished during a judge’s continuance in office’. 
 
However, the most pressing issue for Temporary Judicial Officers is not the 
diminution of salaries during office but the process by which they are determined. 
The issue is best highlighted by briefly contrasting the processes for determining the 
remuneration of Permanent Judicial Officers. Those processes have evolved over time, 
but the current federal model involves an independent tribunal making a 
determination at least once each year about the salaries of federal judges. The 
Remuneration Tribunal’s determinations have the force of law unless disallowed by 
either House of Parliament. 274 
 
Historically, at the state level, most jurisdictions followed the federal model of 
establishing an independent tribunal to make periodic determinations about judicial 
salary. New South Wales, Western Australia and South Australia still adopt this 
approach. In effect, Tasmania does so too, since it pegs its judicial salaries to the 
average of corresponding salaries in Western Australia and South Australia. However, 
Queensland and Victoria now take a different path by fixing the remuneration of state 
judges by direct reference to the determinations of the federal Remuneration 
Tribunal.275 
 
The contrast between these arrangements and those for Temporary Judicial Officers 
can be stark. Part 2.8 described the salary arrangements for Temporary Judicial 
Officers in some detail. We saw there that in several courts (especially in superior 
courts) the salary of Temporary Judicial Officers is aligned with that of Permanent 
Judicial officers – both as to quantum and the process for determining it. But this is 
not always so, especially at the magistrates’ level, which is the level at which most 
temporary appointments are made (see Part 4.3). In New South Wales, a Temporary 
Judicial Officer in the Local Court is ‘entitled to be paid such remuneration as the 
Governor considers appropriate’; in the Northern Territory, the Local Court salary is 
determined by the Administrator or Minister; and in the Tasmanian and ACT 
Magistrates Courts, remuneration is specified in the person’s instrument of 
appointment – presumably therefore by the government. In South Australia, at all 
court levels, remuneration of Temporary Judicial Officers is ‘determined by the 
Governor with the concurrence of the Chief Justice’. 
 
Provisions such as these are a ‘red flag’ for concerns about judicial independence. 
Nor are they solved by provisions, such as those applying to the Queensland Supreme 
Court, that allow the Governor to determine the salary of Temporary Judicial Officers 
(if they were not previously Supreme Court judges), so long as they are paid no less 
than permanent judges.276 Executive preferment is as much threatened by paying 
                                           
274 Remuneration Tribunal Act 1973 (Cth) s 7. 
275 Brian Opeskin, ‘The High Cost of Judges: Reconsidering Judicial Pensions and 
Retirement in an Ageing Population’ (2011) 39 Federal Law Review 33, 40-43. 
276  Judicial Administration (Auxiliary Appointments and Powers) Act 1988 (SA) s 3(6). 
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higher salaries to temporary judicial officers as it is by allowing the possibility of lower 
ones. 
 
In our view, the institutional arrangements for protecting judicial independence with 
respect to the remuneration of judges and magistrates should apply equally to 
Permanent and Temporary Judicial Officers. This is so not only with respect to the 
processes for determining salaries but also to their quantum, taking into account the 
fractional or sessional basis of some temporary appointments. Where states and 
territories have independent tribunals for determining judicial salaries, those bodies 
could be given the task of determining commensurate salaries for Temporary Judicial 
Officers. In jurisdictions that piggyback on the federal provisions there is a 
complication because there are no temporary judicial salaries at the federal level to 
incorporate by reference. In this case, consideration could be given to express 
legislative protections, such as those in Victoria, which mandate equal treatment by 
statute.277 
 
5.4 Termination and pension 
 
5.4.1 Security of tenure during appointment  
 
The review of legislation in Part 2 indicated that once Temporary Judicial Officers are 
appointed they fulfil their functions on the same terms as Permanent Judicial 
Officers, except that they are appointed for a set period. In some courts, express 
provision is made equating the security of tenure of Temporary Judicial Officers and 
Permanent Judicial Officers. For example, in Victoria it is provided that a reserve 
judge of the Supreme Court ‘may only be removed from office in the same way and 
on the same grounds as a Judge of the Court is liable to be removed from office’.278 
However, such provisions are not universal. 
 
It is important that Temporary Judicial Officers should, during their term of office, 
operate with the same security of tenure as Permanent Judicial Officers. That is, they 
should only be subject to removal for cause ‘on the ground of proved misbehaviour 
or incapacity’, and according to the same processes as would apply to a Permanent 
Judicial Officer.279 This important protection of judicial independence is critical to 
the security of permanent officers and would appear similarly critical to the 
perception and reality of judicial independence for Temporary Judicial Officers.  
 
5.4.2 Service contribution to pension scheme 
 
There are a variety of pension arrangements for Temporary Judicial Officers across 
the jurisdictions. In considering these, two issues are raised. The first question, 
addressed in this section, is whether Temporary Judicial Officers should be entitled 
to accrue pension rights during their commission, i.e. whether time spent as a 
Temporary Judicial Officer should count as service for the purpose of satisfying the 
minimum period of service needed to qualify for a judicial pension. The second issue, 
addressed in Part 5.4.3 below, is whether a Temporary Judicial Officer who is a 
former Permanent Judicial Officer, should be entitled to receive a judicial pension 
while serving as a Temporary Judicial Officer in addition to whatever remuneration 
is provided to him or her as a Temporary Judicial Officer. 
 
In relation to the former, a variety of approaches are taken (see Part 2.9). In many 
jurisdictions Temporary Judicial Officers are prevented from accruing pension rights. 
                                           
277 See e.g. Judicial Entitlements Act 2015 (Vic) s 6. 
278 Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) s 81A(1A). 
279 Australian Constitution s 72(ii) 
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In some jurisdictions service as a Temporary Judicial Officer is explicitly included in 
the calculation of prior judicial service and in others there is a discretion. 
 
On the one hand, it seems fair to allow a judicial officer to count as service the entire 
period during which he or she actually serves as a judge or magistrate. In some 
jurisdictions, such additional service can be substantial—e.g. up to five years in New 
South Wales. On the other hand, the right to count periods as a Temporary Judicial 
Officer as service for the purpose of determining pension rights has the potential to 
invest greater significance in receiving such an appointment. This might lead to 
perverse incentives, and increase the risk of the person seeking executive preferment. 
For example, consider a judge who is appointed at age 62 and must retire at age 70. 
In most jurisdictions a person only becomes eligible for a judicial pension after 10 
years of service and reaching age 60. In this instance, the judge at retirement would 
be two years short of meeting the service requirement. Given the very substantial 
value of judicial pensions,280 there is a strong financial incentive for the judge to seek 
further office as a Temporary Judicial Officer. This in turn increases the risk of 
executive preferment during the judge’s final years as a Permanent Judicial Officer. 
 
5.4.3 Interaction between salary and pension 
 
The second issue noted above is whether a Temporary Judicial Officer should be able 
to receive both a judicial pension and a judicial salary while serving in a temporary 
capacity. This issue only arises where the individual was formerly a Permanent 
Judicial Officer who has qualified for a judicial pension. In Part 4.8 we saw that, in 
many courts, an overwhelming majority of Temporary Judicial Officers are indeed 
former Permanent Judicial Officers. Moreover, the issue is likely to have even greater 
relevance should only former Permanent Judicial Officers be appointed as Temporary 
Judicial Officers. 
 
The key policy question that this issue raises is essentially one of public finance, as 
applied in a federal system of government. If a Temporary Judicial Officer can draw 
both a pension and a salary, then on the assumption they are paid the equivalent of 
a full-time Permanent Judicial Officer, they will be remunerated at the rate of 160% 
of the salary of a Permanent Judicial Officer, since the judicial pension in most 
jurisdictions is set at 60% of the current salary of a judge holding equivalent office. 
Of course, some Temporary Judicial Officers may receive less than this, for instance, 
if the temporary appointment is made on a fractional or sessional basis. Some might 
see this as ‘double dipping’; others might regard it as the legitimate price to be paid 
for drawing highly skilled legal personnel out of retirement.  
 
As this intimates, the prospect of remuneration at 160% of the judicial salary might 
act as an incentive to attract former judicial officers back to public service on the 
bench. This might be considered a necessary part of adopting a system under which 
Temporary Judicial Officers perform a small but important role. On the other hand, 
it might be seen as undesirable due to the danger that such generous remuneration 
for former judicial officers may lead individuals to seek executive preferment during 
their final years on the bench in the hope of a future temporary appointment. 
 
The alternative is for a Temporary Judicial Officer to have their remuneration (i.e. 
salary or pension) reduced during their period of service as a Temporary Judicial 
Officer. Only Queensland and Victoria make express provision for such 
arrangements, although they do so in different ways, and there are a number of other 
alternative models. In Queensland, a former judicial officer who serves as a 
Temporary Judicial Officer in Queensland is paid only the difference between the 
                                           
280 See Opeskin above n 275. 
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pension and their salary as a Temporary Judicial Officer (model 1).281 This is the same 
model adopted for auxiliary judges in Western Australia. If the former judicial officer 
serves as a Temporary Judicial Officer in another jurisdiction, their pension is 
reduced by the amount of the salary, with some exceptions (model 2).282 In Victoria, 
former judicial officers appear to lose their pension rights if appointed as a Temporary 
Judicial Officer in a jurisdiction other than the one in which they are entitled to 
receive a pension (model 3).283 A fourth model is that Temporary Judicial Officers 
might be precluded from drawing a pension while appointed as a Temporary Judicial 
Officer. Under models 3 and 4, the judicial officer might find themselves financially 
disadvantaged. This could occur, for example, in circumstances where a Temporary 
Judicial Officer is being remunerated on a fractional basis, or where the after tax 
position of a Temporary Judicial Officer receiving 100% of the judicial salary is less 
advantageous than receiving the pension. 
 
These alternatives are likely to be fiscally equivalent for the jurisdiction if the 
Temporary Judicial Officer was previously a Permanent Judicial Officer in the same 
jurisdiction, because both the salary and the pension come from the same 
Consolidated Revenue. However, this is not the case if there is a cross-jurisdictional 
appointment, as often happens when a temporary appointment is made to resolve a 
conflict of interest. Queensland has anticipated that instance by combining models 
(1) and (2), so the receiving state continues to be obliged to pay the full salary, and 
the sending state only paying any top-up pension (with some exceptions made under 
that particular regime). Without such a provision, if both sending state and receiving 
state adopted model 1, it could result in the sending state continuing to pay the full 
pension (60%) with the receiving state only paying the top-up salary (up to 40%). If 
both the sending and receiving state were to adopt model 2, 100% of the salary would 
be borne by the receiving state, and the sending state may have to pay any top up 
pension, in the event that the judicial salary is less than the pension entitlement. If 
both the sending and receiving state were to adopt the Victorian solution (model 3), 
100% of the salary of the Temporary Judicial Officer would be borne by the receiving 
state, and the sending state would be entirely relieved of the liability to pay a pension. 
Under the fourth model, if both the sending and receiving state were to adopt the 
model, 100% of the salary of the Temporary Judicial Officer would be borne by the 
receiving state for the duration of the appointment, which would be relieved of 
meeting its pension liability for the duration of that appointment. Beyond this, there 
may be additional financial consequences for the individual, and for the state, which 
arise from the differing income tax treatment of pensions and salaries, but these are 
beyond the scope of this Report. 
 
Temporary Judicial Officers, when appointed for legitimate temporary reasons and 
under appropriate conditions, contribute to the effective functioning of the court 
system. In order to encourage the participation of eligible individuals, the legislative 
framework in each jurisdiction should establish a robust and sustainable system for 
the appointment of Temporary Judicial Officers. That would require not only 
appropriate safeguards to maintain the independence and integrity of the officers and 
the system, but also appropriate incentives for high-quality candidates to accept 
appointments, including that they not be placed in a disadvantageous financial 
position by accepting a temporary appointment.  
                                           
281 Judicial Remuneration Act 2007 (Qld) s 5A(1). 
282  Judges (Pensions and Long Leave) Act 1957 (Qld) s 18. 
283 Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) s 83(4); Supreme Court Act1986 (Vic) s 104A(7); County Court 
Act 1958 1958 (Vic) s 13(3A); Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (Vic) s 10A(2). 
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6. A Common Retirement Age  
 
6.1 Overview of Existing Arrangements 
 
6.1.1 Mandatory judicial retirement 
 
In all Australian jurisdictions, judicial officers are subject to a mandatory retirement 
age. This is constitutionally entrenched for members of the federal judiciary following 
the 1977 amendment by referendum of s 72 of the Commonwealth Constitution.284 
The introduction of mandatory retirement from judicial office at the Commonwealth 
level followed the earlier imposition of age limits upon the length of judicial service in 
the Supreme Courts of all states – with New South Wales being the first to do so in 
1918.285 Provisions concerning judicial tenure are not constitutionally entrenched in 
the states and territories, with the exception of New South Wales. While the validity 
of the entrenchment in the New South Wales Constitution of a Part concerning 
judicial independence is questionable,286 for practical purposes the situation in that 
state is not materially different from other states. This is because s 55(1) of the 
Constitution Act 1902 (NSW) preserves legislative flexibility by allowing ‘the fixing or 
a change of age at which all judicial officers, or all judicial officers of a court, are 
required to retire by legislation’.287  
 
There are numerous arguments for and against the use of judicial age limits. The 
1976 report of the Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs, 
which preceded the constitutional amendment of s 72 of the Commonwealth 
Constitution, identified four reasons for the introduction of mandatory judicial 
retirement: 
 
a) It is necessary to maintain vigorous and dynamic courts, which require the 
input of new and younger judges who will bring to the bench new ideas and 
fresh social attitudes… 
b) The relatively high average age of federal judges does, to some extent, limit the 
opportunity for able legal practitioners to serve on the bench while at the peak 
of their professional abilities and before suffering the limitations of declining 
health. 
c) In Australia and to a growing degree in comparable countries, there is an 
acceptance of the need for a compulsory retiring age for judges. In most 
Australian States and the mainland territories this age is 70 years. 
d) The introduction of a compulsory retiring age may result in the automatic 
removal of judges still capable of some years of service, but it will avoid the 
unfortunate necessity of removing a judge who, by reasons of declining 
health, ought not to continue in office, but who is unwilling to resign.288 
                                           
284 Before that amendment, section 72 had been interpreted by the High Court as providing 
for life tenure: Waterside Workers’ Federation of Australia v JW Alexander Ltd (1918) 25 
CLR 434.  
285 Judges Retirement Act 1918 (NSW). For an account of the enactment as motivated by ‘a 
variety of political imperatives and personal agendas and … the product of a unique 
time’ see Tony Cuneen, ‘A Creature of Momentary Panic’ (Winter, 2010) Bar News 74, 
83. 
286 See Anne Twomey, The Constitution of New South Wales (The Federation Press, 2004) 
311, 736-37. 
287 Such a change does not apply to those already holding office without their consent: 
Constitution Act 1902 (NSW), s 55(2). 
288 Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs, Parliament of Australia, 
Report on Retiring Age for Commonwealth Judges (1976) 11. See also Opeskin, above n 
168, 639-40. Opeskin explains that ‘the issue became a live one from the mid-1970s as 
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In a recent and extensive examination of the question, Dr Alysia Blackham identified 
a fifth consideration voiced in parliamentary debates on the constitutional 
amendment bill. This was that the skills of judicial officers forced into retirement 
would then be available for use in other contexts through the employment of former 
judges in different roles, including as Royal Commissioners.289 
 
Dr Blackham subjected all five arguments, and their assumptions around age, 
capacity and community engagement, to a critical analysis before concluding that 
judicial age limits are ‘an arbitrary, discriminatory and outdated feature of Australian 
constitutional law’.290  The change in community attitudes towards ageing since the 
mid-1970s has indeed been significant, resulting in the abolition of mandatory 
retirement for most forms of employment. In its 2013 review into Commonwealth 
legal barriers to the participation of older persons in the workforce, the Australian 
Law Reform Commission stated its general conclusion that: 
 
The imposition of compulsory retirement fails to account for the differing 
capacities of individuals at older ages, reinforces stereotypes about the abilities 
of mature age workers and reduces utilisation of the workforce contribution of 
mature age workers.291 
 
Further, Professor Brian Opeskin has acknowledged the ‘compelling argument … that 
judges as individuals are the bearers of rights and are entitled to be free from age 
discrimination’.292 
 
The case against mandatory judicial retirement also emphasises the premature loss 
of judicial talent.293 In respect of the federal courts, that loss is, of course, irretrievable 
due to the unconstitutionality of enabling retired judicial officers to contribute further 
in the guise Temporary Judicial Officers. But at the state and territory level, it is 
obvious that a central rationale for the use of Temporary Judicial Officers is to 
‘ameliorate the consequence of forced departure’.294 As the discussion in Part 3 of 
this Report makes clear, the constitutional capacity of the courts in those 
jurisdictions to retain the services of experienced and capable judicial officers in this 
way is subject to a range of concerns. Further, it is possible to argue that the 
widespread use of such schemes should not be accepted simply as an effective work 
around, extending the service of judicial officers, but as confirmation that use of an 
age limit to force judicial officers off the bench should be abandoned.295  
 
Ultimately, for reasons of both principle and pragmatism, the use of age limits on 
judicial tenure in Australia appears secure. In 2009, reporting on its inquiry into 
Australia’s Judicial System and the Role of Judges, the Senate Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs Committee said that all four of the justifications given by its 
                                           
the Australian parliament began to create new federal courts, invest them with 
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289 Blackham, above n 170, 771.  
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parliamentary ancestor in its 1976 report ‘still have relevance today’.296 While the 
Committee acknowledged that the arguments against the use of an age limit were 
‘real considerations’, it reported that ‘no major concern’ was raised before it about 
the existence of a compulsory retirement age, which was generally viewed as 
‘appropriate’.297  
 
Unease over the ageist discrimination that inheres in mandatory judicial retirement 
is inevitably offset by competing considerations. This explains the decision of the 
Australian Law Reform Commission to recommend review by an independent inquiry 
of the ‘complexities associated with removing compulsory retirement for judicial 
officers such as Constitutional requirements and public policy reasons for 
compulsory retirement’.298 Chief amongst those issues is how to address the greater 
likelihood of cases of judicial incapacity under a system of life tenure while 
maintaining the independence of individual members of the judiciary from the 
political branches of government. While it is correct that ‘incapacity may occur at any 
age, and cannot always be addressed via mandatory retirement’, it is obviously a 
more common phenomenon among older judges.299 Opeskin has stated that 
‘contemporary experience of increasing longevity and concomitant exposure to mental 
frailty in old age’ suggests that life tenure provides an ‘elevated degree of judicial 
independence [that] comes at too high a cost’.300 In 2012 the United Kingdom’s House 
of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, acknowledged that ‘age is 
undoubtedly a blunt tool by which to assess whether someone is no longer fully 
capable of performing their job’ but was resigned to its use because ‘the principle of 
judicial independence necessarily makes it very difficult to force a judge to retire on 
the grounds of declining capacity to act’.301  
 
By contrast, even advocates for the reinstatement of judicial life tenure concede that 
it ‘is axiomatic that a retiring age for judges does not violate the fundamental principle 
of either their independence or their impartiality’.302 So much was affirmed by 
Gleeson CJ in Forge v ASIC when he declared that the High Court did not become 
less independent as consequence of the change from life tenure to an age limit on 
federal judicial service in 1977: ‘Nothing better illustrates the room for legitimate 
choice that exists in connection with arrangements affecting judicial independence 
than the removal … of the requirement of life tenure for federal judges’.303  
 
Mandatory retirement ages, as a limit on judicial tenure, are likely to remain the 
practice in all Australian jurisdictions for the foreseeable future. They have no 
negative effect upon the principle of judicial independence, they facilitate generational 
change on the courts, and they reduce the need to resort to formal procedures to 
secure the removal of a judicial officer who has become incapacitated. 
 
6.1.2 The age limit upon mandatory judicial retirement 
 
In imposing an age limit on the judicial tenure of High Court judges, the amendment 
of s 72 of the Commonwealth Constitution entrenched mandatory retirement upon 
the judicial officer reaching 70 years of age. The maximum age of the judicial officers 
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in other federal courts created by the Commonwealth Parliament was also capped at 
70 years, but s 72 expressly empowers the Parliament to prescribe a lower maximum 
age for those judicial officers. At present the mandatory retirement age for all 
members of the federal judiciary is 70 years. 
 
Seventy years is also the age limit for state and territory judicial officers with just a 
few exceptions. The mandatory retirement age in New South Wales and Tasmania for 
all judicial officers is set two years higher at age 72.304 The mandatory retirement age 
for Magistrates in Western Australia and the ACT is 65 years.305 
 
The evidence received by the 2009 Senate Committee inquiry into the Australian 
Judiciary, as well as a survey of much of the literature in the field, indicates that the 
use of an age limit to judicial tenure is not especially contentious, but that the age at 
which such limits are set is the source of some debate and disquiet. Many of the 
concerns that have been already noted about mandatory retirement generally are just 
as applicable to a negative assessment of the practical operation of a specific age 
limit. The foremost concern in this respect is that judicial officers at the height of 
their powers and possessed of great experience are forced into retirement too early.306 
Upon reaching 70 years, a judge is entirely lost to the federal court system. At the 
state and territory level, judicial expertise may be retained by the making of an 
appointment to the ranks of Temporary Judicial Officers, but this enlivens the various 
concerns and issues around the use of such appointments that are canvassed in Part 
3 of this Report. 
 
The 2009 Senate Committee Inquiry made the following observation on the evidence 
it received on this question:    
 
As to an appropriate retirement age, divergent views were expressed, but the 
range of difference was small. No submitters argued that the federal retirement 
age is too high. However, some submitters and witnesses sought to persuade 
the committee that the retirement age is too low.307  
 
The Committee voiced sympathy with the latter submissions, observing ‘that there 
are strong arguments for increasing the compulsory age of retirement to at least 72 
and possibly to 75’.308 In discussion of the question in the Committee’s report, those 
arguments were exclusively focused upon the premature loss of talent and 
experience. The Committee did not consider the economic arguments about 
potentially retaining the services of judicial officers for a longer period before they 
retire and start receiving a pension.309 It did aver to the fact that the continued 
suitability of fixing mandatory retirement for the federal judiciary at 70 years might 
be further strained by ‘increases in life expectancy and advances in technology and 
support’ but did not substantially engage with this point.310 Yet the increased 
                                           
304 NSW: Judicial Officers Act 1986 (NSW) s 44(1), (3); Tas: Supreme Court Act 1887 (Tas) s 
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longevity of Australians’ lives is undoubtedly relevant to a contemporary appraisal of 
all the justifications that underlie use of a mandatory retirement age and the question 
of what age limit is appropriate. As Opeskin has explained: 
 
When the age limit for federal judges was adopted in Australia in 1977, male 
life expectancy at birth was 69.8 years, almost identical to the age limit of 70 
years. By 2009, when the Senate recommended increasing the age limit to 72 
or 75 years, male life expectancy had risen to 79.5 years; 14 per cent higher 
than the mandatory retirement age. How relevant will the Constitution be in 
2061, when male life expectancy is projected to reach 92.1 years; 32 per cent 
higher than the current age limit?311 
 
Aside from the extent to which it arises in the discussion in Part 6.2 below about a 
nationally consistent mandatory retirement age, the question of whether the age 
limits currently placed on judicial service should be increased is a question outside 
the scope of this Report.312 It is sufficient to note that given the costs involved in 
amending the age limit for the federal judiciary in s 72 of the Commonwealth 
Constitution, the Senate Committee determined that the matter was not a priority 
warranting immediate action. But the Committee did recommend ‘that at the next 
Commonwealth referendum s 72 of the Constitution should be amended in relation 
to the compulsory retirement age for judges to provide that federal judicial officers 
are appointed until an age fixed by Parliament’.313 Granting the Australian Parliament 
the flexibility to reset the age limit that terminates federal judicial service would 
amount to a reduction in the strength of judicial tenure that currently exists in s 72 
of the Commonwealth Constitution. But, assuming that any such legislative changes 
would only operate prospectively and could not affect serving judicial officers,314 or 
that a constitutional amendment would itself include such a limitation (as occurred 
with the 1977 amendment to s 72), it is difficult to see it as commensurately 
weakening judicial independence. It would appear to be within what Gleeson CJ 
identified as ‘the room for legitimate choice that exists in connection with 
arrangements affecting judicial independence’.315  
 
The practical significance of such an amendment would be to enable responsiveness 
to shifting community attitudes around ageing that is essentially not possible when 
the specific age limit on judicial tenure is constitutionally entrenched. Placing the 
power of the Commonwealth Parliament on an equal footing with that of its state and 
territory counterparts in this regard would also assist in the achievement of a 
nationally consistent mandatory judicial retirement age.  
 
6.2 A Case for Uniformity? 
 
In recent years there have been two significant calls for ‘national consistency’ in the 
age limits applied to judicial tenure – from the Senate Legal and Constitution 
Committee in its 2009 report Australia’s Judicial System and the Role of Judges, and 
                                           
311 Opeskin, above n 168, 660. 
312 Additionally, any discussion of related issues such as regular capacity testing for 
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then the ALRC in its 2013 report Access All Ages.316 In both instances, the focus 
appears to have been on a simple geographical consistency through a single age of 
judicial retirement for all judicial officers across the country. In neither report was 
there explicit engagement with the issue of different age limits applied to judicial 
officers depending on their place in the court hierarchy within a jurisdiction, beyond 
the extent to which that evidenced a general lack of national uniformity. As is 
explained below, a commitment to ‘national consistency’ across the Commonwealth, 
states and territories is not necessarily incompatible with the application of a multi-
tiered approach to mandatory judicial retirement by reference to court level.  
 
This Part examines the arguments for and against uniformity of tenure both within 
the court system of a single jurisdiction and in a geographic sense across the 
Federation. In doing so, it recognises the statutory flexibility over judicial retirement 
ages pertaining in the states and territories.317 This stands in contrast to the 
entrenchment in s 72 of the Commonwealth Constitution of 70 years as the 
mandatory retirement age for Justices of the High Court of Australia and the use of 
that same age as the maximum for judicial officers of other federal courts. Until such 
time as the proposed constitutional amendment that was favoured by the 2009 
Senate Committee is put to the Australian people at a referendum, it is the 
Commonwealth arrangements around which any drive for national consistency as to 
a maximum age must be inevitably framed.  
 
6.2.1 Between courts within a jurisdiction 
 
At present, Western Australia and the ACT are the only Australian jurisdictions that 
distinguish between courts in the prescription of age limits to judicial service. The 
Magistrates in both jurisdictions are required to retire upon attaining 65 years of 
age.318 They may then serve as Temporary Judicial Officers, if so appointed, until the 
age of 70.  
 
It should be noted at the outset that the use of 65 as a mandatory retirement age for 
the magistracy in these two jurisdictions is not a recent step, taken on the basis of a 
contemporary appraisal of the value of making such a distinction. Rather it is a legacy 
from a much earlier time when the introduction of a retirement age of 65 was 
consistent with the practice in other states. What is more, mandating 65 as the age 
for retirement was consistent with the fact that historically ‘Australian magistrates 
were part of a public service department’ and, as such, ‘they were subject to public 
service terms and conditions’.319 The thoroughly judicial character of the modern 
magistracy has resulted in most jurisdictions bringing the tenure conditions of their 
Magistrates into line with that of their other judicial officers. The mandatory 
retirement age of the Magistrates in Western Australia and the ACT has yet to receive 
similar treatment.  
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Understanding the differentiation as essentially historical does not mean that a 
younger mandatory retirement age for the judicial officers of lower courts may not be 
justified on particular grounds. These tend to focus on the distinct requirements of 
trial adjudication in contrast to the exercise of appellate jurisdiction. The 2012 House 
of Lords Select Committee thought that ‘the risk of older judges being viewed as out 
of touch applies to a greater degree to those having to determine the facts of a case’.320 
The Committee also thought a later retirement age for appellate judges was justified 
by the fact that they sit in panels and are afforded the time to think about and decide 
cases in consultation with colleagues, whereas trial judges required ‘a greater degree 
of “quick and accurate recall”’.321 In the same vein, Opeskin has suggested that the 
‘heavy daily caseloads’ expected of the magistracy ‘might be thought too onerous for 
ageing judicial officers’.322 
 
Sir Louis Blom-Cooper QC has reflected on why age limits, to the extent these are 
accepted as a blunt indicia of capacity, may be justifiably differentiated in respect of 
trial and appellate judges by contrasting the physical requirements of the two jobs: 
 
Physical and mental decline is highly variable among people in later life. But 
impairment of hearing – even in middle age – is a common occurrence; even the 
minor problem of tinnitus, the sensation of ringing or buzzing in the ears, can 
be distractive in the listener. Also the tiredness and weariness associated with 
lengthy periods in court can produce torpor and inattention to witness 
evidence. These are the prime factors that are engaged in the process of the 
decision-maker who must hear all the evidence from witnesses and assess its 
weight. The essential orality of the English legal system calls for adjudication 
of testimony, given in the witness-box, examined in chief by counsel for one 
party and cross-examined by the opponent. To put it shortly, there is sound 
reason why these common afflictions of the human being should lead to 
compulsory retirement at an age commensurate with scientific (medical) 
knowledge of the ageing human condition. But these are afflictions that are 
infinitely more pertinent to the trial judge than to his appellate counterpart. 
Most of the work of an appellate judge is reading (often vast amounts of 
documentary material) and writing judgments. The hearings in the courtroom 
do require audio-reception, but only from counsel addressing the court. There 
is no fact-finding, which is the essence of the trial process. The facts of a 
litigated dispute, as assessed after evaluating the credibility and reliability of 
witnesses (in addition to documentary material) are already found by the trial 
judge. The appellate judge may review (or revise) the facts, but that is done by 
testing the written material. Thus while the ability to hear and see the witnesses 
is crucial to fact-finding, no such prerequisite applies in appellate 
proceedings.323 
 
The view that different retirement ages may be justified by reference to the likelihood 
of declining capacities that are of particular importance to one form of judicial work 
over another is interesting, but contemporary standards and anti-discrimination law 
would suggest the need for a more sophisticated approach. In particular, the 
availability of possible workplace adjustments tailored to the individual’s 
circumstances and allowing them to continue in service should be given direct 
consideration. 
 
There are other more systemic and principled reasons for the earlier retirement of 
judicial officers serving lower courts, relative to the limits upon tenure for the senior 
ranks of the judiciary. Traditionally judicial officers serving in the lower courts, 
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particularly as Magistrates, have tended to be appointed at a younger age and so may 
conceivably stay in their post for two or three decades. The House of Lords Select 
Committee was concerned that their delayed retirement could limit ‘opportunities for 
talented younger, and probably more diverse, lawyers to take their places’.324 
Appellate judges could not be said to obstruct the career paths of younger lawyers to 
the same degree – if they reach the senior ranks by promotion from a lower court they 
would be opening up an entry-level space for another; they occupy fewer positions as 
a proportion of the total judiciary; and are appointed later and thus for a shorter 
period of time. While a younger age limit on tenure should facilitate the lower levels 
of the judiciary having a more dynamic and possibly diverse composition, this was 
not viewed as especially desirable in the senior judiciary ‘where proven judicial quality 
and experience are at a premium in the development of the law’.325 For these reasons, 
the Select Committee did not agree that there should be a uniform retirement age 
across the United Kingdom judiciary.  
 
The use of different age limits for the judges of different courts in a jurisdiction may 
be motivated by recognition of the demands placed upon those carrying out a 
particular form of judicial service. Upon the Commonwealth Parliament acquiring the 
power to set an age limit for judicial officers on federal courts lower than the 
maximum of 70 years prescribed by the amendment to s 72 in 1977, the mandatory 
retirement age for judicial officers serving in the Family Court of Australia was set at 
65 years.326 This was in contrast to a retirement age of 70 for the rest of the federal 
judiciary – a distinction maintained until 1991 when the Family Court judges were 
brought in line with their colleagues.327 The rationale for the difference was the 
‘demanding and arduous’ nature of family law disputes and the importance of the 
judges working in the jurisdiction to ‘keep abreast of current social values and 
attitudes’.328 Opeskin has explained the later raising of the retirement age for Family 
Court justices as resulting from a desire to improve the status of the court in the eyes 
of the public by treating its judicial officers alike with judges of the Federal Court, 
which enjoyed an outstanding reputation.329  
 
There are thus two discrete aspects to the issue of different mandatory retirement 
ages being applied to judicial officers serving in different courts within the same 
jurisdiction. To the extent that use of a different age limit is based not on a court’s 
position in the hierarchy, but on the subject matter of that court’s specialist 
jurisdiction, then this may create problems by placing the tenure of judicial officers 
who are formally equivalent to each other on a different footing. The initial 
requirement that the judicial officers of the Family Court retire earlier than their 
colleagues in the Federal Court of Australia may have been well intended, but with 
hindsight we may observe that it is undesirable for the members of superior courts 
of record in the same jurisdiction to be subject to different arrangements as to 
tenure.330 
 
It appears less problematic to apply different age limits to the mandatory retirement 
of judicial officers who are serving at different court levels in the same jurisdiction. 
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Where the differentiation aims to respond to the distinctive load and nature of the 
work of the respective courts, then this is may provide reasonable grounds to resist 
calls for uniformity. Those grounds focus upon the benefits of a younger judiciary 
determining matters of fact that may depend on prevailing social standards or the 
existence of new and emerging technologies, working more quickly and responsively 
to the large caseloads of lower courts, and having a reduced likelihood of physical 
impairments that would diminish the judicial capacity necessary to the conduct of 
effective and fair trials. A lower retirement age will also open up opportunities for 
younger talented members of the legal profession, and in so doing may present the 
possibility of enhancing the diversity of the judiciary.  
 
These arguments are not without merit. It is not necessary for present purposes to 
determine whether they amount to a positive case for differentiating the age limits 
imposed on judicial service in different courts of the one jurisdiction. In any case, it 
may be simply too late for that. While only two Australian jurisdictions presently 
apply a younger age limit of 65 years to the tenure of Magistrates, at the start of this 
decade there were five that did so. In 2010, Queensland, followed by South Australia 
and the Northern Territory in 2013, raised the mandatory retirement age of their 
Magistrates to 70 years.331 
 
Despite a lack of any express acknowledgement accompanying these legislative 
changes, it seems significant that in all three jurisdictions the raising of the age limit 
has effectively closed the gap between the retirement age and the age up to which 
retired Magistrates might be retained as Temporary Judicial Officers, which remains 
capped at 70 years. The appointment of Temporary Judicial Officers in those courts 
is still possible but with judicial officers no longer forced to retire at age 65, we might 
presume that reliance on such appointments has reduced. Of course this need not 
be the case if a substantial number of Magistrates choose to retire before reaching 
the mandatory age limit and then return to serve as Temporary Judicial Officers. 
There is some evidence that this is occurring in Figures 4.4.2 and 4.7.2 of this Report. 
These indicate, respectively, the ratio of Temporary Judicial Officers to Permanent 
Judicial Officers in the Magistrates Courts and the average age of Temporary Judicial 
Officers. Jurisdictions that have closed the gap between the mandatory retirement 
age and the age limit of Temporary Judicial Officers evidently do still find persons to 
appoint in the latter capacity.  
 
While the move clearly seems to be away from the application of a two-tier or multi-
tier set of age limits to judicial tenure within a jurisdiction, reasonable arguments 
may be mounted to justify a continued absence of uniformity in this respect. 
Significantly, if a two-tier or multi-tier approach were thought desirable, it need not 
require a reduction in the mandatory retirement age in lower courts, say to 65 years. 
Instead, it could be achieved by maintaining the present mandatory retirement age 
in lower courts, say at 70 or 72 years, while increasing the mandatory retirement age 
in superior courts to 72 or 75. 
 
6.2.2 Between jurisdictions 
 
As already noted, one of the justifications for the constitutional amendment of s 72 
of the Commonwealth Constitution was so that the tenure of Commonwealth judicial 
officers would align with that of their state and territory counterparts. This extended 
to the selection of 70 years as the age limit for this purpose, based on prevailing state 
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practice. In short, ‘the desire for uniformity in state and federal practice was 
conspicuous’.332  
 
Yet national consistency on the age limit for judicial service has proved elusive. 
Leaving to one side the continued use of a lower age limit in respect of the magistracy 
in Western Australia and the ACT, since the 1977 referendum both New South Wales 
and Tasmania have increased the age of mandatory retirement for all their judicial 
officers from 70 to 72 years.333 This is a path down which the Commonwealth is 
constitutionally prevented from going, although the other states and territories face 
no similar obstacle. 
 
The significance of the constitutional constraint placed upon the Commonwealth by 
s 72 of the Commonwealth Constitution is that any completely nationally consistent 
age limit, applying to every judge from the High Court down, must necessarily, at the 
present time, be set at 70 years of age. Excluding the Justices of the High Court in 
an attempt to work around that limitation would not materially assist any effort to 
otherwise achieve national consistency on mandatory retirement. As s 72 stipulates 
that 70 years is the maximum age for judicial service in the other federal courts, then 
only that age or younger could be selected as the limit for a uniform scheme.334 But 
since the age of 70, the most common age limit across the country, is itself now seen 
by many as too young, it is difficult to imagine that a move toward a nationally 
consistent age limit would see a lower age of mandatory retirement.  
 
In other words, absent constitutional amendment, a conversation about a nationally 
consistent judicial retirement age must take 70 years as the limiting age. Given that 
the Senate Committee did not urge a federal referendum to alter s 72 as a matter of 
priority, so much appears to have been implicit when it recommended ‘that all 
jurisdictions set a nationally consistent compulsory retirement age for judicial officers 
and encourages each jurisdiction to implement it within the next 4 years’.335 There 
was a certain irony in this recommendation in light of the sympathy expressed by the 
Senate Committee to those submissions it received which said the Commonwealth 
age limit of 70 years is too young. 
 
The achievement of a nationally consistent mandatory retirement age would thus 
require New South Wales and Tasmania to lower their age limit from 72 back to 70, 
and for Western Australia and the ACT to increase their age limit for magistrates from 
65 to 70. The Senate Committee’s report does not provide them with any clear and 
attractive reason for doing so. Additionally, under the current arrangements in New 
South Wales and Tasmania (which may be distinguished from those in Victoria and 
Queensland in this regard), employment as a Temporary Judicial Officer does not 
suspend payment of a judicial pension – the Temporary Judicial Officer receives both. 
Accordingly, there is an obvious economic disincentive to New South Wales and 
Tasmania in having judicial officers move from the payroll to the pension two years 
earlier, whereupon their services may be retained by additionally paying them to sit 
as Temporary Judicial Officers. 
 
In 2008, the New South Wales Attorney-General, John Hatzistergos, successfully 
resisted the efforts of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General to settle upon a 
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nationally consistent age limit to judicial service, including that performed by 
Temporary Judicial Officers. In addition to revealing that he actually did not ‘accept 
the view that you reach a use-by date in the law’, Hatzistergos said he would not ‘go 
along with uniformity just for the sake of it’.336  
 
The calls for a ‘nationally consistent’ mandatory judicial retirement age are rarely 
clear on the rationale behind that objective. The recommendation to this end in the 
2009 Senate Committee report was not the result of any dedicated discussion of the 
issue beyond a single sentence that said ‘in determining an appropriate compulsory 
retirement age, the committee encourages jurisdictions to consider the merit of 
achieving national consistency’.337 The ALRC raised national consistency as the 
‘minimum’ issue to be considered by the independent inquiry that it recommended 
be established to look at ‘alternatives to compulsory retirement ages’.338 It was clear 
that the use of age limits of any kind was its central concern. 
 
The submission made by the South Australian government to that ALRC inquiry may 
supply the best answer to why a uniform mandatory judicial retirement age is 
warranted. After noting the various ‘discrepancies’ in age limits across the country, 
it also called for national consistency saying, ‘Although these legislative provisions 
only affect a small number of employees, they may have important implications in 
symbolically representing the capacity of people to work competently until they are 
of a certain age’.339 Given that this sentence followed an apparent acceptance of 
mandatory judicial retirement, it may be taken as a more precise concern that a lack 
of national consistency may send mixed messages to the public about the age at 
which judicial officers have the necessary capacity. To put the matter crudely, if 
federal judicial officers and those serving in the majority of state and territory 
jurisdictions must retire upon reaching 70 years of age, what is the implication of 
this for the public’s perception as to the capacity of those other judges allowed to 
remain in office until reaching some higher age? 
 
The use of Temporary Judicial Officers in many jurisdictions means that there is far 
from a sharp picture conveyed about the cap on judicial service, since some of those 
officers are permitted to serve until age 78 or beyond (see Part 2.6).  Even if we take 
the age limits on Temporary Judicial Officers into account, the lack of consistency 
persists. It is arguable that public confidence in the courts would be better served by 
a uniform ceiling on any judicial appointment rather than a situation where cases 
may be heard in one jurisdiction by a judicial officer who would not, by reason of his 
or her age, be able to sit in another. But there are dangers in assuming too much as 
essential to public confidence in the courts. Without a clearer sense of the value of a 
nationally consistent mandatory judicial retirement age, reluctance by a state or 
territory to abandon its existing age limit to achieve uniformity is understandable. 
This is especially so in light of the readily appreciable benefits of extending judicial 
tenure beyond the constitutionally entrenched maximum of 70 years for the federal 
judiciary and yet it is to that limit that any project of national consistency is inevitably 
tethered absent constitutional change.  
 
Until such time as s 72 of the Commonwealth Constitution is amended either to 
stipulate a higher age limit upon the tenure of the federal judiciary or provide 
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legislative flexibility over the identification of that limit, the desire for a nationally 
consistent mandatory judicial retirement age is likely to be unfulfilled. 
 
It should be briefly noted that the application of differentiated age limits to judicial 
service across the court levels within a jurisdiction, discussed in the preceding 
section, is not inherently incompatible with the achievement of national consistency. 
A two-tier system of judicial age limits might be applied uniformly across all 
jurisdictions. This is within the legislative capacity of all jurisdictions since the 
Commonwealth Parliament may impose an age limit that is less than 70 years for 
federal courts other than the High Court of Australia. Thus there is no legislative 
impediment to the national adoption of the model that exists currently in Western 
Australia and the ACT by mandating the retirement of Magistrates at 65 years of 
age.340  
 
The political challenges of achieving national consistency must presumably increase 
if all jurisdictions are required to agree on more than a single mandatory retirement 
age for their respective courts. But by the same token, should the two jurisdictions 
currently applying two-tiered age limits on judicial tenure prove determined to retain 
that approach, then a strong desire for national uniformity could be met by the 
Commonwealth, the other states and the Northern Territory deciding to do the same. 
As the earlier discussion illustrated there are reasonable justifications for two-tiered 
age limits within a jurisdiction. However, the fact that three jurisdictions have only 
recently discarded the use of a lower age limit for determining the tenure of their 
Magistrates and brought these judicial officers into alignment with their senior 
judiciary, as well as all federal judicial officers, suggests that a nationally consistent 
two-tier system is an unlikely development for the foreseeable future.    
 
Finally, the existence of broader arguments against national uniformity of any kind 
in the use of judicial age limits should be acknowledged. These include a repetition 
of the case against mandatory judicial retirement generally on the basis that it is age 
discrimination and a crude means of addressing concerns about judicial capacity 
that results in a premature loss of talent in many individual cases. Additionally, the 
value of experimentation and diversity of approaches is not to be lightly set aside, 
and is often claimed to be one of the great strengths of a federal system of government. 
  
6.3 Impact on use and availability of Temporary Judicial Officers 
 
The impact of a nationally uniform mandatory judicial retirement age upon the use 
and availability of Temporary Judicial Officers would depend greatly on the age limit 
that was applied.  
 
The different age caps imposed on the service of Temporary Judicial Officers in 
Australia were detailed in Part 2.6 (although it should be recalled that an age limit is 
not applied in respect of all courts in all jurisdictions). The highest age limit was 78 
years for all Temporary Judicial Officers in Victoria and for Supreme Court and 
District Court Temporary Judicial Officers in Queensland. If a nationally uniform 
mandatory judicial retirement age of, say, 75, were introduced then this would 
considerably narrow the window between the compulsory retirement age of a 
Permanent Judicial Officer (currently 70 years in both those states) and the limit on 
service of Temporary Judicial Officers. It might be expected that the number of 
Temporary Judicial Officers appointed in order to serve an additional three years (76–
78), as opposed to eight years (71–78) would be reduced. However, a corollary of the 
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reduction in the supply of Temporary Judicial Officers is that the demand for such 
officers would also decrease because the length of service of Permanent Judicial 
Officers would expand as the age bar is raised. In other jurisdictions, where the age 
limit upon Temporary Judicial Officers is at or below 75 years (an example of the 
former is the Northern Territory), a new uniform mandatory retirement age of 75 
would obviously eliminate any gap between the two and presumably would result in 
the curtailment of temporary appointments.341  
 
Given that earlier discussion has suggested that the constitutional entrenchment of 
the mandatory judicial retirement age at the Commonwealth level means that 70 
years is the most likely age limit to be used as a national standard, it is worth 
reflecting on what that might mean for the use and availability of Temporary Judicial 
Officers. But the answer is not greatly different from existing arrangements. 
Assuming a single mandatory judicial retirement age is adopted (rather than a two-
tier approach), then there would be only two distinct effects worth noting. Both would 
affect only future appointments to the bench and, given the average length of periods 
of judicial service of 15-20 years,342 the impact of such a change would not be fully 
appreciable for some time. 
 
First, in Western Australia and the ACT, Magistrates would be able to serve for an 
extra five years in a permanent capacity, thus eliminating any gap between the 
mandatory judicial retirement age and the cap on service as a Temporary Judicial 
Officer. This would, as already discussed in Part 6.2.1 above, presumably reduce 
reliance on Temporary Judicial Officers in the Magistrates Court of those two 
jurisdictions.  
 
Secondly, in New South Wales and Tasmania, the mandatory judicial retirement age 
would be reduced by two years from 72 to 70 for all judicial officers. This would 
expand the window in which persons required to retire from permanent judicial 
service on the courts of those two states are available to return to the bench as a 
Temporary Judicial Officer (in New South Wales until age 77).343 However, without 
some further amendment of the relevant provisions, the lower mandatory judicial 
retirement age will not lead to longer periods of service by Temporary Judicial Officers 
in that jurisdiction since their commission is presently expressed to be ‘for a time not 
exceeding 5 years’.344 
 
Tasmania does not explicitly provide a mandatory statutory retirement age for 
Temporary Judicial Officers in any of its courts. Thus the lowering of the mandatory 
judicial retirement age to 70 in order to achieve national consistency might increase 
the use of Temporary Judicial Officers, to offset the earlier departure of Permanent 
Judicial Officers from the bench. However, as shown in Figure 4.3.2, Tasmania’s 
recent use of Temporary Judicial Officers is minimal compared to other jurisdictions, 
and a small downward adjustment in retirement age may have little practical impact. 
                                           
341 It need not result in a complete end to such appointments in these jurisdictions since 
Permanent Judicial Officers may, of course, retire before attaining the mandatory 
retirement age and then return to the bench by appointment as a Temporary Judicial 
Officer. In some jurisdictions provisions currently exist that have this operation; that is, 
they do not countenance the service of Temporary Judicial Officers exceeding beyond 
the age limit imposed upon Permanent Judicial Officers (e.g. Supreme Court Act 1935 
(WA), s 11, in conjunction with Judges’ Retirement Act 1937 (WA), s 3, regarding Acting 
Judicial Officers). 
342 See Opeskin, above n 168, 645-46 and, more generally, Opeskin, above n 275, 34-39,   
343 Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 37(4) and (4A). 
344 Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 37(1). This replaced the earlier use of commissions of 
up to a maximum of 12 months only: Courts and Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 
2015 (NSW), Sch 3.8.  
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Overall, it is difficult to see that the introduction of a nationally consistent mandatory 
judicial retirement age set at the age of 70 years would have a marked effect on the 
use and availability of Temporary Judicial Officers. 
 
A more significant change would be the establishment of a nationally consistent age 
limit applied to the use of Temporary Judicial Officers by all states and territories. 
This would have two related effects, which would be felt with little delay given the 
short terms for which Temporary Judicial Officers serve. First, a uniform age limit 
would either extend or curtail those that are presently applied across the various 
Australian jurisdictions regarding the service of Temporary Judicial Officers. 
Depending on what age was selected – but it would presumably be higher than 70 
years – some jurisdictions would have an enhanced capacity to engage Temporary 
Judicial Officers while others would have a diminished capacity to do so. 
 
Second, uniformity in this respect may be expected to diminish the ability of some 
jurisdictions to attract and appoint retired judicial officers from elsewhere. When 
explaining his resistance to ‘uniformity just for the sake of it’, New South Wales 
Attorney-General John Hatzistergos insisted that the higher age limit on Temporary 
Judicial Officers in his state meant that he was ‘taking national talent and utilising 
it in NSW’.345 The age limits in other jurisdictions – both on mandatory judicial 
retirement from permanent service and also as applied to temporary commissions – 
meant there was a pool of judicial talent available for New South Wales to access. 
Shortly after those statements, the New South Wales Attorney-General raised the age 
limit on Temporary Judicial Officers in that state from 75 to 77 years.346 With an age 
limit now of 78 years on service as a Temporary Judicial Officer in Victoria and the 
Supreme Court and District Courts of Queensland, the distinct advantage that New 
South Wales previously enjoyed in this respect has been lost.  
                                           
345 Pelly, above n 336. 
346 Courts and Crimes Legislation Further Amendment Act 2008 (NSW), Sch 26.  
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Schedule 1: Temporary Judicial Officers: Table of Legislation 
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Schedule 2: Judicial Survey Data 
 
A Perspectives on Acting Judges 
 
(See Report at 3.2) 
 
The authors of this Report conducted a survey of sitting judicial officers across 
Australia in 2016.347 Respondents were asked about a number of ‘challenges’ facing 
the modern judiciary. They were asked the extent to which they agreed that 13 
specified issues were ‘challenges confronting the judiciary’ in their jurisdiction. 
Participants were asked to respond to the various questions by indicating on a five-
point Likert scale the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the statement. 
The available responses were: strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, and strongly 
disagree. In each case there was also an opportunity to contribute open comments. 
 
Three survey questions are relevant to the issue of Temporary Judicial Officers 
considered in this Report. In the first of these, respondents were asked to indicate 
‘the extent to which you agree that the following are challenges confronting the 
judiciary in your jurisdiction: Use of Acting judicial officers’. In the second, 
respondents were asked to indicate ‘the extent to which you agree that post-
retirement age limits on the use of acting judicial officers are appropriate’. The 
responses received are considered below. 
 
Q4: Use of Acting Judicial Officers 
 
The responses to the proposition that the use of acting judges was a challenge 
showed that judicial opinions were mixed, but indicate that a significant percentage 
of judicial officers either agree or strongly agree that the use of acting judges 















                                           
347 The survey drew on the work of Jan van Zyl Smit, The Appointment, Tenure and Removal 
of Judges under Commonwealth Principles: A Compendium and Analysis of Best Practice 
(Report of Research Undertaken by Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law), July 2015. 
Participants were asked what they considered to be the most pressing challenges that 
face the various levels of the Australian judiciary, and whether the current regulatory 
and support environment achieves international best practice. The surveys were 
circulated to judicial officers with the consent of their Heads of Jurisdiction. 
Participants were invited to return the survey in hard copy or electronic form. Hard 
copies were transcribed into electronic form to facilitate data analysis. 142 responses 
were received from a total population of around 1200 judicial officers.  
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Of the 142 respondents, 29% either disagreed or strongly disagreed that this is a 
challenge, 37% indicated neutrality and 34% agreed or strongly agreed. These 
responses, together with the comments associated with this question, support the 
proposition that arguments can be marshalled both in favour and against the use of 
acting judges, but there is some disquiet among judicial officers surveyed about the 
appropriateness of the current approach. 
 
The data indicate that two demographic factors can be correlated with different 
responses: gender and level of court. Female respondents were slightly more likely to 
indicate that the use of acting judges was a challenge.  By court level, those 
respondents from superior courts (the Supreme, Federal and Family Courts, n=34) 
were more likely not to see the use of acting judges as a challenge when compared 
with those respondents appointed to either the lower courts (Magistrates, Local, 
n=48) or the intermediate courts (District, County, Federal Circuit, n=48). This might 
be partly explained by the fact that federal judges (including those in the Federal 
Court and Family Court) are not exposed to temporary judicial appointments due to 
the constitutional prohibition on such appointments. 
 
Comments indicated that the predominant advantage of using acting judges was that 
they provided assistance with the management of workload demands. Typical 
comments were: 
 
As the appointment of acting judicial officers are made from the ranks of 
recently retired judicial officers the usual concerns about tailoring outcomes 
to ensure political favour is maintained does not occur. Without acting judicial 
officers, the efficient operation of the court during times of illness and the 
provision of out of hours services would be compromised.348 
 
They are a necessity given work-loads.349 
 
                                           
348 Magistrates/Local; 15-19 years. 
349 Magistrates/Local; 5-9 years. 
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Appropriately qualified judicial officers, such as those recently retired allow 
Judicial administrators to more efficiently manage lists and circuits.350 
 
Appointment of appropriate acting judicial officers may be an efficient way to 
deal with case backlogs.351 
 
For another respondent the opportunity to ‘try before you buy’ was appealing: 
 
Trialling proposed new appointees for say 3 months is similarly not 
objectionable. Both the Court and appointees should have the opportunity for 
an obligation free fixed term trial.352  
 
A number of negative responses were focused on the threat to independence that was 
seen as accompanying temporary appointments: 
 
Easily perceived as not independent and not part of the body of permanent 
judicial officers....also golf or surfing 3-4 days a week and one day work and to 
ensure full days salary string out the hearing of cases or get part heard to 
ensure more work.353 
 
It is of concern when Acting JO's are used in substitute for permanent 
appointments. I am also concerned that acting appointments are subject to 
renewal at the instance of the AG and also the head of the court and this is a 
problem in terms of any potential impact upon independence of decision 
making.354  
 
An anathema to the independence of the judiciary.355 
 
They may feel constrained, because of lack of tenure, in acting entirely 
independently.356 
 
The State Government has been making use of Acting Magistrates over the 
past 5 years, instead of appointing additional magistrates. That has enabled 
the AG to select retiring magistrates whose approach, particularly to 
sentencing is consistent with the Government's law and order agenda. At a 
time when magistrates have been forced to retire on their 65th birthday certain 
favoured retiring magistrates have been appointed as Acting magistrates up to 
their 70th birthday, whilst others who would like to continue working have not 
received such a commission.357 
 
Others noted the impact of drawing on the banks of retired judges: 
  
There is some discussion, maybe even concern about the number of retired 
appeal judges returning to the Court of Appeal. Given the small number of 
appeal judges, and the capacity of a small number of them to exercise a 
disproportionate influence on appellate decisions, there is concern about the 
                                           
350 District/County/Federal Circuit; 25+ years. 
351 District/County/Federal Circuit; 10-14 years. 
352 District/County/Federal Circuit; 25+ years. 
353 Level of Court not provided; Length of service not provided. 
354 Magistrates/Local; 15-19 years. 
355 District/County/Federal Circuit; 0-4 years 
356 Magistrates/Local; 5-9 years. 
357 Magistrates/Local; 10-14 years. 
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lack of renewal usually provided for by retirement. This is compounded by the 
8-year window post retirement for appointment as an acting judge.358 
 
I am not persuaded that circumventing the retirement age but having retired 
judges come back as acting judges is a good idea. It tends to perpetuate the 
lack of diversity and it does not encourage generational change in our 
courts.359 
 
A few responses demonstrated empathy for the acting judges and indicated that 
drawing on acting judges could raise concerns about the degree to which such judges 
were being appropriately managed and supported: 
 
Ok provided that they are given the same resources such as bench books. Lap 
tops etc to keep them up to date with the changes in the law.360 
 
It’s unfair of the gov [sic] to appoint acting Judgers [sic] 5 or 6 times and then 
not appoint them to the position.361 
 
Subject to continuity of work to keep up to date.362 
 
Q21: Post-retirement age limits on the use of acting judicial officers 
 
The second relevant question asked respondents to indicate ‘the extent to which you 
agree that post-retirement age limits on the use of acting judicial officers are 
appropriate’. The response was largely positive and indicates a majority of those who 
responded (n=135) either agree or strongly agree that the existing framework is 
appropriate (64%), or are neutral (18%). Some 19% have concerns about the 
appropriateness of the post-retirement age limits. 
 




                                           
358 District/County/Federal Circuit; 10-14 years. 
359 Supreme/Federal/Family; 0-4 years. 
360 Magistrates/Local; 15-19 years. 
361 District/County/Federal Circuit; 5-9 years. 
362 Magistrates/Local; 25+ years. 
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The main thrust of the comments focussed on capacity: 
 
There are some judges who need to retire early while others are forced to retire 
when they are still perfectly capable. A good experienced competent judge is a 
really valuable asset and as long as appropriate capacity checks are in place I 
don't see the need for an age limit. People are far more healthy and vigorous 
than in the past so expecting a person to be less able at a particular age is not 
necessarily a reliable indicator. In the community generally people are 
expected to work longer, the age pension is expected to be lifted to 70 years, 
which although not totally on all fours with my argument, there is no reason 
why people's increased capacity to work to a later stage should not be reflected 
among judges.363 
 
Providing they are properly resourced and have physical and mental capacity 
commensurate with performing the task allocated.364 
 
One respondent noted that capacity problems could be easier to manage in the 
context of an acting appointment: 
 
As the positions are acting only, there can be more discretion and an easier 
termination if a person is no longer acute enough to fill the role.365 
 
B Perspectives on Capacity Testing 
 
(See Report at 5.35) 
 
Judicial officers were asked to ‘indicate the extent to which you agree it would be 
appropriate for judicial officers to be asked to undergo capacity checks at the request 
of a Head of Jurisdiction or a relevant body constituted by judges’. Their responses 
are illustrated in Figure S2.3. 
 




                                           
363 District/County/Federal Circuit; 10-14 years. 
364 Magistrates/Local; 15-19 years. 
365 District/County/Federal Circuit; 15-19 years. 
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Of the 135 respondents, just 12% expressed any form of disagreement, while 11% 
were neutral on the question. Those in agreement constituted 77% of respondents 
with 56% selecting ‘agree’ and 21% selecting ‘strongly agree’. These responses, 
together with the comments associated with this question, support the proposition 
that there is little disquiet amongst the judiciary about the prospect of requests for 
capacity testing.  
 
With such a significant percentage of respondents expressing agreement with the 
proposition, it is difficult to identify a clear correlation between particular 
demographic factors and different responses. But some points are worth noting 
regarding gender, length of service and level of court. First, responses were virtually 
indistinguishable on the basis of gender. Second, the longer respondents had served 
as judicial officers, the more likely they were to agree with the proposition, i.e. the 
more favourably they were disposed to capacity testing. Of the 15 respondents who 
had served 20 or more years, none expressed disagreement and only one was neutral. 
Third, as a proportion of their responses, judicial officers from the superior courts 
(the Supreme, Federal and Family Courts, n=34) had a higher level of agreement 
relative to disagreement or neutrality than respondents from the other court levels.  
 
Comments in favour indicated that, although rare, the problem of judicial officers 
serving while at less than full capacity was not a theoretical one and a better response 
system was required. The more pointed comments included: 
 
This is a very vexed issue and would require extraordinary sensitivity and 
safeguards, but the reality is that every head of jurisdiction would say that 
most of their "pastoral" time with members of their court is taken up with a 
small number and the rest just get on with the job. I think that there is much 
more understanding of depression and other debilitating health issues and 
certainly my experience is that if the individual asks for help it will be given 
generously and without judgment. The problem is the judicial officer who has 
problems (which are reflected adversely in her work) and they are not prepared 
to seek help. It is then that I think that the head of jurisdiction (perhaps after 
consulting senior colleagues) should have the capacity to compel such tests.366  
 
These should be required annually from 70 with a system for removal for 
incapacity which did not involve the parliament.367 
 
Although comparatively rare, senile judges present real problems. The 
existence of a formalised structure would make it easier to deal with.368 
 
Several responses emphasized the importance of any such power of request to be 
accompanied by ‘safeguards’369  or ‘a proper and fair procedure’.370  
 
Very few of those who gave a response indicating disagreement or neutrality also 
made a comment. A few of those respondents who did comment simply indicated a 
lack of certainty as to what was meant by ‘capacity testing’. 
 
 
                                           
366 District/County/Federal Circuit; 20-24 years. 
367 Supreme/Federal/Family; 0-4 years. 
368 Supreme/Federal/Family; 5-9 years. 
369 Magistrates/Local; 10-14 years. 
370 District/County/Federal Circuit; 10-14 years. 
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C Perspectives on Mandatory Retirement Ages 
 
(see Report at Part 6) 
 
Judicial officers were asked two questions about mandatory judicial retirement ages. 
The first was to ‘indicate whether or not you think there should be a mandatory 
retirement age for judicial officers’. Those who selected ‘Yes’ for that question were 
then asked to ‘indicate at what age retirement from the judiciary should be 
mandated’.  
 
Use of an age limit 
 
Of the 135 respondents, 9% (n=12) gave ‘No’ as their answer to the use of a 
mandatory judicial retirement age, representing overwhelming support amongst the 
judiciary for the current system of age limits determining judicial service in all 
Australian jurisdictions. There was no facility to make a comment in respect of this 
question. 
 





Age of Retirement 
 
There were 126 responses to the follow up question asking for an indication of the 
age at which retirement should be mandated. Excluding outlier ages of 60, 65, 68 
(n=1), 78 and 80, there were three ages that received substantial support for 
mandatory retirement: 70 (41%, n=56), 72 (17%, n=22) and 75 (25%, n=32). A small 
number of respondents (6%, n=7) indicated age ranges, such as 70–72 or 70–75 
years, which are indicated in Figure S2.5 as ‘Other’. 
 
As New South Wales and Tasmania currently use an age limit of 72 years, one might 
have expected this to be somehow discernible in a jurisdictional breakdown of the 
results. Interestingly, of the 32 respondents from New South Wales, only 8 favoured 
the existing age limit, while 9 favoured 70 years and 13 favoured 75 years. Only three 
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judicial officers from Tasmania responded to this question, two favouring that state’s 
existing retirement age limit of 72 years and one preferring 75 years. 
 




Few respondents commented on this question, but a sample includes: 
 
I think 70 works well. The legal profession is cumulative in terms of knowledge 
and experience and I think many people do their best work in their 50's and 
60's. 371 
 
I believe 70 is about right. I would make an exception for the High Court of 
75.372  
 
Around 70 is acceptable as long as service for at least 10 years is also a 
criterion eg to receive a full pension.373  
 
One comment addressed the point made in Part 6 of this Report about the need for 
two age limits upon judicial service, namely 72 years for Permanent Judicial Officers 
and 75 years for acting appointments.374 
 
  
                                           
371 Supreme/Federal/Family; 0-4 years. 
372 Supreme/Federal/Family; 15-19 years. 
373 Supreme/Federal/Family; 10-14 years. 
374 District/County/Federal Circuit; 25+ years. 
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Schedule 3  Temporary Judicial Officers in Overseas Jurisdictions 
 




Supreme Court Act 2003 (NZ) (‘SCA’) 
Judicature Act 1908 (NZ) (‘JA’) 




In New Zealand, Temporary Judicial Officers (TJOs) may be appointed to the 
Supreme Court, the High Court and District Courts. There is, however, no provision 
for the appointment of TJOs to the Court of Appeal. There are two types of TJOs in 
the New Zealand court system: ‘acting’ judicial officers (SCA s 23; JA s 11A; DCA s 
10A) and ‘temporary’ judicial officers (JA s 11; DCA s 10). In short, ‘acting’ judicial 
officers are retired judges who are appointed for a two year period after their 
retirement to meet specific needs and work only when called to do so by the Supreme 
Court Chief Justice, Chief High Court Judge, or Chief District Court Judge. 
Consequently, they are paid only for the time that they actually work within their 
period of appointment. In contrast, ‘temporary’ judicial officers are appointed for a 
short period of time for a temporary purpose. This is a full-time position and those 
serving are paid for the entire period of service on the same basis as full-time judges. 
Both retired judges and practitioners who meet the general eligibility requirements 
for judicial appointment may be commissioned as ‘temporary’ judicial officers. The 
New Zealand Law Commission has noted that the provisions dealing with TJOs ‘lack 
consistency’.375 
 
In 2008, Professor Michael Taggart explained the principal reasons for the use of 
TJOs in New Zealand. He cited the small size of the New Zealand Supreme Court (5 
judges), the requirement to sit en banc (a 5 judge quorum), and the small size of New 
Zealand society, which makes conflicts of interests more likely.376 These factors make 
it difficult to hold a full quorum of permanent judges in all cases, necessitating a 
roster of retired Court of Appeal and Supreme Court judges. Additionally, for lower 
courts, the number of permanent appointments is limited by statutory provisions 
that place a constraint on the ability of the executive to appoint permanent judges 
(JA s 4(1)(b); DCA 5(2)).  
 
In the courts that permit the appointment of TJOs, appointment is formally made by 
the Governor-General. Nonetheless, the justification and procedure for appointment 
differs according to whether the position being appointed is that of an ‘acting’ or 
‘temporary’ judicial officer. Persons, including retired Judges, may be appointed in 
the latter role to the High Court and District Courts to cover the ‘illness or absence 
of any Judge, or for any temporary purpose’ (JA s 11(1); DCA s 10(1)). In contrast, 
the Governor-General does not require any reason to appoint a retired judicial officer 
to be an ‘acting’ judge of the Supreme Court, High Court, or District Courts. This is 
because a distinction is made between appointment and service. For example, 
despite being appointed by the Governor-General, an ‘acting’ judicial officer may only 
                                           
375 New Zealand Law Commission, Review of the Judicature Act 1908: Towards a New 
Courts Act (Report 126, 2012) 78 [7.13]. 
376 Michael Taggart, ‘Acting Judges and the Supreme Court of New Zealand’ (2008) 14 
Canterbury Law Review 217. 
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act as a member of the Supreme Court upon the Attorney-General receiving a 
certificate signed by the Chief Justice and at least two other permanent Judges of 
the Court stating that, in their opinion, it is necessary for the proper conduct of the 
Court’s business for the retired judicial officer to be authorised to act as a member 
of the Court (SCA s 23(6)). This is only provided where the Chief Justice is satisfied 
that a vacancy exists, or a Judge is unable to hear proceedings (SCA s 23(5)). 
Likewise, a retired judge appointed as an ‘acting’ judicial officer to the High Court or 
District Court, may only act ‘during such period or periods only and in such place or 
places only as the’ Chief High Court Judge or Chief District Court Judge may 
determine (JA s 11A(2); DCA s 10A(4)).  
 
In New Zealand, eligibility for appointment as a TJO is tied to mandatory retirement 
age (set at 70 years of age: JA s 13, DCA s 7(2)) as well as terms of office, and differs 
across the judicial hierarchy. Acting appointments to the Supreme Court are limited 
to retired Judges of that Court or the Court of Appeal, who have not reached the age 
of 75 years (SCA s 23(1)). An acting judge of the Supreme Court may only be 
appointed for a period not exceeding 24 months, and cannot serve beyond 75 years 
of age (SCA s 23(2)). The Act does not mention reappointment, but in practice, acting 
Supreme Court judges have been reappointed after their 24-month period has 
ended.377 For the High Court, persons appointed to serve as a ‘temporary’ judicial 
officer may do so for a term not exceeding 12 months (JA s 11(1)). He or she may be 
reappointed, but may not hold office for more than 2 years in the aggregate (JA s 
11(2)). Only retired judges may be appointed as ‘acting’ judicial officers and this is 
for a ‘term not exceeding 2 years or, if the former Judge has attained the age of 72 
years, not exceeding 1 year, as the Governor-General may specify’ (JA s 11A(1)). 
Although the Act does not mention whether ‘acting’ judicial officers may be 
reappointed, this was held to be the case in R v Te Kahu (CA 492/04, 28 September 
2005), and in practice this has occurred.378 Appointment as a ‘temporary’ judge to 
the District Court is open to persons eligible for appointment as a permanent judge 
of that Court, including persons who have reached the mandatory retirement age 
(DCA s 10(2)). A person so appointed may serve for a period not exceeding 12 months, 
or for 2 or more periods not exceeding 4 years in the aggregate (DCA s 10(2)). Similarly 
to the High Court, only retired judges may be appointed as ‘acting’ judges on the 
District Court (DCA s 10A(1)). Each appointment is for a term not exceeding 2 years 
or, if the person has attained the age of 72 years, not exceeding 12 months (DCA s 
10A(3)).   
 
All TJOs are to be paid at the same rate as a permanent judge of the court on which 
the officer serves. However, under the distinction drawn between ‘acting’ and 
‘temporary’ judicial officers, those retired judges who serve as ‘acting’ judicial officers 
are paid a salary only for the days on which the officer serves as a member of the 
court, not the whole appointment (SCA s 23(8); JA s 11A(3); DCA s 10A(5)). 
Conversely, persons appointed as ‘temporary’ judicial officers are paid for the entirety 
of their period of appointment: JCA s 11(3); DCA s 10(1). 
                                           
377 See e.g. reappointment of the Honourable Noel Crossley Anderson, KNZM, retired Judge 
of the Supreme Court of New Zealand as an Acting Judge of the Supreme Court: New 
Zealand, Appointment of Acting Judge of the Supreme Court, Gazette No 70, 24 June 
2010, 2027; New Zealand, Appointment of Acting Judge of the Supreme Court, Gazette 
No 122, 4 October 2012, 3484.  
378 See e.g. reappointment of the Honourable Colin Maurice Nicholson an Acting Judge of 
the High Court for a term of one year: New Zealand, Appointment of Acting Judge of the 
High Court, Gazette No 60, 27 May 2004, 1440; New Zealand, Appointment of Acting 
Judge of the High Court, Gazette No 91, 16 June 2005, 2137.  
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No statute refers to pension arrangements or whether a TJO may perform outside 
work. As ‘temporary’ judicial officers are employed on a full-time basis, it is likely 
that the same rules as for Permanent Judicial Officers are in force. Conversely, as 
retired judicial officers are only paid for the period that they actually work as ‘acting’ 
judicial officers, different rules may apply. 
 




Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (c. 4) (‘CRA’) 
Courts Act 1971 (c. 23) (‘CA’) 
Judiciary and Courts (Scotland) Act 2008 (‘JC(S)A’) 




In the United Kingdom, TJOs may be appointed to the Supreme Court, the Crown 
Court, the High Court, and the Scottish Courts. The use of TJOs on the Supreme 
Court is governed by CRA ss 38-9. Under s 38(1), the President of the Court is 
empowered to request the service of a TJO, drawn from two categories of people. The 
first is any person serving as a ‘senior territorial judge’, defined as a judge of the 
Court of Appeal of England and Wales, the Inner House of the Court of Session, or 
the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland (unless the Judge holds that office only by 
virtue of being a puisne judge of the High Court in Northern Ireland) (CRA, s 38(8)). 
The second category consists of members of the supplementary panel established 
under s 39. Membership of the supplementary panel is restricted to Supreme Court 
justices and territorial judges (CRA, s 39(4)) who have retired from judicial service 
within the past five years and are younger than 75 years of age (CRA, s 39(9)). The 
mandatory retirement age for Permanent Judicial Officers is 70 years of age (JPRA, 
s 26(1)). A person ceases to be a member of the supplementary panel upon exceeding 
either of those caps, whichever is first. Appointment is made only after the President 
of the Court gives the Lord Chancellor notice in writing (CRA, s 39(4)). As at 6 
January 2017, there are four retired Justices on the supplementary list.379 
 
The remuneration and allowances of TJOs on the Supreme Court are determined by 
the Lord Chancellor with the agreement of the Treasury (CRA, s 38(7)). Service as a 
TJO is not treated as judicial service for the purposes of pension arrangements (CRA, 
s 38(6)). The CRA does not indicate whether a TJO on the Supreme Court may 
perform outside work. However, as s 38(4) provides that TJOs are ‘to be treated for 
all purposes as a judge of the Supreme Court’ subject to appointment, retirement, 
removal, disqualification, tenure, remuneration, allowances, and pension (CRA, s 
38(5)), it is likely that the same arrangements for Permanent Judicial Officers are in 
force. These are found in the Supreme Court’s Guide to Judicial Conduct, and permit 
a limited range of activities that do not interfere with the performance of their judicial 
duties or are inconsistent with perceived impartiality and neutrality.380  
 
Recorders are part-time judges of the Crown Court. Appointment is formally made 
by the Queen on recommendation of the Lord Chancellor, subject to approval by the 
Judicial Appointments Commission (CA, s 21(1)). Eligibility is restricted to persons 
                                           
379 The Supreme Court, ‘Supplementary List’, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
<https://www.supremecourt.uk/about/supplementary-panel.html>.  
380 United Kingdom Supreme Court, Guide to Judicial Conduct (2009) 5.5-5.10.  
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of 7 years standing (CA, s 21(2)). A person holds office as a Recorder for five years. 
This term is usually automatically extended by the Lord Chancellor for further 
successive five-year terms.381 A person ceases to hold the office of Recorder at 70 
years of age, though the Lord Chancellor may authorise continuance in office up to 
age of 75 (CA, s 21(5)). Recorders are expected to sit between 3-6 weeks a year and 
are paid a daily fee determined by the Lord Chancellor, with the approval of the 
Minister for the Civil Service (CA, s 21(7)). Recorders are therefore permitted to 
continue to perform outside work including their bar practice. A Recorder requested 
to sit as a judge of the High Court is not treated as such for the purposes of pension 
arrangements (CA, s 23(3)(c)).  
 
TJOs, known as temporary sheriffs, are a feature of the Scottish Judiciary. They are 
used to cover for permanent officers who may be away from business on leave, 
attending training, or to meet additional workload that may arise from time to time.382 
TJOs may be appointed to the Court of Session (the supreme civil court) and the 
High Court of Justiciary (the supreme criminal court). In 2000, the European Court 
of Human Rights found the then office of temporary sheriffs incompatible with the 
European Convention on Human Rights. The Court held that the provisions 
providing one-year tenure and situating the power to recommend whether 
commissions should be renewed in the Lord Advocate, a member of the Scottish 
executive and the official responsible for all criminal prosecutions, was incompatible 
with the right of an accused to a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal 
under art 6 of the Convention.383 The system of temporary sheriffs has been 
substantially amended as a result, and has since been twice upheld as compatible 
with art 6 of the Convention.384  
 
In Scotland, TJOs are appointed by the executive for five years (JC(S)A, s 20B(4)) they 
are eligible for reappointment, and must retire when they reach the age of 70 (JC(S)A, 
s 20C(1)). An individual is eligible only if they are qualified for appoint as a permanent 
judge of the Court, and the executive has consulted the Lord President: (JC(S)A, s 
20B(3)). A TJO is paid at a rate determined by the executive, which may differ among 
individuals (JC(S)A, s 20G(1)-(2)). Service is not treated as judicial service for the 
purposes of a judicial pension (JC(S)A, s 20B(6)(b)). A TJO may perform outside work 
‘not inconsistent with the individual acting as a judge’ (JC(S)A, s 20B(7)). At the date 
of the last published list (9 November 2016), there were 21 TJOs appointed in 
Scotland.385 
 




28 U.S. Code § 371  
 
                                           
381 Judicial Office, ‘Recorder’, Courts and Tribunals Judiciary 
<https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/who-are-the-judiciary/judicial-
roles/judges/recorder/>.  
382 Lord President the Rt. Hon. Lord Gill, Guidance Note: The Office of Part-Time Sheriff 
(2013) 1 [4]. 
383 Starrs v Ruxton [2000] SLT 42.  
384 Clancy v Caird [2000] HRLR 557; Kearney v Her Majesty’s Advocate [2006] UKPC D1. 
385 Judicial Office for Scotland, ‘Temporary Judges—Expiry Dates for Current 
Commissions’ http://www.scotland-judiciary.org.uk/55/0/Temporary-Judges (6 
January 2017). 




At the federal level in the United States, TJOs operate in a distinct manner. Rather 
than appointing retired judicial officers for a renewable term, currently serving 
federal judges may adopt ‘senior status’, permitting them to work a reduced caseload. 
Senior status is detailed under 28 U.S.C. § 371. To be eligible for senior status, a 
judicial officer must satisfy an age and service requirement, known as the ‘rule of 80’ 
(28 U.S.C. § 371(c)). This means that the Judicial Officer’s age and years of service 
must sum to at least 80, examples of which are given in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Age and service requirement: 









To remain eligible, a judicial officer must be annually certified by the chief judge as 
having met at least one of the following criteria: 
 
1. Having carried, in the preceding calendar year, a caseload involving courtroom 
participation which is equal to or greater than the amount of similar work 
which an average judge in active service would perform in three months (28 
U.S.C. §371(e)(1)(a)). 
 
2. Having performed, in the preceding calendar year, substantial judicial duties 
not involving courtroom participation, but including settlement efforts, motion 
decisions, writing opinions in cases that have not been orally argued, and 
administrative duties for the court to which the justice or judge is assigned 
(28 U.S.C.§371(e)(1)(b)). 
 
3. Having performed substantial administrative duties, either directly relating to 
the operation of the courts, or for a Federal or State governmental entity (28 
U.S.C. §371(e)(1)(d)). 
 
However, 28 U.S.C. §371(e)(1)(e) provides that a judge not meeting these criteria may 
still be certified as being in senior status by the chief judge, provided that the judge 
did not meet those criteria ‘because of a temporary or permanent disability’. A senior 
judge may retire at any time.  
  
A judicial officer who takes senior service is entitled to draw a full salary (28 U.S.C. 
§ 371(a)), but does not receive a pension.  As a Judicial Officer who takes ‘full 
retirement’ is ordinarily entitled to a pension equal to the salary at the time of 
retirement, senior judges essentially provide volunteer service to the courts, but with 
the benefit of an office and staff. It is estimated that senior judges handle about 15 
per cent of the federal courts’ workload annually.386 A senior judge is considered a 
                                           
386 United States Courts, ‘FAQs: Federal Judges’ <http://www.uscourts.gov/faqs-federal-
judges#faq-What-is-a-senior-judge?>  
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